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by Vice Admiral

P. S. Das (Retired), Indian Navy

From a paper presented at the First Sri Lanka-India Strategic Dialogue jointly organised by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), New Delhi at Colombo, December 4-5, 2003.

The global security environment is no longer Euro-centric and the focus has shifted to the Asia-Pacific region. Seven of the ten largest countries of the world are located here as also four of the largest standing armies.

Almost all present and potential major powers viz. the USA, China, Russia, Japan and India have relevance to the geopolitics of this theatre. Economically, the APEC comprises nearly half of the world's economies; with India added, this figure would rise even further. In this scenario, it is inevitable that the sole superpower will remain engaged in this region.

The Indian Ocean

A brief overview of this ocean space is necessary. Nearly half of the world's seaborne commerce moves across the Indian Ocean. It is also interesting that while 75 percent of all shipped cargoes in the other two great oceans are moved between and to countries littoral to them, in the Indian Ocean, this same percentage goes to countries external to this region.

Navigating the Indian Ocean

Even more important, as much as 20 percent of this commerce consists of oil and gas, two extremely critical raw materials. Consequently, countries external to the Indian Ocean, and especially those with critical energy needs, have a natural interest in the geopolitics of the region.

For example, 70 percent of Japan's energy needs are imported from the Gulf and Korea is equally dependent. The USA imports 20 percent of its oil and gas from the Gulf and even China's imports exceed 50 million tons annually, a figure which is certain to increase greatly in the years to come.

Other critical raw materials such as coal and iron ore transit through the SLOCs of this ocean, consigned to countries in East Asia, and manufactured goods are brought to Asia and Africa from there.

Therefore, the entire Asia-Pacific region survives on the energy resources and trade moved through these waters which act as 'arteries' to the major economies. 40 percent of the world's annual production of oil comes from the Gulf which also has the greatest reserves.

These are very important strategic assets. What lies below the sea bed is still to be explored. These existing and potential assets lend great strategic significance to the Indian Ocean region.

India's specific concerns

India has some specific concerns in the Indian Ocean. More than 65 percent of our energy requirements are imported from the Gulf and this figure could rise to 75 percent in the next ten years.

Nearly 4,000 oil and gas tankers dock in Indian ports every year and their numbers will double by 2020. More than 48,000 square kilometers of our coastal waters are being exploited for offshore energy and this area will increase considerably as exploration of the presently untapped eastern waters gathers momentum.

The security of offshore oil areas, of the ships which bring energy imports and of ports which handle them, are critical to India's economic growth. To this should be added the fact that more than 97 per cent of India's overseas trade is carried in ships.

Safety of sea lanes is, therefore critical to our national interest. Narco-terrorism is another concern. Situated between two of the major narcotics producing centres of the world, India is affected by the drugs trade which ultimately supports terrorism.

It is well known that merchant vessels hijacked at sea are repainted and re-registered and then used for transporting narcotics. Funds thus accrued are used for purchase of arms and explosives which fuel terrorism.

The LTTE movement in Sri Lanka has been supported by exactly this methodology. Another concern is the potential conflict scenarios which can arise once technology to exploit seabed resources becomes available at affordable cost.

India shares maritime boundaries with three South Asian and four ASEAN neighbours. The existing irritants of poaching, smuggling and illicit movement of people can magnify into major confrontations when the EEZ begins to be explored. On a larger plane, India has an interest in the stability of the entire region because instabilities impact on our own interests.

For example, nearly 4 million Indians working in Gulf countries contribute over $10 billion annually to the Indian economy. Any destabilization will affect them and their remittances. Similarly, India has a flourishing bilateral trade with the ASEAN group which is slated to grow from $12.5 billion annually to $30 billion by 2010.

Any instabilities in these countries will affect this trade and India's economy adversely. We are also concerned at the inter-connectivity between radical Islamic groups in the entire region, stretching from the Gulf countries to those in South Asia and in South East Asia.

Their activities not only put strain on communal harmony but also create internal instability.

In the immediate neighbourhood, there are issues such as illegal migration from Bangladesh or the ongoing Maoist insurgency in Nepal but these are manageable within the bilateral relationships. Pakistan alone continues to be intrinsically hostile to India.

Kashmir is only a manifestation of more fundamental problems in Pakistan which relate to a crisis of identity and military elitism. Unfortunately, Pakistan has continued to remain under military rule for much of its life as an independent nation and the high profile which the armed forces consequently enjoy, can only be sustained by maintaining an inimical confrontation with India.

However, as long as India maintains a decisive military superiority over Pakistan, there is little possibility of a major conflict. Kargil should have cleared any doubts on that score.

The militancy presently ongoing in Kashmir is likely to continue, aided and abetted as it is, through cross border infiltration and support, and India will need to neutralize it through a combination of measures, military, political and diplomatic.

Recent initiatives have created some optimism but the situation will need to be watched closely.

India and Sri Lanka

Mention has earlier been made of the military relationship between India and Sri Lanka. The two countries share several common interests.

Sri Lanka is also completely dependent on the sea lanes for its overseas trade and for imports of oil and gas. Not only that, it is the largest container terminal in this part of the world and any disruption of seaborne commerce will have serious repercussions on its economy.

It has been afflicted by terrorism for decades and recent reports indicate that representatives of a radical Islamic group may have visited some eastern cities of the country.

The territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country is in India's national interest. Even more, Sri Lanka, along with India, is well positioned in the Northern Indian Ocean, sitting astride the main East-West shipping routes.

It is for this reason that the British, recognizing its strategic importance, chose to exploit Trincomalee as a major base in the chain stretching from Gibraltar to Hongkong. For the same reason, the Japanese fleet deployed in these waters during World War II.

A close relationship between India and Sri Lanka contributes to the strategic security of both; conversely, a suspicious or confrontational interface will have serious implications on their interests.

There have been periods in earlier years when relations between the two countries have been strained and external influences allowed to play a potentially destabilizing role. It is heartening to see that this phase has now disappeared.

Sri Lanka now sees relations with India as one of the 'main cornerstones of the island's national security policy' and this should form the platform on which interactions between the two countries should be progressed.

Through the Free Trade Agreement of 1998, India already has a special relationship with Sri Lanka in the economic sphere.

At the political level, there is greater synergy between the two countries on larger strategic issues and the suspicions harboured earlier that Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and sovereignty could be compromised by India's own Tamil compulsions, have been removed by categorical assertions by India to the contrary.

The situation is, therefore, conducive to formulation of closer ties in defence and security matters.

Defence cooperation

In the last several years, militaries of the two countries have developed closer interface which not only covers training of personnel and supply of some hardware but also cooperation in operational activities. As can be expected, these are, essentially, in the maritime sector.

India's naval and coast guard ships and aircraft mount a continuous surveillance and patrol in the Palk Strait on the Indian side of the maritime boundary line while the Sri Lankan Navy patrols its own waters.

There have been occasions when Indian fishermen straying across the boundary have been fired upon or dealt with harshly. This creates needless tension on the Indian mainland.

In accordance with international convention, the correct course of action would be for the offending boats to be confiscated and the personnel to be returned. Such aberrations need to be resolved quickly through mutual agreement.

The arrangements mentioned above are reviewed and readjusted every half- year through meetings of an Operations Review Group of the two navies.

Indian maritime reconnaissance assets have also been used to carry out searches in large ocean areas for ships suspected to be carrying arms for the LTTE and vessels thus located have, thereafter, been intercepted and neutralized by the SLN.

An ocean going patrol vessel transferred from the Indian Navy to the SLN in 2001 has added greatly to its capability to patrol the vulnerable east coast and, on occasion, Indian warships have also patrolled areas to seaward as required.

However, there has been no joint operational activity; the emphasis has been on providing help and assistance without direct engagement. The stress has been on caution, concern and continuity. This is understandable given India's unhappy experiences during the period of IPKF operations and later. Recognition of the sensitivities of its own Tamil population has also guided India's attitudes.

In October 2003, the Indian and Sri Lankan Prime Minsters agreed that defence cooperation between the two countries be further strengthened and an agreement to this effect concluded 'at the earliest'. This marks a qualitative change in the existing arrangements, lending to them a strategic and geopolitical content.

The fact that the two nations have talked of such an agreement openly, sends the right messages to various quarters looking at this region in strategic terms.

The pact would benefit both sides, India in terms of its larger concerns in the northern Indian Ocean, and Sri Lanka in terms of an assurance of India's support for its integrity. It would also clear the way for a more meaningful interface in the transfer of arms and related hardware.

As highlighted earlier, India and Sri Lanka are advantageously positioned to maintain surveillance over the sea lanes transiting east-west.

Sri Lanka is very well located geographically but is also exposed as it does not have the level of forces needed to fulfil the task while the Indian Navy has adequate capability to safeguard these routes, which could be further enhanced if supported by required facilities.

As surveillance patrols in waters south of Sri Lanka and to its east and west will be an essential ingredient in safeguarding these vital sealanes, our cooperative arrangements should provide for India's seagoing capabilities to be used along with those of Sri Lanka, afloat and ashore.

To reduce turn around times, Indian ships should be able to avail of replenishment and associated facilities in Sri Lankan ports. Similarly, it should be feasible for the smaller patrol aeroplanes to refuel at airfields in Sri Lanka so that their endurance can be exploited to the full.

This will permit optimization of surveillance assets to the mutual advantage of both countries. While the existing mechanism for review of operations every half year is adequate, it is desirable that the emerging defence cooperation agreement should cover all facets of the larger security concerns of the two countries and its implementation monitored at a higher level, possibly, by groups chaired by the respective Defence Secretaries.

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