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by Sumanasiri Liyanage

Sri Lanka has been cited in conflict literature as another classic case for a prolonged social conflict. In 1983, the conflict escalated into an internal war and except for five brief intervals of cessation of hostilities, military conflict has been the most noticeable feature in Sri Lankan polity.

Raising the cry for peace in Lanka

War normally paves the way for its other, i.e. peace movement; but ironically Sri Lanka has never had a vibrant peace movement notwithstanding the fact that several non governmental organizations are engaged in peace work since the eruption of internal war in 1983. How do we explain the non-presence of a vibrant and dynamic peace movement is an interesting question and an attempt to answer this question may provide a sound basis for building one.

However, in this article, I have no intention of dealing with this question since it needs more careful research and analysis; but I may touch upon some aspects related to this question. The main theme of this article is based on the premise that movement building calls for strategic framing and framing processes to a great extent determine the dynamics of the movement. Hence I argue that the failure of the Sri Lankan peace movement may be partly attributed to the flaws of the movement frame shared by peace activists and organizations. In this article, I propose an alternative framing process.

Civic and human rights issues were raised first outside the formal political institutional framework after the 1971 insurrection. If my recollections are correct, the peace and reconciliation issues were taken up first in a small gathering at Satyodaya, Kandy around 1973 in response to the developments in which politically led gangs tried to forcefully evict plantation Tamils from the estates.

Fr Casperez convened a meeting of academics from University Peradeniya, lawyers in Kandy, trade union leaders of the plantation and local civic leaders to discuss the flight of the plantation workers and the measures to be taken to redress their problems and improve inter-ethnic relations in plantation areas.

This group played an active role when inter-ethnic conflicts erupted in the region in 1977 after the general election. When the security forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) started repressive measures against Tamil militant youths in the late 1970s, Fr Casperez once again took an initiative in the formation of Movement for Inter-Racial Justice, and Equality (MIRJE). MIRJE seemed to follow classical social movement agendas in its early years; and was led by charismatic leaders; and its framing and repertoire of action were somewhat similar to those of the left movement.

Its main assertion was that the GoSL was the main adversary that stood against a just solution to an ethnic conflict and adopted repressive measures to suppress opposition of Tamils. However, MIRJE eventually descended into a formal institution; and this degeneration and its final collapse may be attributed to many reasons including personal rivalries. I believe that its inability to transform its framing to accommodate other realities such as the all round violence perpetrated by Tamil nationalist organizations is one of the major causes of its decline.

Recent attempts at building nationwide peace movements appeared to have failed to understand this situation; and those attempts take the form of classical NGO organizational structure rather than the classical social movement mobilizing structure. Given the intensity of conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE, the bilateral dimension of the conflict was foregrounded to such an extent so that the conflict resolution agenda was given an overarching importance.

Although a negotiated settlement between two contending parties are of paramount importance in bringing about peace, conflict resolution agendas and the agenda of the peace movement cannot be the same as the latter belongs to category of politics of contention.

Framing the peace movement

Social movement has a potential to mobilize citizens. However, this mobilizability depends on the collective action frame of the social movement, i.e. 'a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns.' Gamson distinguishes three elements of collective action frames, namely,

(a) a sense of injustice; (b) an element of identity; and (c) the factor of agency.

A sense of injustice may be an outcome of inequality or unhappiness about the way in which power-holders address social issues or social injustice. Anger is an emotion expressed by people who hold an external agent responsible for the unwarranted and undesirable situation. So movements need open adversaries; although they may not be the real adversaries.

Movement actions may be oriented and directed towards these adversaries if and only if these adversaries are clearly identified. During the early phase of the development of MIRJE, the adversary is clearly identified as the GoSL. Movement framing included the discriminatory actions of all post-colonial governments in Sri Lanka and repressive action by the GoSL especially after 1979 onwards.

Sending Brig. Weeratunga to Jaffna peninsula with clear orders to crush the militant opposition, enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, killing Inbam and others in night attacks similar to ones carried on by the Argentinean repressive military regime in the 1970s, suppression of the 1980 general strike and the repressive measures against the opposition parties especially the Sri Lanka Freedom Party provided the basis for the framing process.

The struggle of the militants was framed as a struggle for justice; and this struggle was also painted as a part and parcel of the broader struggle for justice. MIRJE, in its initial phase, was not a peace movement; but a movement for social justice and equality. In addition to a sense of justice, the frame of action needs an element of identity; beliefs held and shared collectively. To make the movement broad-based, many people have to be convinced that they hold those beliefs or at least sympathize with them.

Nevertheless, a sense of identity and the element of identity should be supported by the notion that proactive intervention can make a change. The groundwork prepared by the left tradition in the late '70s and the early '80s contributed significantly to the activities of MIRJE.

However, when the Tamil struggle for justice and peace turned into an armed conflict in which the security forces of the GoSL and the combatants of the Tamil nationalist movements were engaged in fierce battle, the nature of the conflict changed significantly. In addition to internal conflicts within the MIRJE and the disengagement of its initial leadership, the collapse of the MIRJE to a great extent signified its failure in developing a new action frame consistent with the changing situation.

The new situation was marked by the escalation of military engagement by the security forces of the GoSL and the LTTE; both combatants heavily used intimidatory and terrorist actions against the civilian population. The LTTE killed the leaders and the followers of its rival Tamil political parties; and deployed ethnic cleansing strategies against non-Tamil populations in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

The classical conflict resolution agenda in this context proposes that the two contending parties need to be engaged in negotiation; and that the status of parity between two contending parties prevails in the negotiation process. While the agenda of a social movement for peace recognizes and understands the importance of negotiation of the contending parties as equal partners, its action frame cannot be reduced to a building up of pressure on contending parties and supporting the negotiation process when it begins.

Peace movement on the contrary should posit contending parties in the violent conflict as movement adversaries; as parties that stand for violence and armed action and are engaged in gross human right violations. It appears that many people and organizations have failed in grasping the difference between conflict resolution framing and the framing of social movement.

Let me outline this difference (see Table 1) in relation to the concrete situation in Sri Lanka in the last two decades.

Table 1

Action Frames Conflict Resolution Framing Social Movement Framing

1. View the GoSL and the LTTE as partners of negotiation and to an agreement; 2. Equal partners in a future settlement; 3. Sharing power by the two power holders in a negotiated settlement; 4. Privileging the two contending parties; 5. Bias towards the non-state partner in the power equation; 6. Using ceasefire as a means for the resolution of the conflict; 7. Issues like child recruitment, silencing other voices are issues to be negotiated.

1. Oppose both the GoSL and the LTTE as adversaries of peace and violators of rights; 2. Parties that have to be weakened in achieving peace; 3. Empowering people who were subjected to marginalization and victimization by the two parties; 4. De-privileging the concerns of the two contending parties; 5. Regarding the two contending partners as equals in relation to their war effort; 6. Using periods of ceasefire as the basis for movement-broadening; 7. Issues like child recruitment, silencing other voices are matters to be condemned.

Does this mean that the peace movement should deviate from its justice oriented dimension? I do not think so. Let's discuss this issue linking it to a related question. Why did Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. decide to choose non-violent paths of transformation? They were of the firm belief that for movements for justice to be sustained movements require the support and sympathy of large number of people with different affiliations including the members of the group whose authority the movement is determined to question and challenge.

At least members of the dominant group whose ideas are conditioned by the notion of democracy and justice should not be able to legitimize the actions against the subaltern group/s. When the subaltern group loses its own legitimacy through unjustified violent acts, it gets weakened even if it gains a certain degree of military capability. If the social movement begins to depend on all the violent inhumane actions of the militant groups deploying terrorist tactics using the argument that the militants represents marginalized people, the social movement would gradually deviate from its movement agenda.

This I believe happened to the Sri Lankan peace movement, since it was not critical of the LTTE atrocities by defining them as the defensive actions of the 'weaker' community. Had the peace movement come out against the inhumane actions of the LTTE as it did against the inhumane actions of the security forces and the GoSL, it would have become a movement that could have mobilized the substantial support of the Muslims and the Sinhalese.

The best example is that the peace movement has failed to include within it human rights groups such as UTHR (J), instead it views UTHR (J) as a kind of spoiler. Thus the Sri Lankan NGOs and peace activists have failed miserably to produce a significant impact on the peace process and have become subservient partners of donor agencies that privileges conflict resolution agenda over movement agenda.

This in fact forces us who have been active in the peace work to reflect on our own work in the past and to redirect them with clearly defined movement action frame and repertoire of mobilization. While I focus on the first aspect in this article, I will leave the second aspect for the next article.

(The writer teaches political economy at the University of Peradeniya).

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