Sri Lanka: an unsung model for post- conflict security

such as intelligence and counter-terrorism, that peace and security has managed to prevail. Although the military defeat of the LTTE eradicated that organizations’ capacity as a large scale force it did not entirely remove their ability to continue to engage in acts of terror either from a reactivation of its dormant cells in Sri Lanka or orchestrated through its operations overseas,

Simon Harris

Why hasn’t Sri Lanka started to demobilise its massive military machine or decreased the size of its huge defence budget? After the defeat of the LTTE, three years without a single terrorist incident, followed by the recent rapidly rising cost of living, a devalued rupee and growing signs of popular protest, these are questions that are on the mind of many Sri Lankans and international observers alike.

Indeed, an article published in The Economist on February 11th this year states that the size of Sri Lanka’s military spending at a fifth of the national budget 'is an alarming share for a country now at peace' and goes on to criticise the expanding business role of the Armed Forces in the agriculture, construction and tourism sectors. However, these concerns are missing two pivotal points. Firstly, it is exactly because Sri Lanka’s military has remained fully funded, intact and even expanded in crucial areas such as intelligence and counter-terrorism, that peace and security has managed to prevail. Although the military defeat of the LTTE eradicated that organizations’ capacity as a large scale force it did not entirely remove their ability to continue to engage in acts of terror either from a reactivation of its dormant cells in Sri Lanka or orchestrated through its operations overseas.

Peace and national security

Besides the LTTE, other forms of terrorism are on the rise both globally and domestically which pose a threat to Sri Lanka. It is only because of the increased levels of surveillance, intelligence gathering and of course a modicum of good fortune that this country hasn’t yet witnessed the return of terrorism in some form or other. Sri Lanka’s security sector leaders know fully well that inevitably one day something will happen and have had the foresight to retain a capacity to both reduce the risk and to deal effectively with its impact when it eventually does occur.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Sri Lanka’s government and military commanders have keenly understood that the risks of rapid and contrived demobilisation following decades of protracted conflict on multiple fronts - the LTTE and two JVP uprisings - are far more dangerous for the preservation of peace and national security than retaining the former wartime strength of its Armed Forces.

The risks of rapid demobilisation are huge but Sri Lanka has learned from the mistakes of many other countries around the world whose post-conflict peace has been eroded by the ill-timed and unplanned shedding of its Armed Forces. By resisting international pressure to down-size its military, Sri Lanka has avoided the potential threat of having tens of thousands of weapons-trained and battled-hardened troops suddenly finding themselves being reintegrated into the hum-drum routine of civilian life where the purchasing power of their military pensions would diminish with inflation.

Where many post-conflict countries have struggled to find viable alternatives to reducing the size of their militaries Sri Lanka has strategically applied the skills base and discipline of its Armed Forces to civilian type activities without the need for demobilisation.

By engaging in the construction of roads, hotels, restaurants and golf courses, running transport facilities or growing and selling agricultural produce, Sri Lanka’s military are being usefully employed in essential reconstruction and development work.

New skills

They are learning new skills and are engaging with civilian actors in new ways which are helping the country prosper and which will ultimately help them reintegrate into civilian life when they are eventually demobilised or retired from service.

Naively viewed as a simple matter of budgetary economics a few years after the end of a war, the size of Sri Lanka’s military machine could easily be mistaken as an unnecessary folly. However taken from a perspective of preserving national security during a period of continued uncertainty, contributing to the country’s development needs and avoiding the profoundly destabilising risks of demobilisation, Sri Lanka’s approach may well serve one day as a replicable model for post-conflict security and reconstruction.

(The writer is an international humanitarian, peace and development sector consultant based in Sri Lanka and a Visiting Fellow at the Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, USA)