Reconciliation, Sri Lanka and the world
Text of a presentation on January 10th at the Observatory Research
Foundation, Delhi by Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, MP, Adviser on
Reconciliation to the President
[Continued from yesterday]
These areas then remain problematical. The argument that applying
pressure on the grounds of war crimes will lead to a political solution
is a pernicious one, and counter-productive. Sadly, I have even heard
this suggestion advanced by an Indian General who, with active
experience of Sri Lanka, should have known better. That was not however
an Indian government view, and I believe India, whilst anxious for a
political solution, will work towards this in a manner that develops
confidence, as it has done in the past, except of course when the
adventurism of the Jayewardene government during the Cold War was seen
as irritating, if not quite threatening.
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One of the
LLRC sittings. File photo |
But India too would do well to assess more carefully the additional
motives of those who promoted Sarath Fonseka whilst suggesting that this
would serve Indian interests. Efforts to present Sri Lanka as a bone of
contention between India and China are largely self-serving, though they
may not be entirely hypocritical, given the tendency of the West to
function in terms of binary opposites. This is also understandable given
the manner in which they fought the Cold War, but China has made it
clear to Sri Lanka that the primacy of our relationship with India is
understood. If rivalries on the lines of those that dogged all of us
during the Cold War are to develop, they will be primarily economic in
character, and be played out in Africa, and similar fields for large
scale investment, without any need for hostilities in South Asia. It
would be a pity if either India or Sri Lanka allowed themselves to be
used as tools in such developments.
Reconciliation Committees
I have dwelt at some length on these factors because they could
adversely affect the very positive measures both taken and recommended
with regard to reconciliation. I am sorry therefore that, in the
mandatory references to accountability, given the frenetic campaign that
has taken place over the last 12 months with UN Advisers and former
spokesmen acting together as it were to reinforce the shoddy journalism
of Channel 4, there has been inadequate attention paid to the very
constructive recommendations made by the Commission in the latter part
of its Report.
In this regard I am sorry that analysts have not noted that this
forms the bulk of the Report, rather than what was feared at the time
the Commission was set up and began operating, namely endless
navel-gazing about what went wrong with regard to the Ceasefire
Agreement. The reasons for that going up in smoke, as it were, were
fairly obvious, and it was a pity that there was much stress on this in
early days since it gave the impression that the Commission was
concerned primarily with justifying the military approach that had to be
adopted.
That such an approach was essential, given the manner in which the
LTTE used the CFA to build up its own military capacity, was obvious to
all except the different components of the strange coalition that
supported Sarath Fonseka in the Presidential election of 2010. But
again, given their influence, that aspect was focused upon, and little
attention was paid subsequently to the enormous amount of work the
Commission did amongst the people who were affected by the conflict and
need support through reconciliatory efforts, as opposed to the backward
looking theoreticians in Colombo and other capitals.
It is on what the affected people said, and what they need now, that
the Commission has rightly concentrated. In this regard too, I should
note, the measures that need to be taken are fairly obvious, and long
before I was appointed Adviser on Reconciliation I have been making the
point repeatedly. Some of this springs from the work of the Liberal
Party which, in the 80s, engaged in detailed discussions about
Constitutional Reform and in looking also at the Causes and Consequences
of Conflict in the 90s, identified several areas in which action was
desirable. More recently, discussions in District Reconciliation
Committees that have been set up, identified several problems which the
Commission has now highlighted, with suggestions for remedial action.
To mention just a few of these, we need very practical measures to
protect the vulnerable in conflict affected areas, in particular women
and children (as to whom more effective measures are needed in the rest
of the country too); we need to ensure better training and support for
productive employment, in the North, with effective micro-credit
facilities and incentives for small and medium size business enterprises
(which should also be done elsewhere in the country); we need to
modernize our education system, with greater stress on skills
development and in particular communications skills, in two if not three
languages; we need to encourage religious and social and cultural
activities to bring people together.
In short, we need to do what the Liberal Party recommended in its
programme formulated in 1987. Most importantly perhaps, as we have noted
over the years, is the need for upgrading the public service, to make it
more responsive to the needs of the people whom it serves. An
attitudinal change is vital, as the Commission stresses, which also
promotes consultation. The revision of Administrative and Financial
Regulations, which the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises has
also recommended, is long overdue, and should be undertaken in a manner
that promotes public accountability as well as flexibility based on
close attention to people’s needs, grievances and aspirations.
Another area we stressed then, which the Commission expands on, is
the importance of ensuring Law and Order, and the protection of Human
Rights. When I was Secretary to the Ministry of Disaster Management and
Human Rights we did much work in this regard, or rather in drawing
attention to what needed to be done. The Action Plan that we formulated,
and which was, unfortunately only very recently, adopted by the Cabinet,
lays down suggestions as to how to overcome many of the problems the
Commission identifies.
Armed forces
Most important in this regard is an issue that was identified even
before the Action Plan was prepared, when I chaired a Committee on
Police reforms. The police sadly were neglected in the concentration on
defending ourselves against terrorism of the last couple of decades,
which led us to modernize the security forces and ensure they functioned
as skilled and disciplined professionals. As senior police officers
indicated, their training programmes had meanwhile been cut, while
recruitment of minorities into the force, despite efforts to promote
this, had suffered. Combined with increasing politicization of the
police, the result was inefficiency, compounded by a lack of confidence
that particularly affected the minorities.
I am glad therefore that the Commission lays stress on the need for
better and more responsible policing. However implementing this will not
be easy without adequate will, and insistence that parochial political
considerations should not operate. I hope therefore that, while ensuring
rapid recruitment of minorities, the discipline and effectiveness that
characterized the armed forces over the last few years will be
replicated. For this purpose it would be best, at least in the short
term, to ensure a command structure such as obtained for the army, with
high level education for officers, as opposed to the perfunctory and
rote training now provided. It is also important to revive the police
manual that was provided to members of the force in the past, and make
copies of salient points available to the public too, so that there is
transparency and mutual understanding in their relations with the force.
Trilingual society
In all these areas, and more, there is need of concerted action.
Those anxious for reconciliation should endeavour to support government
in setting up mechanisms to work quickly and imaginatively towards the
goals laid out in the Report. Unfortunately there seems no urgency at
the moment about implementation, or even allocating responsibility for
the different tasks. What certainly well not work, as we saw with regard
to the interim recommendations, is a Committee of Ministry Secretaries,
chaired by someone without executive authority in this regard. Rather,
there should be a Ministry for Reconciliation, charged with fulfilling
the recommendations of the Commission as best possible. I would also
suggest that it be given a limited life span, of two years perhaps,
after which it should have made itself redundant.
I have wondered about suggesting this, since it would be assumed that
I wished to be Minister myself. Given the way Cabinets are constituted
now, this would not be possible, though I am not sure that any of my
senior colleagues would be willing to take on a limited assignment that
had only a coordinating role. But whoever does it, there is need of an
efficient and experienced Secretary, and dedicated staff, though very
few would suffice given that the bulk of the actual work would have to
be done by other Ministries.
However, current lethargy, as exemplified for instance by the failure
of Education Ministry to even think of mechanisms for increasing the
supply of competent language teachers – despite the clear commitment of
the President to building up a trilingual society – makes it clear that
innovative ideas and ensuring their implementation would have to come
from a dedicated agency. Similarly, though in theory there are special
desks for women and children in all police stations, little thought has
gone into institutionalizing procedures, liaison with community workers,
whether those in government service or from social service
organizations, and there are no clear work plans and goals that can be
measured. Certainly individuals can sometimes be effective, but we must
build up systems, so that coverage should be comprehensive and
supportive rather than reactive.
Political problems
My own view is that the recommendations of the Commission can be
fulfilled very easily, provided initiative and imagination are brought
to bear, along with the will to succeed. Similarly, I believe that the
process of a political settlement can be expedited if action is taken
immediately on recommendations in this regard that are not
controversial. For instance the mechanism of a second chamber to promote
regional input into national legislation could be put into operation
straight away, though of course we would also need better training on
legislative principles for potential members. I should note that we
should also be ensuring proper training for local government
representatives, so that they can use more effectively the powers and
resources they do possess, to resolve problems that should not require
intervention by distant officials and politicians.
Reconciliation will not be difficult to achieve, and the Report of
the Commission shows us the way. We should not be distracted by
insistence on retribution and stress on major political problems, when
we can so easily deal with the root causes of resentment and, through
setting mechanisms of empowerment in place that are generally
acceptable, move on to solutions for more contentious issues. But we
should also recognize that the failure thus far of government to work
consistently in required areas, to have followed intensively the interim
recommendations of the Commission even if common sense had not already
indicated the way, has led to suspicions which government must assuage
through committed action. As the Commission makes clear with regard to
Reconciliation, ‘the responsibility for being the prime mover of this
process lies squarely with the government’.
Concluded
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