Tigers and the Darusman Panel:
Using food as a weapon
Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, MP
One area in which there is an element of truth in the report of the
Panel is its accusation that Government underestimated the figures of
IDPs in the Vanni towards the end of the conflict. This is correct, and
I myself was under the impression that the figure was less than it
finally turned out to be.
What is wrong is the claim that the Government used these figures to
‘deny humanitarian assistance’. The fact is that, from the very
beginning, there was uncertainty about the figures. At my very first
meeting with UNHCR, when I was actually impressed with the commitment of
Elizabeth Tan and her immediate boss, I asked why the UN still
maintained a distinction between what were termed old IDPs and new ones.
I could understand this in the case of those in static situations, for
instance the Muslims chased out of the North by the LTTE in 1990, who
had mainly stayed put in Puttalam since then. But in the Vanni it was
clear that the IDP population had to be treated as a whole, and we
needed to make sure that everyone there was adequately fed.
Propaganda purposes
What was also crystal clear was that it was in the interests of the
LTTE to deprive them of food, not out of wickedness, but for propaganda
purposes.
This had become clear to me way back in 2007, when I took over as
Head of the Peace Secretariat, and found in my consultations with people
living in those areas, in particular the Chambers of Commerce in the
North, that this ‘was perhaps the single most important topic, rivaled
only by the issue of restrictions on fishing’.
I quote from a press release I issued shortly after we succeeded in
having the A9 opened six days a week, whereas previously it had been
open just three days a week, because the LTTE refused to agree to more.
Negotiations regarding this were conducted through the ICRC, and I can
do no better than set down what I wrote at that time -
‘When the Peace Secretariat took up the issue of the opening of this
road with the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, back in June, it was
to find a markedly liberal approach to the issue.
It was pointed out that opening the road southward from Jaffna would
not be possible, given that the LTTE had taken advantage of such opening
to launch its attacks at Muhumalai in August last year. Though the
sequence of events is largely now forgotten, it should be noted that,
after a series of guerilla attacks between November 2005 and July 2006,
the LTTE then launched two concerted efforts, amounting practically to
regular offensives, in both the Eastern and the Northern Provinces.
These attacks, in Muttur first and then in Muhumalai, were successfully
repulsed.
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
Though the armed forces have since then successfully eliminated the
threat of further such attacks in the East, this has not happened in the
North.
It was therefore understandable that the road southward from
Muhumalai could not be opened at this stage. However the Secretary made
it clear that he had no objection whatsoever to opening the road
northward from Omanthai, but at that stage the ICRC had not been able to
sanction this.
The Peace Secretariat at this stage contacted the ICRC, also raising
the issue of sea transport to Jaffna. ICRC involvement in this had been
stopped after what was reported in the press as LTTE warnings. These
followed on a helpful relief operation by the ICRC, following an LTTE
attack on a vessel carrying a member of the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission.
E-mail correspondence with the ICRC suggested that indeed in both
these cases the government of Sri Lanka was keen on greater mobility.
ICRC response
Following further questions on the part of the Peace Secretariat, the
ICRC discussed the matter confidentially and indicated its reasons for
its approach, but agreed that the matter should be reconsidered. Though
the ICRC complacence with three days a week was based on the indubitable
fact that movement of personnel was limited, SCOPP pointed out the need,
based on actual demand, for greater movement of goods, which the ICRC
acknowledged.
Meanwhile our Economic Affairs Unit was concerned with the
possibilities of a scanner that would help reduce delays at checkpoints,
whether at Omanthai or at Medawachchiya. However the Secretariat felt
that the costs involved were too high, given the threat of violence. The
ICRC restriction had in fact been decided upon following an incident in
which the LTTE had fired in close proximity to the checkpoint. At the
meeting of the Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Affairs which was
attended by Sir John Holmes, the Peace Secretariat had been asked to
report on progress with regard to the scanner.
We noted then that this seemed unnecessary if the road northward from
Omanthai could be opened for more than the current three days a week.
The Secretary of Defence then made it clear that he was happy to open it
even seven days a week, but noted that it was the ICRC that was
responsible for the restrictions.
Of course the ICRC only recommends and it is the government that
makes decisions on such matters, but in the current situation it is
desirable to act in consultation with the ICRC. At the CCHA meeting the
ICRC response was cautious, but Secretary of Defence made clear the
urgency of the situation and the ICRC promised to look into the request.
This took some time, because it was reported that the ICRC also
needed to consult its Head Office in Geneva. This was finally done, and
then the ICRC also approached the LTTE in Kilinochchi, since as had been
mentioned earlier the ICRC needs guarantees from both parties. Finally
the required guarantees were received.
As mentioned before, the government of Sri Lanka had been ready for
extended opening for a long time previously. The Peace Secretariat
therefore welcomes the ICRC response to the request made at the
insistence of the Secretary of Defence, and its success in getting the
LTTE to respond positively.' I should note here that in the North too,
it was the LTTE that tried to restrict shipping so that food supplies
would run low. Government asked the ICRC to escort food ships, when a
crisis seemed imminent, but the LTTE pulled the plug on this after one
voyage, so that the navy had to expend a lot of time and energy and
money in providing escorts to commercial vessels.
And it is now forgotten how the LTTE fired on a ship carrying members
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. They claimed then that they did not
know they were on board but, at the farewell party for the SLMM, one of
them told me that they knew perfectly well what they were doing.
UN agencies
Conversely government made it its business to feed its own people. It
is often forgotten that, in addition to food supplied through the World
Food Programme, the Commissioner General of Essential Services sent
truckloads of food to Vanni for general consumption. And when, given the
problems they were causing, NGOs were asked to move out, government
specifically asked WFP and UNHCR to remain, and it was only because the
UN Resident Coordinator was misled - I suspect by the Coffee Club which
wanted to affirm that the UN's first obligation was to NGOs, not the Sri
Lankan people - that all UN agencies withdrew, leaving only the ICRC in
place.
During this period government provided facilities for the UN to take
up the food that had been provided for when original estimates were made
for the 2009 Common Humanitarian Action Plan.
It was well-known that the LTTE took first possession of the food
trucks when they went up, and no one objected.
I still remember the Head of USAID telling me when this was brought
to her notice that the US might have reconsidered its support to WFP if
they had known this was happening, and I could only express surprise at
her ignorance of what the whole NGO community knew - though she was
basically a decent sort, and they might well have concealed from her the
level of their complicity with terrorists.
It is certainly true that towards the end supplies were short, and
there were cases of malnutrition amongst those who were rescued, but we
found that the majority of these were of long-term malnutrition. 'Within
a few months, we had reduced malnutrition levels considerably, as was
acknowledged by the UN Resident Representative.' Given the superb work
of our Health Ministry, which directed operations very systematically
despite the massive demands on the system they set up, the number of
deaths in the displaced population soon stabilized and was much lower
than in comparable situations. By June it was below the 0.25 per 10,000
population per day for South East Asia in general.
Political agenda
The condition of those we had to look after showed that we had
basically managed to provide basic rations over the years, though there
certainly had been deprivation.
But for the Darusman Panel to ignore the fact that it was the LTTE
which, commandeering the bulk of rations themselves, kept the rest of
the population in deprivation, is symptomatic of their venom.
The best comment on this was provided in the account by Jon Lee
Anderson, who penned in the 'New Yorker' a forceful attack on the Sri
Lankan government.
But he was basically a journalist, anxious for sensation, and he did
not omit a telling detail in his account of the suffering of the
civilians. He describes a pastor looking after a group of 60 orphans
'who had run out of food and went foraging in an abandoned bunker
nearby. "We found food packets-meat, chocolates," the pastor said, and
they took as much as they could carry, dodging incoming fire.
It is possible the members of the Darusman Panel did not read the New
Yorker article. But it is also probable that, given their particular
political agenda, they would have suppressed such a telling detail,
about how well supplied the Tigers were, in their determination to throw
the whole book at the government of Sri Lanka. |