Incompetence, wastage and perversity overcome at Menik Farm

Second part of this article was published last Wednesday (May 4):

Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, MP

People had to wait many hours or sometimes an entire day for food and water. Food was of very poor quality and sometimes was served into bare hands, without plates. 91 UNHCR tents of 5 x 3 metres were set up next to each other, holding up to 14 persons each, leaving not much more than a square metre per person. The footnote explains exactly what happened, when UNHCR responded with these preposterous tents, when they had been asked for more decent ones. There were long waits at times but these were swiftly alleviated, and conditions were certainly better than in many comparable situations.

161. Families were often grouped into tents with other families, to whom they were not related.

In cases of families headed by women whose husbands were missing or dead, such practice made them vulnerable to abuse by unrelated men living in the same tent. The poor conditions provoked violence by IDPs against other IDPs, including sexual violence and exploitation, particularly considering the high number of women without male relatives and unaccompanied children. Women were not given sufficient privacy, and soldiers infringed on their privacy and dignity by watching them while they used the toilet or bathed. Some women were forced to perform sexual acts in exchange for food, shelter or assistance in camps. 92- 92 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, 13 April 2010, A/64/742-S/2010/181, para. 148. The report also states that ‘Within the internally displaced person sites, exploitation of women and girls appeared to be perpetrated by various actors through promises of favours, money or marriage and through threats.’ Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, April 13, 2010, A/64/742-S/2010/181, para. 151.

International community

‘Certainly the crowded conditions led to problems, but the crowding was no worse than these poor victims of LTTE hostage taking had experienced previously. The bizarre mentality of the Panel is apparent from their suggestion that the poor conditions were responsible for the violence by IDPs against other IDPs. No one is to be blamed for that, though the simple fact that there were women without male relatives and unaccompanied children is also deemed to have contributed. Blame is attached to soldiers who watched women, infringement of privacy and dignity being the worst of the problems of these poor women. It is also quite splendid that the evidence for women being forced to perform sexual acts (the agents not being mentioned) is a Report by the Secretary-General published a year later, that talks of exploitation through promises of favours, money or marriage and through threats.’ Presumably not even these perverse Panelists assume that the good Secretary-General was talking of the soldiers offering favours or money or marriage, though one hopes they asked him whether he was referring to soldiers when he talked about threats, and if so why.

162.While basic conditions at Menik Farm were inhumane, a Western Union (money transfer facility) soon opened, and thousands of people, many of them LTTE with connections among the Diaspora, were able to buy their way out of the camps by bribing the military.93 Conditions in Menik Farm did improve over time after much protest from the international community and threats from donors to cut off funding.

Resettlement process

Clearly Sri Lankan officials and in particular the forces as a whole must be responsible in the eyes of the Panel for everything that was amiss. The assertion here is bribes were just to ‘the military’, whereas the military as a body were worried about such disappearances, though individuals may have been complaisant. Conversely the military were convinced the bribes were being taken by NGOs and Civil officials, which is why they called a halt to the large numbers of vehicles going in and out. It is typical of the panel that this aberration is attributed to the military as a whole, not to individuals, whereas when something positive happened, it was not the military but merely individuals - some civilians tried to stage a mass breakout, but were shot at and shelled by the LTTE. Those who managed to escape were helped across by individual SLA soldiers (Para 119) Typical of the whole approach - and indeed the agenda - was a comment slipped into an update, conveying a very different impression from the one we were given by a shelter review team that had checked on the resettlement process. I tried to get an explanation from the Head of UNHCR, as indicated in Annexe 4, but of course all one got was silence as usual.

The last sentence in Para 162 is nonsense, given that government was engaged in a constant battle to get better value for money (see annexed a letter to the Head of UNHCR about their massive staffing costs, all of which came out of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan, which was supposed to benefit Sri Lankan victims). I had often to write to OCHA as follows, since they were run circles around by agencies which took the money that had been raised and then failed to report regularly and productively - ‘With regard to WASH, if the OXFAM project is mentioned under the CHAP, there should be some record of it, certainly not something that is inaccurate. Would you also know to whom they report, if they do not report to you?

Drainage problems

I hope the Line Ministry has been kept informed throughout. It would also be absurd, when we have an expensive and theoretically well experienced coordinating mechanism, that it should not function. I hope ACTED and World Vision and Malteser and Muslim Aid are not acting on similar principles, and refraining from keeping you informed as a matter of principle.

It is also regrettable that, here and elsewhere, there is no record of the donor. Could this be filled up as soon as possible? It should not be difficult for you to point out that, under the CHAP mechanism thus far, you are responsible for co-ordinating information and passing it on to us, and agencies must help you in this.’ To go into further detail in an area I found especially worrying, the appalling sanitary conditions were due entirely to the UN and the agencies which it had hired at great expense completely ignoring Sri Lankan national standards in constructing toilets. They used plywood, whereas we required concrete or reinforced plastic. When it was pointed out that the gully suckers would suck out the bottom, the shelter consultant, Chris Nixon - who cost $11,000 a month, in a strange system whereby different UN agencies all made money by hiring through each other - declared that operators had been told to stop sucking half way.

The image of these operators judging the correct moment to stop, waiting as long as possible - since otherwise their machines would have to make even more journeys down narrow and vulnerable roads - and then cursing when they misjudged, as plywood and shit splayed out over the latrines, belongs in a novel by William Burroughs, not in the real world of suffering human beings. But the man in charge of all this lived in a strange world where, as the monsoon was about to come down, and humidity was increasing, he claimed that nothing could be done to improve conditions until the question of fire hazard was addressed.

I conclude the annexes with a letter to the UN Resident Coordinator about the need for further improvement after we had at least managed to attend to the drainage problems that the Shelter Consultant had ignored, given his obsession with fire. 93 Different ‘packages’ were available offering a combination of ‘services’, depending on what those buying could afford, including release from the camp, the obtaining of a false passport or an airline ticket or all three. But these were not options for those too poor or with few connections.

Annexes: Annexe 1 (December 5)

Dear Elizabeth, Thank you for your letter of December 4th, which deals also with queries of September 28th in addition to those in five other letters you mention. I can appreciate that you are busy, but I am now getting very old and find It difficult to remember past letters and engage in cross referencing. it would be good therefore if in future you replied promptly, and if this is impossible you referenced particular responses. Also, are you sure of the dates you note? I must also point out sadly that you do not respond to my questions in any meaningful way. I have reiterated the point that we are supposed to work together on protection issues to ensure that problems are resolved. I have no doubt that many of those involved see this as a priority, but provokingly there are continuing efforts to engage in unsubstantiated criticism.

UNHCR statements

After the appalling behaviour of your junior staff who had assured you that they brought up matters with officials, only to confess afterwards that they had done nothing of the sort, I believe you really must be more careful about formal UNHCR statements. We can do nothing about the junior personnel whom journalists tell me continue to criticize government in order to correct what they see as senior management attitudes which are too close to government, but you can make sure that for mal reports are more responsibly written, Your letter indicates close cooperation with government regarding SGBV issues, but your formal report claims that ‘the management denies the existence of any problems and refuses to collaborate with UNHCR to run SGBV awareness programs for its staff’. I asked for an explanation of this and, if you are now denying it, you should say clearly that this statement was not true.

It should also be withdrawn in any future report you make. Of course I agree with the purposes you record and am only sorry that you now tell me it would be helpful to have a discussion about the substantive issues raised in the report.

To be continued