Decisions that changed the course of Lanka’s history
Will a good number of soldiers, tanks
and artillery ensure victory in a war? These are outward aspects of a
war which alone are insufficient, says Master Strategist Defence
Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. He says the key to triumph in a war is
political will and strategy In an interview with Indian journalist V.K.
Shashikumar, Rajapaksa revealed the crucial decisions of the Government,
that led to the successful completion of Armed Forces’ combat operations
against the LTTE
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa says it was President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s
determination that ultimately helped the Army defeat the Tigers.
“President Mahinda Rajapaksa took several brave decisions. In the final
analysis, it was the cumulative effect of those decisive, brave
decisions that enabled Sri Lankan Armed Forces to liquidate the LTTE.”
Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa |
He says, “usually in a military operation the world outside the
conflict theatre, domestic and international, see only soldiers
fighting.
They see tanks, guns, armoured vehicles, artillery weapons and men
and women in battle fatigues.”
“What is not visible to the people, to the outside world, is the
strategy. What is also not visible immediately and also not recalled at
that moment in time is the history that led to the current context of
military operations. What was that context? Eight previous Governments
led by four Presidents had failed to end the war. They had failed to
rein in the LTTE. It is not as if those eight Governments and four
Presidents did not have under their command good military leaders and
soldiers. In fact, when President Rajapaksa’s Government assumed charge
in 2005, around 26,000 soldiers had sacrificed their lives,” he adds.
Rajapaksa emphasises that political will is the supreme commander. He
points to the successful operation, Liberation Vadamarachchi Operation
from May to June 1987 and Operation Riviresa from October to December
1995 to suggest that there was no deficiency in the Armed Forces.
The Vadamarachchi Operation led to the recapture the Vadamarachchi
from the LTTE control. This was the Security Forces’ first conventional
combat engagement in Sri Lankan soil after the British colonial rule.
During Operation Riviresa the SLAF launched a successful assault to
wrest control of Jaffna and rest of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE.
Using these examples, Rajapaksa explains that if at all there was any
deficiency then it was on account of inadequate, lax and effete
political will.
He said, When President Rajapaksa assumed Office in 2005, we studied
all previous war operations: Eelam War I (1976-1987); Vadamarachchi
Operation; IPKF intervention; Eelam War II (1990-1995); Operation Sea
Breeze; Operation Thrividha Balaya; Operation Balavegaya I, II; Eelam
War III (1995-2002); Operation Riviresa; Operation Jayasikuru; Operation
Rivibala; Operation Ranagosa; Operation Rivikirana; and Operation
Kinihira I, II, III/IV, V/VI, VII, VIII, IX.
Crucial points in winning war |
* Attention
to detail
* Ability to arrive at
clutter-free decisions
*Expansion of Armed Forces
* Backing formulation of new war
doctrine |
The objective was to arrive at conclusive reasons for our previous
failures to comprehensively finish the war against the LTTE in the past
30 years. All four previous Presidents had resorted to military means
and yet had failed. So a political decision was made by President
Rajapaksa to comprehensively study all previous war operations and
arrive at a solution for every factor of failure or inability to win the
war. For every factor we found a solution, he said.
We found that there was really no failure factor attached to the
military. In fact, we realized a simple fact in 2005, that if we
launched war operations against the LTTE then we would have to fight
with the same military that had fought the LTTE in the past 30 years. We
were confident of winning with the same military and its Special Forces
and Commandos.
They were already there! Yet, what explained the inability of the
previous Governments led by four different Presidents to utilize the
country’s military strength effectively?
He adds, We came to the conclusion that the solution was to increase
the Force strength. The key factor of previous inability to finish the
war was inadequate numbers. We realized the expansion of military would
have a definitive impact on LTTE.
Therefore, the second decisive political decision was to expand the
Armed Forces, he said.
President Rajapaksa’s and his advisors’ detailed and nuanced study of
previous war operations was marked by two defining characteristics.
One was attention to detail and the second was their ability to
quickly arrive at a clutter-free decision. The third important political
decision was a natural corollary of the imperative to expand the Armed
Forces.
The Defence Secretary says the decision to increase numbers actually
enabled the Security Forces to address two previous failure factors. The
first has already been discussed. The second was the previous inability
of the Armed Forces to conduct war operations on a broad front and
operate simultaneously across multiple frontlines.
When we cleared the Eastern Province, the LTTE said they were not
defeated and that its Forces had merely staged a tactical withdrawal.
The LTTE was confident that the Army will not have the troop strength
to hold the ground in the Eastern Province. Like all earlier occasions,
the LTTE believed that if it opened sporadic operations along the
Northern Frontlines then the Armed Forces will be forced to redeploy
enabling LTTE to regain ground in the East. Several opposition party
leaders, too, openly declared that the military operations in the East
will not be sustainable.
We lulled everyone into believing that the previous status quo will
prevail - that the Armed Forces will fight and win, then the LTTE will
open a new front, and the Forces will redeploy and fail to hold ground
and consolidate in the areas where they had attained victory - this
would enable LTTE to regain control over lost areas. Little did the LTTE
know that we had prepared a new war doctrine! That we were indeed
prepared to fight war on a broad front, along multiple frontlines.
Courtesy: Indian Defence Review and
Sify News India
To be continued |