Why LTTE failed
R. Hariharan
Sri Lanka’s Security Forces appear to have redeemed their
professional reputation with their resounding success in the fourth
edition of the Eelam War, which has been going on since 2006 against the
LTTE, popularly known as the Tigers. They were not able to achieve
decisive results against the LTTE in their three earlier outings.
President
Mahinda Rajapaksa |
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had rated the
Tigers as “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world”.
The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist
networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in Iraq”. So, the Security
Forces’ success against the LTTE should not be underestimated,
particularly when similar wars against insurgents and terrorists in
other countries, including Afghanistan, have been dragging on.
Deadly results
The LTTE, over the past 25 years, has built a 15,000-strong force
that innovatively adapted its suicide war tactics to both land and naval
warfare with deadly results. It mastered the use of terror tactics as a
force multiplier. The LTTE’s ruthless leader, Velupillai Prabakaran,
built a loyal network of cadre - the Black Tigers - whose deadly suicide
terror attacks changed the course of political history in Sri Lanka and
to a certain extent in India also.
The LTTE demonstrated its prowess with a daring suicide attack on the
Katunayake International Airport, destroying 26 military and civil
aircraft, in July 2001, just four months before Al Qaeda’s dramatic 9/11
attacks in New York.
It sent a strong message to Sri Lanka and the world at large that the
LTTE was a formidable force not be trifled with. But the consequences of
the 9/11 attack on the global attitude to terrorism was far-reaching.
The U.S. marshalled forces for a global war on terror to destroy Al
Qaeda and its roots in terror. And the LTTE was already listed in the US
as a foreign terrorist organization.
The late Anton Balasingham, a close confidant of Prabakaran’s and the
political adviser to the LTTE, apparently understood the need to modify
the LTTE strategy in the face of the rising tide against terrorism.
He persuaded a reluctant Prabakaran to agree to take part in a
Norwegian-mediated peace process, deferring the idea of an independent
Eelam in favour of finding a solution to accommodate Tamil aspirations
within a federal structure. That was how the 2002 peace process came
into being.
The LTTE signed the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with Sri Lanka in 2002
as part of the peace process from a position of political and military
strength, having weathered four wars - three against the Security Forces
and one against Indian Forces. It was at the pinnacle of its power at
that time.
To a certain extent, this enabled the Tigers to dictate the terms of
the peace process, which recognized it as the sole representative of the
Tamil minority, a status denied to it earlier. Thus, the peace process
accorded parity of status to the LTTE at the negotiating table in its
equation with the elected Government.
By then, the repeated stories of LTTE successes, propagated by its
well-oiled propaganda machine that glossed over its significant failures
(for example, the retaking of control of Jaffna by the Army), reinforced
the popular belief of Prabakaran’s invincibility in war.
It also generated great political expectations among the Tamil
population of his ability to satisfy their long-standing aspirations
through the peace process although he had dropped the demand for an
independent Tamil Eelam. All that has been proved wrong now.
Winston Churchill once remarked, “Those who can win a war well can
rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would
never have won the war.” This is very true in the case of Prabakaran’s
handling of events leading up to the war.
His monolithic and egocentric leadership style does not encourage the
free exchange of ideas except with his trusted childhood friends. This
has been the big roadblock in his strategic decision-making process.
Prabakaran failed to use fruitfully the political talent at his
disposal, among the seasoned members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA),
in handling complex political issues during the period of peace.
Their advice was neither sought nor paid heed to in taking decisions
on key issues. The LTTE’s handling of the Presidential Poll of 2005 is
one such instance when their plea for his support to elect Ranil
Wickremesinghe, an architect of the peace process, went unheeded.
Dismantling of LTTE
Wickremesinghe’s
rival, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had promised, in his election manifesto, to
eliminate LTTE terrorism. Prabakaran not only ignored this but, on the
basis of some convoluted reasoning, enforced a boycott of the
Presidential Poll in areas under LTTE control. This action prevented a
bulk of the Tamils from voting for Wickremesinghe.
This enabled Rajapaksa’s victory with a wafer-thin majority through
Southern Sinhala votes. And the newly elected President went about
systematically dismantling the LTTE.
Similarly, Prabakaran’s handling of the international community
lacked coherence. Apparently, he misunderstood the international
involvement in the 2002 peace process and thought it was a vindication
of the LTTE’s methods. Perhaps this made him complacent when it came to
observing the ceasefire in spirit.
The LTTE’s conduct, which was in utter disregard of international
norms on human rights and humanitarian laws during the entire period of
the ceasefire, came under severe criticism from international watchdog
bodies and the United Nations.
These related to a large number of issues, including the recruitment
of child soldiers, illegal arrests and kidnapping apart from the
assassinations and suicide bombings. This made the LTTE’s rhetoric on
human rights hollow.
LTTE’s indifference
While the Co-chairs were sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for
equity, they were wary of the LTTE’s tactics and covert operations in
their own countries. And the LTTE’s indifference to their counsel during
the peace process eroded its credibility. Things came to a boil with the
assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in
August 2005.
This wanton act compelled the European Union and Canada to ban the
LTTE. Thus, the LTTE shot itself in the foot as it was banned in 32
countries. The ban also coincided with the introduction of strong
international protocols in shipping and against money laundering to
prevent the international operations of terrorists.
Prabakaran probably failed to appreciate the implications of these
developments when he gave the Government a legitimate excuse to abandon
the peace process after the LTTE made an abortive suicide attack in
April 2006 on Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, the Army Chief. It also
enabled Rajapaksa to persuade the international community to crack down
on the LTTE’s support network and front organizations in their midst.
International cooperation was further enlarged in scope to intelligence
sharing and economic aid, which indirectly underwrote Sri Lanka’s
mounting burden of war.
Similarly, Prabakaran never made any effort before the war to redeem
the LTTE’s relations with India. He failed to tap the fund of sympathy
for the Tamil cause that exists in India even among large sections of
the non-Tamil population.
Presumably, his dubious role in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination
prevented him from dispassionately examining the positive contribution
India could have made in pushing the Tamil cause at the negotiating
table. Apparently, he put his faith in the international community
rather than in India to bail him out when the Government decided to go
to war.
Played havoc
This showed a lack of understanding of the complexities of
international relations. On the other hand, successive Sri Lankan
Presidents went out of their way to keep India in good humour and that
helped the country politically and militarily in its war with the LTTE.
In Eelam War III (1995-2002), the performance of the Security Forces was
far from satisfactory. By then, the LTTE had developed the Sea Tiger
wing - a daring guerilla navy that played havoc with the Sri Lanka Navy.
The Sri Lanka Army had suffered heavy casualties in defending
Mullaithivu and suffered a huge setback in Elephant Pass despite its
superior strength and firepower. In that operation, the LTTE acquired
its modern artillery, armour and high-tech communication systems apart
from capturing equipment.
At the start of the peace process, the Security Forces were a
demoralized lot. The terms of the peace process further added to their
misery as it prevented them from retaliating when the LTTE’s pistol
groups systematically eliminated the forces’ intelligence operatives and
killed even military commanders during the first three years of peace.
In this backdrop, no one was sure of the ability of Sri Lanka’s
Forces to sustain an offensive against the LTTE when Eelam War IV
started in 2006. Even after the LTTE defeat in Mavil Aru in the Eastern
Province in July 2006, the Security Forces were cautious in their
optimism.
However, the LTTE belied the defence analysts’ expectations when it
floundered in the Eastern Province, offering stiff resistance only in
patches. Perhaps, it was at this time that Rajapaksa and Fonseka made up
their minds to go the whole hog against the LTTE in the North.
Failure
Although Prabakaran has demonstrated strategic military capability in
the past, he appears to have failed to draw two obvious strategic
deductions in the developing war scenario, which put the LTTE at a
disadvantage.
The first was not factoring the impact of the defection of Karuna,
his able military commander from Batticaloa, on the LTTE’s overall
military capability.
The second was in underestimating the determination of Sri Lanka’s
political and military leadership to turn Rajapaksa’s promise to
eliminate the LTTE into a reality.Prabakaran never made any effort to
patch up with Karuna, who had grievances with respect to the poor
representation of Easterners in the leadership although they provided
the bulk of the LTTE cadre. Instead, he dispatched killers to eliminate
Karuna.
The Tiger leader commanded wide support among cadre in the east,
particularly around LTTE strongholds in Batticaloa. A direct consequence
of his defection was the disbanding of a bulk of LTTE cadre, other than
Karuna’s core supporters.
It also drove Karuna into the arms of the Sri Lanka Army for
protection. So when the war started in the east, the LTTE’s strength as
well as its manoeuvring space was reduced.
In the course of time, recruitment from the East to augment LTTE
strength petered out. Ultimately, when the Security Forces launched
their offensive in the North with huge numerical superiority, the LTTE
did not have the essential strength to face the onslaught. It was clear
that the LTTE would not be able halt the Security Forces by conventional
warfare.
However, somehow Prabakaran failed to use his superior insurgency
tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional warfare. Instead,
the LTTE adopted a passive defensive strategy with a line of bunds that
reduced the natural advantage of guerilla mobility enjoyed by the cadre.
The bunds imposed a limited delay as they required heavy firepower to
break up the offensive. This was a luxury that the LTTE did not enjoy.
Military capability
The second aspect was the LTTE leader’s failure to read the mind of
Rajapaksa. In his first two years in Office, the President had oriented
his entire policy framework towards the goal of eliminating the LTTE.
His strong support to the operations of the Security Forces, regardless
of national and international compulsions, enabled the Army Chief to
plan and execute his offensive.
Prabhakaran failed to take into account the impact of Karuna’s
defection from the LTTE on its overall military capability.
His strategic direction of war, operational planning and neat
execution undoubtedly paved the way for success. In the words of
Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, the distinguished Indian Army
officer, Fonseka “displayed the qualities of a great military leader
nations are blessed with from time to time”. In short, under Fonseka’s
leadership, the demoralized Armed Forces reinvented themselves to become
a well-knit and highly motivated force.
As a result, when the Security Forces went to war in 2006, they were
well-trained and enjoyed superiority in firepower and mobility.
Learning from the past, they built up force levels on land, in the
air and at sea to ensure success against the Tigers. The Army went on a
recruiting spree. For instance, in the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops
were added, to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, four task
force contingents and two divisions.
The Army now has 13 divisions, Three Task forces and one armoured
brigade. Evidently, Prabakaran failed to read the sea change taking
place in the capabilities of the Security Forces and adapt his tactics.
Instead, he stuck to a conventional warfare mode that was doomed to fail
although it inflicted casualties on the advancing troops.
The humane aspect; which the LTTE failed to capture |
Fonseka adopted a multi-pronged strategy to split the defending Tiger
ranks and keep them guessing. It aimed at pinning down the LTTE at the
forward-defended localities astride the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road in the
North from Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and in the South along the
Palamoddai-Omanthai line.
This prevented the LTTE from thinning out the troops to reinforce its
defences along other axes. Offensives along two broad axes were
launched: along the Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A-32 Road on the west coast
to block LTTE access to Tamil Nadu through the Mannar Sea and along the
Welioya-Mullaithivu-Puthukudiyiruppu line on the east coast.
Operations on these axes progressively cut off the external supply of
military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea. In tandem
with ground operations, the Sri Lanka Navy progressively curtailed the
freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevented LTTE shipments from
reaching the Sri Lanka coast. In well-planned raids in international
waters, the Navy destroyed eight ships of the LTTE’s tramp supply
shipping fleet in 2006-07.
Despite faltering steps at times, the Security Forces maintained the
momentum of their offensive in the North from the second half of 2007,
which culminated in the dramatic capture in January 2009 of Kilinochchi,
the so-called administrative capital of the LTTE.
This capture contributed largely to the rapid advance of the Security
Forces in areas east of the A-9 axis, which never gave the withdrawing
LTTE a respite or permitted it to deliver a strong counterstroke.
In the present Eelam war, except for a short-lived surprise offensive
in the Jaffna peninsula in the early stages of the confrontation in the
North, the LTTE was never able to launch proactively a major offensive
or a sizable counteroffensive against the Security Forces that would
have turned the course of the war.
The LTTE strategy of carting off all the civilians from captured
areas to areas under its control after the fall of Kilinochchi is
questionable.
This reactive defence strategy affected the mobility of cadre,
pinning them down to static defences rather than allowing them to adopt
a resilient mobile withdrawal strategy.
This strategy neither prevented the Security Forces from using their
heavy weapons or Air Force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as
human shields. It only generated adverse publicity, and that the
Security Forces were also blamed for the same callousness in dealing
with ordinary people is no consolation as they have emerged as victors.
The performance of the LTTE in Eelam War IV glaringly displayed
Prabakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional warfare.
As he is an astute military leader, if he survives the current ordeal,
he will put on his thinking cap to reinvent the LTTE, just as Fonseka
reinvented the Security Forces when he took on the monumental task of
reviving them and leading them to war.
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