Behind the Climb Down
Vir SANGHVI
So, where does India stand on the nuclear deal now? After what both
Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi said at the HT Summit, it is clear that
political pundits who have been predicting (and in some cases, itching
for) a confrontation between the government and the Left will have to
revise their assessments.
It is as clear that the conventional wisdom in Delhi that we were
looking at a general election in March will have to be overhauled.
But first, here are the things that haven’t changed no matter what
the Big Two said at the Summit. One: few unbiased observers doubt that
the deal works to India’s advantage. You don’t have to think very much
of the US or of George W Bush to see that India gains a backdoor entry
into the hitherto restrictive club of nuclear weapons states.
The negotiations that have led up to the agreement represent a
remarkable diplomatic triumph for India. Two: it is as clear that the
Left’s real objections are not to the deal at all but to any kind of
alliance with the United States.
The Communist parties have never forgiven the US for winning the Cold
War and cannot abide the thought that any government over which they
have some influence will draw India closer to Washington. This feeling
may be most loudly expressed by the Politburo but it extends all the way
down to the cadre.
Because the Left cannot say that it opposes the deal only out of
blind anti- Americanism, it has dressed up its objections in specific
terms: one aspect of the 123 Agreement, another clause in the Hyde Act
etc.
Three: there is a huge level of impatience with the Left within the
UPA. Even otherwise responsible politicians believe that the Communists
may be protecting Beijing’s interests. Moreover, there is growing anger
over the bullying rhetoric employed by sections of the Left chiefly the
CPI, whose leaders now spend more time on briefing the press than on
making policy.
All that still holds true. So, why the apparent change in stance?
Well, that’s more complicated. First of all, I think it is wrong to say
that the UPA was ever dead set on a confrontation with the Left to the
extent that it believed that the nuclear deal was a make-or-break issue
for the government.
The allies supported the deal but never regarded it as vital to the
continuance of the government. The Congress was more enthusiastic but
its members have a historical suspicion of American foreign policy
objectives. These suspicious were allayed by the assurances offered by
Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi, but they never fully vanished.
Sections of the Congress wanted an April election. If the government
waited a year then the monsoon might well fail and food prices could
shoot up leading to anti-incumbency sentiment.
The bulk of the party, however, was not ready to fight a general
election. State units said that they needed more time and it was feared
that an election now would benefit neither the Congress nor the BJP but
would only work to the advantage of such wild cards as Mayawati whose
aura has yet to fade in UP.
The allies were less conflicted. No party not the DMK, the RJD or the
NCP wanted an election. Many felt that the deal was an electoral
non-issue and some feared that Muslims would be told that a vote for the
deal was a vote for George W Bush and his “anti-Islamic foreign policy”.
Third, there was the question of what would happen after the
election. As no party would get an overall majority, one of several
situations could result. The NDA (with the BJP as its primary
constituent) could form the government.
Given that the BJP has publicly opposed the deal as an affront to
India’s sovereignty, an NDA government could not have gone ahead with
it. A more likely outcome (judging by the opinion polls) was that the
Congress would increase its tally at the expense of the Left and the
BJP. But even if that happened, the Congress would still not have got an
overall majority.
It would have needed the support of Mayawati (who does not back the
deal) or the Left in addition to its existing allies to form a
government. In that case we would have been back to square one the deal
was still a goner.
The most feared outcome was a Third Front government with somebody
like Mayawati or Jayalalithaa as Prime Minister. Such a government would
have needed the Left to make up a parliamentary majority.
And so, the deal would have stalled anyway. No matter how you did the
math, there was no way that an election would have thrown up a
government capable of passing the deal.
In the circumstances, once tempers had cooled and the UPA had taken a
long, hard look at the choices, the Big Two were left with only one real
option: stick with the status quo, and try and negotiate again with the
Left. That realisation accounts for their statements at the HT Summit.
So, what does the immediate future hold? My guess is that the
government will tell the US that it is slowing down the process of going
ahead with the deal. Next, it will offer to consult the Left at every
step and to take its objections into account rather than treat the
nuclear agreement as a done deal and rush ahead with its
operationalisation.
That “victory” may give the Left leaders the moral authority they
need to support an amended version of the original deal. They can now
claim that they’ve forced the UPA to back down and to remove some of the
“pro- American” clauses from the deal. If that happens, then the deal
will go ahead.
It will almost certainly be delayed and it will be tweaked, but the
essence will be preserved. Alternatively, the Left could simply decide
to be bloody-minded and not accept any version of the deal at all. On
Friday, the Prime Minister told the HT Summit that if the deal died he
would be disappointed but not necessarily devastated life would still go
on.
Some observers have interpreted this remark to mean that the deal is
definitely dead. But it is more likely that the denouement has been
postponed rather than cancelled. If the Left can show a degree of
flexibility now that the PM has demonstrated a willingness to compromise
on his core agenda, then the deal could still go ahead.
But the entire episode leaves us with several lessons. It teaches us
that in a coalition situation it does not pay to provoke allies whose
support you need for survival. It reminds us that no matter how much the
Congress may strut, it does not really have a mandate.
It is the UPA with the support of the Left that has the mandate. And
it tells us that the recent media caricature of Manmohan Singh as a
poorly-advised, single-issue Prime Minister who is overly reactive, and
easily misled into being needlessly provocative and foolishly stubborn
is not accurate.
When it comes to the crunch, the Prime Minister has shown that he can
look at the big picture, pull back and demonstrate the flexibility that
you need to lead a coalition.
Hindustan Times |