Theoretical perspective of peace process
PEACE PROCESS: Looking last week at the spanners being thrown
into the body politic, and in particular the peace process, by Ranil
Wickremesinghe and his ilk, I thought it would be useful this week to
attempt some sort of a theoretical perspective with regard to that
process.
Karu Jayasuriya
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Nimal Siripala de Silva
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Prof. Tissa Witarana
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I do not mean by this the traditional theories that are propagated
without attention to practicalities in the various peace studies courses
that have sprung up over the last few years.
Having acted as External Examiner since its inception for the
Bradford University Peace Studies Diploma, I was overwhelmed with
information about Track 1 etc and Lederer and Co, but found little
ability or motivation to apply all this systematically to the Sri Lankan
context.
But, that does not mean such theories are irrelevant. The fault lies
not with them, nor indeed with the Bradford approach.
The problem rather was the corrosive corruption engendered by our
education system, in which lifting large chunks of material from
elsewhere, without even marginal adjustments to disguise outdated
references, passes for scholarship.
Unfortunately, with inadequate supervision, this passed muster more
often than not, while the attitudinal changes such a programme should
have promoted seemed a pipe dream.
Approaches
I was particularly struck in those days by the dogmatic approach of
the candidates from Kilinochchi, who I was told were relatively high up
in the LTTE hierarchy. Some of them seemed comparatively sharp, but many
of their essays suffered from undigested recapitulations of the
iniquities of the Sri Lankan state.
There were no attempts to distinguish between different approaches
that had been adopted, nor any distinctions between racism, which
certainly existed, and political pusillanimity, which was also relevant.
Of course it could be argued that the results were the same, a raw
deal for Tamils, culminating in the state sponsored violence of 1981 and
1983. But if one is serious about peace, it is necessary to adopt a less
rigid approach, to look for aspects that would lead to consensus.
In that sense there seemed greater flexibility in say the army
candidates from the Colombo center, who were willing to grant that there
had been much abuse on the part of the state.
It seemed a pity then that, in the flurry of apparent goodwill that
had marked the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002, there had not been more
concerted efforts to bring personnel at operational levels closer, to
seek common ground instead of continuing in crucial cases with long
established sectarian perceptions.
Such problems recurred to me when I began to think about the factors
essential for pursuing peace, distant as that may seem in the present
context. The first requirement obviously is to reduce aggression, which
seems again to be reaching worrying heights, with the recent bombs in
Colombo.
My own view is that aggression over the last five years has been
largely the responsibility of the LTTE, with the activities of the
Security Forces being primarily retaliation.
However that, that is a position that needs to be substantiated.
Doing this should not be difficult, given the restraint of the Rajapaksa
government during its first six months, despite the attacks on
servicemen towards the end of 2005. Indeed its restraint led to the LTTE
going back to the negotiating table, from which it had withdrawn nearly
three years earlier.
However, with the subsequent not entirely straightforward withdrawal
of the LTTE from negotiations, its provocations, most notably the
attempt on the life of the Army Commander, led to retaliation which is
now presented internationally as a resumption of hostilities by a
warmongering government.
But having said all that, one has to realise too that perceptions are
of the essence. Not, I emphasise, the distorted propaganda of the
opposition leader, but the perceptions of the LTTE. I do not think it
makes any sense to try to convince Wickremesinghe, because his hypocrisy
is beyond repair.
However, clearly there are members of the LTTE who sincerely believe
that they are victims, and their own hostile acts are merely retaliation
for aggression on the part of the government. Setting the record
straight with them is something that should be done with sympathy, with
the government bending over backwards to show that, whilst terrorist
aggression cannot be tolerated and will be met with retaliation, acts of
war will not otherwise occur.
Sympathy
I use the word sympathy advisedly, for it seems to me that, apart
from questions of aggression, the other area that must be addressed in
any meaningful peace process is that of the resentments that must be
reduced. In this respect I am absolute in my conviction that the balance
is on the Tamil side, and that it is the responsibility of the
government to do all it can to assuage feelings.
Certainly there is resentment amongst many Sinhalese, and the bombs
the LTTE seems so free with now are clearly designed to increase that
resentment until it leads to further conflagration.
But the bottom line is that, whereas the LTTE may be responsible for
these acts of terrorism, they have nothing to do with Tamils at large.
Contrariwise, Tamils at large were the victims of state terrorism, on
two seminal occasions, which are without a doubt the rationale for the
reliance placed now on the LTTE by many Tamils, particularly those of
the diaspora.
Of course those horrors cannot be laid at the door of the current
government, nor indeed the governments of the previous three Presidents.
Except for President Wijetunge, the others have made it clear that they
see themselves as representing all races in this country.
But the fact remains that an elected government of this country (or
rather an elected President - most people would now accept that
Parliament after the preposterous 1982 referendum was not legitimate)
perpetrated atrocities upon a minority on two occasions.
Those lie at the heart of LTTE propaganda, as the recent debate in
the House of Commons made only too clear. With acolytes like
Wickremesinghe prepared to perpetuate the myth that the situation is now
worse, resentments can only rise.
Privileges
Unfortunately for the government, though it has done nothing to rouse
such resentments, it has a responsibility, as an elected government,
successor to the monstrosity of the eighties, to assuage the feelings
roused then.
Though it may seem irrational for the British government and church
to apologise for the brutalities of the slave trade, given how long ago
it happened, such actions make a lot of practical sense, for emotions
have nothing to do with rationality. The assumption of office, in the
context of perpetual succession, means that one has to pay for the sins
of one’s predecessors.
In that light, it is the responsibility of the current government to
do all it can to soothe resentments, to convince the vast majority of
Tamils that they are an integral part of the Sri Lankan State, enjoying
the privileges and dignities and security of their fellow citizens.
Many Tamils now, though by no means as many as the LTTE claims, see
the LTTE as their only refuge, and this is the more serious amongst the
diaspora which contributes so much, not only to LTTE funds but to the
perceptions of foreign governments.
Proposals
Dealing with such perceptions will not be easy. Certainly it cannot
be done only by argument, even if substantiated by the historical
record. Rather, it also requires active measures now, to remedy the
wrongs that were perpetrated.
Fortunately the proposals of almost all parties suggest lines on
which consensus can readily be achieved, if not on the biggest issues of
all, certainly on smaller ones that are particularly germane to the
problem.
All parties for instance agree on measures that will ensure greater
participation by the minorities in the administration and in the
security forces. This does not require legal changes, but can be
achieved by administrative action, as was done with regard to education,
in theory to redress previous imbalances.
That was how standardization was introduced in the early seventies by
the United Front, and also the UNP government’s vicious reintroduction
of discriminatory quotas in 1978 after Cyril Mathew’s first disgusting
outburst against Tamils in Parliament.
Of course, given the appalling levels to which education has sunk in
many Tamil schools, and the eagerness and abilities of well educated
Tamils to seek better positions, it may be necessary to provide special
training to Tamils willing to serve the government in potentially senior
positions.
But this is obviously an area in which assistance will be readily
forthcoming, and the Ministry of Public Adminstration now clearly has
both the political will, and the ability, to move swiftly in this
direction.
Similarly the proposal of, for instance the EPRLF - P, that
minorities should be recruited in greater numbers into the Armed Forces,
can be pursued on the lines already proposed by the Ministry of Defence.
Though there may be some restrictions as to deployment in the current
context, the point is to make it clear that official bodies, and
particularly those that closely affect the citizenry, are not the
preserve of just one segment of the population.
Again, with regard to both Health and Education, recent
pronouncements show a willingness to move from the monolithic
centralised controls that have done so much damage over the years.
The Health Ministry had made some excellent suggestions in its
proposals published in the long term development plan of the government
and, though there is less coherence in the educational proposals, a
willingness to shift is apparent.
Sadly, there will be those who argue that, because any formula to
devolve or even decentralise cannot readily be implemented in Colombo,
where vested interests jealously guard the status quo in the grand
schools, there should be no structural changes. But, as was shown when
English medium was introduced, incremental changes that are made where
possible will facilitate changes on a larger scale in the future.
But pursuing development through allocating greater responsibilities
to subsidiary units will not be enough on its own. There is need also of
rebuilding and reinforcing the dignity that majoritarianism had eroded
over the years.
I used to think earlier that the proposal of two Vice-Presidents to
represent the minorities was nonsense, lip service that served no
purpose, and I see no reason to change this view. But I do realise that
a formal recognition of the involvement of minorities in the body
politic makes sense, and for this reason I welcome the suggestion in the
SLFP proposals to involve them more at the center.
Satisfaction
Unfortunately the particular scheme suggested may not serve the
purpose. But this is clearly an area in which, once the principle has
been accepted, devising a formula that provides general satisfaction
will not be difficult. And so too with electoral reform, which has
recently once again seemed a contentious subject.
Once the principles are agreed - and I have thus far seen no one who
disagrees with the basic principles of ensuring fairness as well as a
close relationship between the representative and the represented -
working out a generally acceptable formula should not be a problem.
I hope then that these two tracks, of constitutional and
administrative reform, will proceed smoothly over the next few months.
Obviously the larger problems cannot be solved, not at least until the
LTTE returns to the negotiating table. But there is no need to assume
that nothing can move until that happens.
On the contrary, incremental relief with regard to some of the
problems that have arisen over the years will make a more comprehensive
settlement much easier in the future. |