Govt, Security Forces rising to challenge of establishing extensive Air Defence System

LTTE fails to attack Palaly by air due to troops’ swift action; Tiger Air Wing a desperate attempt to boost faltering image:

AIR DEFENCE: The LTTE made their second attempt to launch an air attack on Tuesday, despite their failure to achieve their objective at Katunayake Airbase on April 2.

This time too they miserably failed in their endeavour as the Security Forces were on full alert about an impending air attack by the LTTE. The fierce resistance by the troops at Achchuveli and Palaly air base compelled them to give up their target and drop the bombs in an unexpected location at Myladi.

The Tiger Air Wing this time too made use of the same tactics as they did during the air attack on Katunayake airbase. They used the same time period they used to launch the attack on Katunayake air base, this time too to take advantage of the darkness and to escape becoming a direct target of the Security Forces fire.

But this time they had the target within the range of their artillery guns, to divert the attention of the Security Forces.

The Tigers at Pooneryn drew their artillery guns, after a lapse of a few months, to take the Palaly High Security

 Zone within their artillery range.

They commenced firing artillery rounds at 1.05 am towards the Palaly High Security Zone. Security Forces Headquarters in Palaly reacted to this situation within minutes, with artillery and Multi Barrel Rocket launchers.

Ten artillery rounds of the LTTE fell within the HSZ limits while another 10 fell outside the HSZ according to Security Forces.

While the Forces were taking measures to neutralise the artillery fire of the LTTE from Pooneryn side troops manning FDLs south of the Jaffna peninsula informed the Palaly Air Base about the sound of a suspicious aircraft heading towards Palaly at 1.10 a.m. five minutes after the LTTE started firing artillery rounds.

But there was a small delay on the part of the Security Forces to identify whether it was their own aircraft or an enemy aircraft as an Air Force plane was on a maritime patrol and reconnaissance mission in the area.

But troops at Achchuveli identified it as an enemy aircraft and fired towards it as it tried to enter the Palaly HSZ from Achchuveli. Due to the firing of troops they had diverted their air path towards Thondamanaru and tried to enter Palaly Air Base.

But, by this time all the guns at the Palaly airbase were ready to face the Tiger aircraft as they heard the sound of the aircraft flying at tree top level without lights, and guns started firing at the aircraft.

Having failed to enter the Palaly Air Base due to heavy resistance by the troops, the Tiger aircraft again diverted its path as they realised they cannot do any harm to the Palaly air base. They dropped three bombs at Myladi just 50 metres away from the sea as they found no other place to drop the bombs before reaching their escape route from the sea belt.

Six soldiers fell victim to the crude bombs made of iron balls that fell at Myladi junction on the Palaly-KKS road at 1.20 a.m. The Tiger craft then had proceeded to the Wanni within minutes from the Thondamanaru side. (The path taken by the Tiger air craft is marked in the map)

Though the Tiger outfit made a big noise about their mission, using its media network, they had not achieved much other than two small holes that had been created due to the explosion of the bombs in Myladi close to some old buildings.

To do a small damage, they first flew all the way from Wanni to Katunayake on the previous occasion. It was obvious that the Tigers took such a risk, since they launched the attack on the Katunayake air base. They than had the advantage of a surprise attack.

But this time they selected a short distance target, to take a minimal risk on the Tiger Air Wing as the ‘surprise factor’ no longer existed.

Adding to this they minimised the risk component, taking a different path to return to the Wanni after its failed mission in Palaly as they were well aware that there won’t be any return journey if they took the same path.

However, the question is, why the LTTE had used one of their precious assets to cause such a small damage. According to Security Forces assessment, the LTTE has the capability to cause bigger damage, using their artillery guns located more than 20 Kilometres away from Palaly air base.

Therefore, it is obvious that the LTTE has engaged in a psychological operation through this air attack as they had already tasted it, through the publicity campaign they launched following the air attack on the Katunayake Air Base.

The LTTE, which is now in its weakest position in the 30 years long history of the internal conflict of Sri Lanka, is in need of an immediate image boost locally and internationally.

One objective they are trying achieve through this image boost is to convince the Tamil diaspora across the globe vis-a-vis their fund raising campaigns.

This is because, many countries have frozen the channels of funds to the LTTE through the proscription of the LTTE as a terror organisation. The Tamil diaspora’s unwillingness to contribute to a weakening organisation which is facing continuous defeats at the hands of the Security Forces.

Therefore, it was an immediate necessity, on the part of the LTTE to have an international image boost to achieve their objective internationally.

The other objective of the LTTE is to boost its recruitment drive, after convincing young Tamils of their capabilities. The Tiger outfit is now facing a severe shortage of manpower, with hundreds of their cadres killed during Eastern battles while hundreds of other cadres are deserting the organisation unable to bear the tragic circumstances they had to face in battles.

The Tiger leader may made use of this attacks to convince the cadres as to why they should not desert the organisation. But, it is unrealistic on the part of the LTTE to mislead the Tamil community, using this game as

 a tool, as the Tamil community is wise enough to differentiate reality from fantasy.

The second question is why the Security Forces were unable to destroy the enemy aircraft for the second time with more troops attempting to shoot at the aircraft using various type of guns.

Though, it appears to be a simple task for those who are critical of the situation, it is a difficult task for the troops on duty to detect an air craft, flying at tree top level, since it is visible to them only for a few seconds.

The task becomes extremely difficult at night since they have to detect the aircraft only with its sound, since the Tiger aircraft had flown without lights on both occasions.

The soldiers in Myladi after they got the message about the enemy aircraft, tried their best to fire at the enemy aircraft, when it came to an open space close to the coast. This correspondent met many of the soldiers who fired at the LTTE aircraft, detecting it only by its sound, when he visited Palaly on Wednesday.

They explained how difficult it is to detect an aircraft which is flying at tree top level. They had heard only the sound but not seen the aircraft.

But the Tiger cadres on the aircraft probably equipped with night vision equipment must have seen the real danger when soldiers came out of their bunkers to fire at them after reaching open air space in the coast.

That must have been the exact reason for dropping bombs at Mylady junction which is only 50 metres away from the coast.

The third question that has arisen from this attack is as to why the Air Defence System (ADS) could not detect this Tiger Aircraft for the second time. During the first incident, there had been a technical fault with the Air Defence System.

According to the explanation given by the military, an active Air Defence System would basically function on four broad principles.

It begins with the function of detection where respective mechanisms are in place to render early warning of an enemy aircraft and it can be done either through Electronics (radar), Visual Observation or Intelligence. Currently the most favoured means across the globe is the Radar.

After the detection the second basic principle involved in the ADS is to have an identification mechanism to identify whether the detected suspicious target is friend or foe (IFF - Identification Friend or Foe).

Immediately after identification, an evaluation of the imminent threat needs to be done with lightning speed to ascertain the size, the probable payload and the speed of the target to facilitate the instantaneous assignment of weapons for example either interceptors, Missiles or AD guns.

The forth step in the ADS is weapons assignment. During this decisive phase, the weapon that can inflict the severest destruction to the target will be opted for. Enemy aircraft too close to a vulnerable area would immediately be subjected to “Missile Fire”, depending on their deployment, failing which Point Defence Mechanism, the Anti Aircraft Artillery would be activated.

For the establishment of an effective ADS, Controlling and Reporting Organization (Air Defence Radar System), Radar Guided Defence Gun System/ Anti Aircraft Artillery Guns and Surface to Air Guided Missile System are essential components.

When M.K. Narayanan, National Security Advisor to Government of India writing to then Sri Lankan President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga in September 2005, mentioned in his letter, “the Air Defence capabilities cannot be developed overnight since both concepts and infrastructure are involved”, in the process of establishing ADS.

That explained how difficult it is to establish an Air Defence System.

But, according to military experts the Air Defence Systems available at present are meant for conventional type of warfare. They are basically to detect aircraft from enemy countries, but not within their territory.

The conventional type of ADS cannot detect aircraft flying at tree top level.

Therefore, the task of the Air Force has now become more complex. The first option, available with them is to destroy the Tiger Air Wing on the ground. Since, the Tiger Air Wing, according to intelligence reports, is equipped only with less than three aircraft, they could be destroyed on the ground.

That needs surveillance and intelligence gathering to locate the aircraft.

The second option available for them is to have 24 hour surveillance to detect the Tiger aircraft as soon as they take off from the Tiger hideout in Wanni and activate the ground attack systems to destroy the aircraft.

Therefore, for such 24 hour surveillance a 3-D radar system is a must since it enables them to intercept the exact location, from which the aircraft had taken off, the speed of the aircraft and the altitude.

It is incumbent upon the SLAF to take whatever possible steps to nip the Tiger Air capabilities in the bud, not allowing the LTTE to develop further, without repeating the mistake that had happened when LTTE formed it Sea Tiger wing.

If authorities had taken steps to destroy the Sea Tiger capabilities, once the Tigers exposed their sea capabilities, the problem would have become this worse today.

In the same way, those who are critical of this Government are unaware of the fact that it was only the present Government which had laid a solid foundation to face Tiger air capabilities, by initiating the process of establishing Air Defence System in the year 2005.

In this context, a word of appreciation should also go to then Air Force Commander now holding the position of Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera for his courageous remarks when he wrote a letter to then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga about the Air Defence System of the country.

As a final remark on this column it is apt to quote the courageous remarks made by then Air Force Commander in his letter: “Whilst appreciating the assistance offered by a Government of a friendly nation to establish an Air Defence System for Sri Lanka it is strongly warned that National Air Defence Plan for Sri Lanka should not be compromised due to any external influence or pressures.”