Flying Tigers or Aerial folly

PROPAGANDA: It was as if the target of the LTTE was the tabloid press of the Western world that has already begun referring to “Flying Tigers” with some glee.

Among anchor persons and newscasters of international news channels who see terrorists only when viewed through the prism of Washington propaganda, the LTTE’s flying terror seemed a welcome relief from the bloody quagmire in Iraq, and the embarrassment that Britain faces in the Persian Gulf today.

If the international media was dancing for joy at their new discovery of the LTTE’s air capability, there were those in Sri Lanka too, ready to raise the decibel levels of cheap politics with an all but hidden nod of thanks to the LTTE.

Satisfaction at the LTTE’s attack on the Air Force Base at Katunayake was evident in the UNP’s rapid fire responses, that came both from party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and his wordy General Secretary Tissa Attanayake.

Forgetting that one swallow does not make a summer they were jumping to the most rash conclusions from the LTTE’s exercise in desperate frenzy, questioning everything the Government had so far said and demonstrated about curbing the power of the Tigers in the East.

Speaking at the launch of the 12,000 village development programme under the Jathika Saviya and Gama Neguma schemes, President Mahinda Rajapaksa set the LTTE’s attack in proper perspective.

He said: “Those who think they will be right on top if terrorism wins are making a grave mistake. No one can be pleased if terrorism is victorious. On September 11 the entire world was threatened with the airborne attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. This made the United States too agree on the need to eradicate terrorism worldwide. It is now clear that terrorism is a threat to our region too.”

Dramatic terror

In an interesting analytical piece Dayan Jayatilleka (Daily News - March 28, 07) had some well focused observations, on what may prove to be the aerial folly of the LTTE. He said, “the Air Tiger raid is not unprecedented in the annals of irregular warfare and terrorism as some breathless Western reporters would have it.”

Jayatilleka explained that: “The Palestinians launched a successful hang-glider raid on an Israeli army camp some years back.

In the late 1960s the Biafran separatists of the Ibo tribe in Nigeria had some western volunteer pilots flying light aircraft rigged with rockets under their wings. Of course Cuba has been attacked by air-terrorists flying light and sometimes not so light aircraft (except none of these emanated from Cuban soil, unlike the Air Tiger strike).

His important observation bound to displease those shouting themselves bloody hoarse about the escalation of the conflict in Sri Lanka is that “the capacity to launch dramatic terror raids from the air is no guarantee of success and not even an indication of it.

As the above mentioned examples demonstrate, the formations that launched these attacks were all defeated”, and this included the US supported Cuban emigres who carried out air attacks on Cuba.

In its efforts to divert the people away from the background to the LTTE’s air capability as seen today, the UNP is finding fault with all comments that it was in the initial period after the Cease Fire Agreement was signed in February 2002 that the LTTE began to acquire this capability.

Former foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar’s apprising of India, the US and other countries of the emerging air capability of the LTTE took place after the CFA was signed. It is no secret that the Sri Lankan authorities knew of this capability for some time, as did Indian intelligence.

Ceasefire factor

If it is the comments made by politicians about the CFA shelter for the LTTE that irks the UNP much, it may be interesting to note that the “Sunday Times” Defence Correspondent Iqbal Athas commenting live on Hiru FM soon after the air strike at Katunayake on Monday, said the LTTE utilised the opportunities provided by the CFA to strengthen its air capability, and that it was possible to identify one of its aircraft as being of Czech make.

This is what Colonel R. Hariharan, retired Military Intelligence officer and head of intelligence with IPKF in Sri Lanka, wrote in the Hindu on March 28: “The LTTE built up its air arm during the ceasefire period from 2002. This was partly confirmed by reconnaissance flights over its airstrip at Iranamadu.

Though the intelligence services and media had reported the build up of the LTTE’s air capability in 2003, the Sri Lankan Government perhaps chose to ignore the reports so as not to jeopardize peace parleys. (Emphasis mine.)

After the LTTE walked out of the peace talks and continued violating the Ceasefire, Sri Lanka raised objections to its development of facilities for an air arm. India had also expressed its growing concern.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission then took up the matter with the LTTE. Though the LTTE acknowledged the existence of an air wing, it did not give any other information.

During the ceasefire period, it also developed a second airstrip at Pudukuduiruppu (about 26 km northwest of Mullaitivu). When the Security Forces started hitting back in December 2005, LTTE air assets were one of the earliest targets.”

These are hard truths flying in the face of UNP apologists now trying to extricate themselves from the present morass by claiming the CFA had nothing to do with the LTTE’s present ability to carry out air strike as it did last Monday.

If the UNP is in fact the national party that it claims to be, it will serve the national interest better if it moves away from vituperation of the desperate kind and consider the realities of the current situation regarding the LTTE and its military strength in Sri Lanka, including its air capability.

It is interesting to quote Col. Hariharan again as he says that “The [LTTE’s] air raid was perhaps a bid to shore up credibility, not only among its cadres but also among Tamils both at home and abroad”.

Sagging morale

Despite the many attempts to show that the Security Forces have not weakened the LTTE by its recent operations, the more studied judgment is that this very weakening that has forced the LTTE to make itself an even worse pariah among the international community today.

The Tamil Diaspora may have cause for worry at what has happened. There is even more cause for worry for those who steadfastly see this ruthless killing machine of terror as a force of liberation of the Tamil people.

There is obviously a sense of frenzied desperation demonstrated by the LTTE in this attack. It is a desperation born from the fact that it can no longer convince the Tamil people that it can lead them even within distant sight of the much promised Eelam. Such desperation can lead to frenzied flight too.