Politics & People

Mangoes and Olive Branches

by Dr.Rajiva Wijesingha

POLITICS: A few months back I decided to abstain from politics in my newspaper columns. One reason was that things seemed very complicated and I thought it is best to study what was happening more carefully before reaching any conclusions.

Another was that I was engaged in producing for publication a couple of books on Sri Lankan politics, which fairly well took up the side of my head reserved for such subjects.

Besides, in finalising those books I felt that politics had reached a sort of breathing space, a plateau at which developments would be along predictable lines, as they had been after President Kumaratunga had been elected for her first term.

My last two historical accounts of Sri Lankan politics had been published during such periods, which provided full stops or at least semi-colons to the periods of turmoil that had preceded them.

The Process of Consolidation

In President Rajapaksa’s case, as with President Premadasa for different reasons, the plateau was harder to reach. In that case it had been because of the continuing JVP insurrection, this time it was because of the turmoil that continued and indeed increased immediately after the November 2005 election.

I refer to the tremendous Tiger provocation of December 2005 when so many sailors were killed, and the drawing rooms of Colombo, bitter about the result of the election, insisted that open war would soon start and the world at large would hold the government responsible.

The Government however was not to be wrong footed. They refused to be provoked and gradually the world began to realise that, while the Tamil cause required attention and sympathy, the Tigers were indeed terrorists who had to be restrained.

Conversely, the Government did not fall into the trap of submitting tamely to all provocation, and made it clear that attacks would be countered forcefully.

The result was that, though there were setbacks such as at Muhumalai, which illustrated the need for more careful planning, it was clear by the end of 2006 that the advantages the Tigers had gained during the initial period of the Ceasefire had been neutralised.

And, impressively, the Government achieved this without leaving room for complaints of violence against civilians.

Allegations of atrocities could be countered with evidence of what had really happened, as with the orphanage that turned out to be a training camp, or the school from which mortars were launched. Conversely Tiger terrorism, against civilians, against soldiers on leave, against the Army Commander and the Secretary of Defence, made clear their total disregard for the Ceasefire.

In such a context, the authority of the President steadily increased, while elements in the opposition began to recognise, and to voice, the need to support him in particular areas in the national interest.

Whether because of such elements, or international pressure, the Leader of the Opposition responded positively to the President’s overtures and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed that seemed to signify progress by consensus during the foreseeable future.

And though there was criticism of this from the JVP, they along with the JHU seemed to confirm basic support for the Government. In short, while there was bound to be argument over any major constitutional or policy changes, it seemed that Presidential authority was widely accepted, with his political opponents having only to react for at least a year or two, rather than make any running themselves.

All that has changed drastically in the last month. The crossover to the Government of 18 UNP MPs, including almost all who combine proven leadership qualities with national stature, seemed immeasurably to strengthen the President’s hand while destroying the consensus that was supposed to have been so promisingly formed.

However, the aggressive opposition of the JVP signified that the Government would have to face active opposition on two fronts which, given the vagaries of Sri Lankan politics, could even combine for negative reasons, whatever their policy differences.

This was then followed by forceful expressions of dissent from within the Government party, which culminated in the dismissal of three Ministers including two of the most senior members of the Cabinet.

The fact that one of these could be reabsorbed into the Cabinet is really neither here nor there, since it does not detract from what might be termed an underlying structural problem.

I hope to look into the first two of these elements in the weeks to come, the crisis in the UNP as well as the response of the JVP to the accession of so many different interests, the SLMC as well as the reformists in the UNP, to the government.

This week however, I will concentrate on the latest development, the trauma within the SLFP, since this could in the short-term prove the most disruptive threat to the Government.

In commenting on these developments, I will try to adopt a different approach to that of the many political columns that provide such fascinating reading in different papers. Some, which provide detailed accounts of political developments in a particular week, are basically news reports.

Though they comment as well, from different angles, they do not really function as analysis, and certainly they tend not to provide detailed arguments for their conclusions. Other columns, which present interesting points of view, are not usually news analyses, but incline more to being features, based on underlying principles rather than review of current developments.

There are of course exceptions to these, but the title of this column I hope suggests a special feature I would like to dwell on, which is the importance of people in our political process.

Initially I had hoped to use the title ‘Politics, policies and people’, but I realised that that made little sense in a context in which policies rarely govern perceptions, actions or reactions. The JVP may be an exception to this rule, but I would argue indeed that it is an exception that proves the rule, as its history has shown.

My analysis will, I should make clear, be based on history as well as current developments, for I have no doubt that understanding of the past is a key to studying the present.

I will also look at developments in other countries because, whether we like it or not, we are all prey to general historical forces. To pretend we are unique, and cannot learn from others is a sure way to fall into traps that could be avoided.

Three Mango Musketeers

All this is by way of preamble to arguing that, to understand the current crisis in the SLFP, we need to look at the characters of three individuals. I mean the two Cabinet Ministers and, not Mr. Sooriyarachchi, whose past record does not really provide much evidence except in terms of the others involved, but rather President Kumaratunga.

Of the three, I am saddest about Mr. Samaraweera, because his record in office suggests an extremely capable Minister, able to take decisions quickly and ensure that they are implemented efficiently.

I hope that in his case reconciliation is possible, because he still has much to offer the country - and he also has a capacity to work together with people of different points of view, which should make him a useful ally for the President when he moves on to the structural reforms that must accompany the vision he expressed in his manifesto.

This is not true of Mr. Bandaranaike, delightful companion though he may be on convivial occasions. Indeed in any other country, except one in which a Cabinet can expand indefinitely, he would have been retired long ago, with full honours. He could then have made an excellent ambassador in a country like France, or even Cuba, which appreciates his strengths.

But he would be the first to admit that he has really done very little of benefit to the country in any of the Ministries he has held, Higher Education or Foreign Affairs or Tourism.

What he did instead was travel, which is why indeed one has to acknowledge the kindness of the President in giving him Tourism in 2005. He had after all made it very clear, being a direct sort, that he would have preferred Mr Rajapaksa not to win the 2005 Presidential Election.

It was bizarre then to have thought even for a moment that he might be appointed Prime Minister, and almost as bizarre to think he could have been made Foreign Minister in a context in which quick action was needed to ensure that we continued to receive high level international support.

But in giving him instead the portfolio which provided the greatest pretext for overseas travel, the President was I believe extending an olive branch that a more sensitive man would have grasped with appreciation.

Sadly, the Bandaranaikes were not able to recognise and respond to such gestures. Given what happened during the Presidential election, when the brother quite openly, and the sister much more tactfully, indicated that they were not on Mr Rajapaksa’s side, the latter must have been furious.

However, in his acceptance speech, having remembered Mr S W R D Bandaranaike and Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike as the original stalwarts of his party, the new President made it a point to also mention Mrs Kumaratunga. Watching that speech I had the impression that the words stuck in his throat, but he made an effort and brought them out with as much grace as he could muster.

In a better world, that should have been a reason for reconciliation, and Mrs Kumaratunga would have retired gracefully, and her services could well have been used in a context she and the new President would both have wanted.

But, sadly, President Kumaratunga found herself unable to forgive, though I suspect that, had she tried to articulate what she could not forgive, she would have found it difficult to specify.

After all, the only grouse she could logically have had was that of having lost a year of her term, but for that she had only herself to blame.

Even if the original oath was understandable, in the context of the horrifying attack she had just escaped, she and her advisers should surely have sought clarification once a doubt had been raised.

That happened in 2000 itself, but she did nothing to clarify the position until after Mr Wickremesinghe had raised a hornets’ nest - and once an ambiguity had been suggested, it was understandable that almost everyone else wanted the matter resolved as soon as possible.

But bitterness can be pervasive, especially if one thinks one has nothing to lose by it. So Mrs Kumaratunga refused to see her successor when he tried to meet her in London, and back in Sri Lanka she even gave an interview in which she attacked him harshly.

Unfortunately all this reflected badly on Mr Samaraweera who had been determined to maintain good relations with her, despite her initial anger with him as well for having contributed so much to the Rajapaksa Presidential campaign.

Of course it is conceivable that Mr Samaraweera was as keen as Mrs Kumaratunga to embarrass President Rajapaksa. Certainly there would have been many to insinuate as much to the President.

But given his general political savvy, as well as the fact that he has a long political future ahead of him, I find it difficult to believe that Mr Samaraweera would have been happy with the strange bedfellows Mrs Kumaratunga was willing to tolerate in her own more negative enterprise.

And it is such bedfellows, as opposed to disagreements over policy or personalities, that would have struck the President as potentially dangerous.

What was strange then was how far out on a limb Mr Samaraweera was willing to go with his friends, to the extent even of refusing to take the President’s many calls to him. Of course there are those who would argue that the President’s attempts to make contact, the many olive branches he extended as differences arose, were all hypocritical.

But the simple fact is that none of these gestures were necessary if he did not at least hope they might help to bridge the gap. The implication then is that he was sincere, and would have preferred to defuse the crisis amicably.

The metaphor of the mango that was used to describe Mr Samaraweera’s associates, a new sort of ginger group within the SLFP, was ironic, given his earlier relations with the two Bandaranaike siblings and the transitory nature of once close friendships.

I hope therefore that he responds actively to the olive branch, the symbol of reconciliation between different points of view, and does not allow himself to be overwhelmed by the emotional appeals of Mango friends.