Dr. N.M. Perera's policies and achievements as Finance Minister
Saman Kelegama
REVIEW: Dr. N.M. Perera was a colossal figure in the Sri
Lankan political sphere. Among his many roles, the role he played as the
Minister of Finance during the periods 1964/65 and 1970-75 stands
prominently.
The policies that Dr. N.M. Perera (henceforth NM) articulated and
implemented during his second term of office truly reflected his
ideology and realities of that time.
Dr. N.M. Perera |
Prof. Buddhadasa Hewavitharana, the author of the book, was closely
associated with the policy making process as the Economic Advisor to the
Ministry of Finance during 1970-75. In this book, he recollects the
political economy of the policy making process in order to explain the
underlying thinking and objectives of the policies.
The coverage of issues is vast but they have been methodically
arranged into four chapters, viz., Management of External Finances:
Policies and Measures; Management of Internal Finances: Policies and
Measures; Economic Development and Growth: Policies and Measures; and
Building Socialism and a Socialist Economy: Policy Perceptions and
Approaches. The author has gone through a vast array of literature
including his own writings/notes at that time to extract important
material to compile this book.
The book starts with the inherited economic crises of the United
Front government in 1970 - a foreign exchange crisis and a large
domestic financial imbalance. NM as the Finance Minister was not
prepared to accept the stringent conditionalities of the IMF.
For the first time, several 'Letters of Intent' of the IMF that the
previous regime had agreed to was tabled in Parliament where there was
prior commitment for a certain set of economic policies.
A number of previous short-term borrowing bills had to be settled
with the IMF. NM was of the opinion "small beggers cannot be big
choosers" (p.33) and if the country refused to honour these bills, it
would be treated as a bankrupt nation.
He did not want this to happen and went on to state: "we cannot brush
aside and completely ignore the International Institutions; we can
repudiate their terms only if we are prepared to face the far reaching
dislocations" (p. 07).
NM saw the transformation to a socialist society to be determined not
by heavy dependence on international financial institutions but by the
extent to which the country was willing to make sacrifices and increase
its productive work.
He always looked at economic management from a long-term perspective
and thus pursued a policy of containing present consumption via the
practice of austerity or 'tightening the belt'. A plethora of measures
were implemented to address both the external and internal deficits and
a massive effort was made towards domestic resource mobilisation for
economic development.
Accordingly, a system of higher taxation (capital levy, wealth tax,
etc.), income ceilings and forced and voluntary savings were introduced,
accompanied by price control and rationing of essential commodities. The
exchange control laws were tightened and extended to cover trade
malpractices and asset transfers.
External deficit
The author identifies the formation of the State Gem Corporation as a
shining example of NM's strategy to address the foreign exchange
shortage. As far back as 1937, NM was instrumental in setting up a
Select Committee of the State Council to inquire into the Gem Industry
and was also a member of that Committee.
From the mid-1960s, when he was the Finance Minister for a short
period, NM had an idea of formalising gem business in the country when
he argued in the then budget speech that the annual output from the gem
industry could be in the range of Rs. 100 million although the customs
recorded only Rs. 3.5 million worth of exports.
He argued that the bulk of it may have been smuggled out and fed the
black market operations in foreign exchange. In turn, the government not
only lost foreign exchange but also revenue because of the inability to
tax as there was no proof of income received.
The Gem Corporation was set up to "recapture this foreign exchange
that the country was getting deprived of" (p. 08). NM "prioritised
foreign exchange gains over local tax revenue gains in the trade-off
between foreign exchange earnings and tax revenue" (p. 12).
Among other incentives offered, the Convertible Rupee Account (CRA)
introduced in 1973 acted as a powerful incentive for increasing gem
exports via the SGC. The rate under the Foreign Exchange Entitlement
Certificate (FEECS) system inherited from the previous government
(introduced in 1968) was adjusted to support this initiative.
According to the author, by these measures the prevalent gem cutting
monopoly was diminished, the farcical rigged auctioning was broken, and
organised gem smuggling and related black marketing in foreign exchange
and goods was crushed. Gem exports rose steeply from a mere Rs. 3.4
million in 1971 to Rs. 152.8 million in 1973 to Rs. 234 million in 1974,
making gems the third largest export income earner and the lead item in
Sri Lankan non-traditional exports.
Another method by which NM attempted to address the external
imbalance was to set up an Export Import Bank (EIB). The genesis of this
was inspired by the socialist idea of liberating the country's financial
system from the control and influence of foreign banks.
Accordingly, a new EIB was to be created as a jointly-owned venture
with the government owning 51 per cent of the capital and 49 per cent to
be owned by the nine foreign banks that were in operation. This idea was
proposed from the perspective of servicing the non-traditional exports,
supporting exporters who did not have access to commercial banks at that
time, introducing export guarantee systems, etc.
A Committee Chaired by the author argued against it as the timing was
not correct given the very small size of the non-traditional sector.
Moreover, there was objection from the bankers, particularly, the Bank
of Ceylon which had a large lucrative foreign trade division. NM
accepted these realities and decided to abandon the idea of setting up
an EIB.
Internal deficit
The author notes "revenue increased at a slower pace than expenditure
and the gap between the two rates widened due to financial imprudence
..... Several years monetary expansion....... had by 1970 created a
cumulatively increasing inflationary pressure and an escalation in
prices" (p. 19). The country was basically living beyond its means and
corrective measures were urgently needed.
A revenue enhancing exercise was launched not by discovering new
sources but by making existing ones yield more revenue through
innovative methods in tax collection. Introduction of the PAYE (pay as
you earn) system, raising tax rates on luxury and semi-essential goods,
expanding tax coverage via an innovative demonetisation exercise were
noteworthy measures.
As a part of mobilising savings, a ceiling on disposable income was
imposed to contain consumption and collecting the income above the
ceiling as a contribution to compulsory savings. The objective was to
divert income from consumption to a process of saving and investment
through the budget. In the monetary history of Sri Lanka, the
demonetisation exercise was unique where the primary purpose was to
bring in tax evaders to the tax net. At that time, demonetisation was
conceived as the only measure that could possibly bring tax evaders to
the tax net.
It required the prevalent large denominated currency notes (Rs. 100
and Rs. 50) to be surrendered in exchange for new notes and in the
process, details of the owner were passed on to the Department of Inland
Revenue. Acting on this information, it was possible to rope in
additional sums of tax collection. The author provides an interesting
account of the preparatory work and the social response to this
exercise.
Promoting savings received top priority in NM's budgetary management.
He gave emphasis to non-inflationary financing of the budget deficit and
for this purpose he saw increasing savings as an essential ingredient.
Although measures such as demonetisation mobilised private savings,
and income ceilings to contain consumption and engage in compulsory
saving had some impact on saving, there was a need for an overall
institutional framework and policy to mobilise more savings.
The existing saving institutions were handicapped by their cumbersome
procedures for depositing or withdrawing money and by their inability to
mount aggressive savings mobilisation through attractive schemes.
Thus, the National Savings Bank (NSB) was established in 1972 by
merging the Post Office Savings Bank, the Ceylon Savings Bank, and the
Savings Certificate Branch of Post Master General. The bank interest
rates were raised to cap this initiative and thus "fulfilled a
pre-requisite for building-up a viable market for savings of all
sections of society" (p. 27).
NSB was not the only institution to support budgetary management. The
State Distillery Corporation (SDC) was established in 1971 to increase
public revenue among other objectives. Earlier, the Excise Department
(under the Ministry of Finance) was managing the State Distilleries and
it was not run on a commercial basis.
The author served as the Chairman of the Committee to overlook this
transition and played a key role in forming the new Corporation. NM's
initial idea was for the Corporation to take over the entire
distilleries and make it the sole monopoly of distilling arrack.
The Committee felt this was a too radical approach and advised
against it and NM following the Committee's recommendations made it take
over only the commercial functions of the State Distilleries.
The author documents steps taken to energise the new Corporation by
training toddy tappers, combating illicit liquor, etc. Many of the
objectives were achieved and today the SDC remains a major source of
revenue to the Government.
1973 Oil price hike
NM's guiding principle was 'long-term interest of the country before
short-term popularity'. Often at the risk of unpopularity with Cabinet
colleagues and the people, he pursued this policy. The second measure of
rice at subsidised price that the United Front government introduced had
to be scaled down and eventually withdrawn from the rationing system.
In 1973, at the time of the first oil price hike, import of
subsidiary foodstuff was banned to reduce the trade deficit. The concept
of 'self reliance' gathered full momentum in 1973. NM firmly believed
that Sri Lanka can cushion against all external threats if the country
develops its own resources and enters a path of self reliant growth.
Local import substitution industries could not catch up with demand
due to well known problems of the limitations of import substitution
industries and the government became very unpopular with shortage,
queues, etc. Revenue protection was uppermost in NM's thinking; when the
import price of sugar and flour rose and "profit margins and revenue
came under threat, the Minister did not hesitate to raise the sale price
of these items in order to protect revenue" (p. 22).
NM was convinced that channelling of increased resources for welfare
expenditure in the context of limited growth of revenue impairs the
availability of resources for development.
Continued on page 09
However, he did not take a pure technocratic approach to curtailing
welfare measures, but attempted to replace universal welfare with
provision of welfare on a selective basis. Withdrawal of the free ration
from the tax payers and introducing the two-tier pricing system for
sugar are a few examples. The author notes that these measures were not
very successful as they were one step behind the escalating world food
prices.
Development and growth
Chapter three deals with Economic Development and Growth. The
strategy for dealing with the problem of raising resources for
investment to achieve development was to increase savings by containing
present consumption via the practice of austerity. Income ceilings,
compulsory savings, cuts on welfare expenditure, and a 'climate of
austerity' were to provide the enabling framework. The growth,
investment, and productivity nexus as illustrated in standard economic
theory (Harrod-Domar model) was very much in NM's mind when he argued
that wages should be tuned to productivity levels and low productivity
should be addressed by increasing work intensity.
"For the investment that is made by mobilising resources to succeed,
its productivity must be high" (p. 33). Sri Lanka's wages were out of
proportion to her productivity at that time and this fact was recognised
by the ILO mission in 1971 headed by Professor Dudley Seers. NM proposed
'Workers Councils' to increase productivity.
The author identifies this as a first step towards socialism.
Worker-participation in management can generate a process of weakening
the wage-labour based consciousness and raising the level of social
consciousness to a point where eventually the workers can take over the
management (p. 59). NM in fact initiated an awareness programme on this
where the author played his role as the Economic Adviser.
That productivity was uppermost in his mind comes out clearly when
the author discusses the estate sector. When Land Reform was introduced
in 1972 NM looked at it in terms of increasing productivity and not from
a populist angle. NM was concerned about the break-up of economic units
under possible land fragmentation and the adverse impact on
productivity.
The author notes: "The impression I have is that the Minister viewed
the proposed land reform with much reservation, although he did not go
public about it" (p. 43).
In this Chapter, the author covers a number of issues such as the
take over of the Plantation Companies in 1975. But what is noteworthy is
how some of the policies that NM wanted to pursue got diluted due to
ideological differences between the LSSP (of which NM was the leader)
and the SLFP (key political party of the United Front coalition).
For instance, capital expenditure allocations which came under the
Ministry of Planning were not in accordance to the expectations of the
Ministry of Finance.
The author highlights the uneasy relationship between the Ministry of
Finance led by NM and the Ministry of Planning, where most crucial
issues were handled by the Secretary to the Ministry, Prof. H.A. de S.
Gunasekera, and his unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the differences.
The failure of the Five Year Plan (1972-1976) to take-off the ground
could also be partly attributed among other factors to this conflict of
the two Ministries.
Socialist economy
The last Chapter is on Building Socialism and a Socialist Economy. In
a socialist economy social consciousness emerges as the integrating
force of the socialist process with planned economic development
process. In essence, it is the driving force of a political economic
process.
NM always argued that a radical transformation of the economy cannot
be done unless the level of social consciousness is high. He warned the
JVP that there are no easy shortcuts to socialism.
A heightened social consciousness was necessary to motivate different
groups in society so as to mobilise them effectively to make a success
of the implementation of the Five Year Plan, which was the means of
achieving the development objectives.
The author highlights the problems encountered in creating social
consciousness in a coalition political set up and where the social
consciousness was low.
Then the author moves on to highlight policies and measures of
socialistic forms that had strong redistributive elements (pp. 53-55).
The popular concept in the 1970s 'redistribution with growth' was close
to NM's thinking even before it was advocated by Robert McNamara - the
then Chief of the World Bank.
Reflections
The author has enriched the narrative with wit, humour, and some
anecdotes. Moreover, the documentation of his interaction during the
policy formulation process with a galaxy of LSSP leading lights of that
time, viz., Colvin R. De Silva, Bernard Soyza, Hector Abhayavardhana,
Doric De Sousa, and Osmund Jayaratne adds colour to the narrative.
An investigative reader may look into some data. For instance, to
what extent did the NSB assist non-inflationary budgetary financing?; to
what extent did the demonetisation exercise enhance government revenue
?; how effective were the income ceilings and compulsory savings in
curtailing consumption and promoting savings? These are not mentioned in
the book.
Thus, to comprehend some of the points highlighted by the author it
would be essential to delve into the Budget Speeches and Central Bank
reports of 1970-75 period and this is left to the interested researcher.
But giving such data analysis may not have been the intention of the
author from the beginning. As stated in the concluding remarks: "This
book is not about evaluation of the totality of policies and activities"
(p. 60).
It is imperative to note that both the external and internal deficits
became major issues for NM and he gave priority to rectifying them by
repaying short-term debt, tightening import controls, and engaging in a
massive domestic resource mobilisation effort.
He attempted this strategy at a time when the terms of trade
deteriorated from 260 in 1970 to 145 in 1975 (44 per cent decline),
international oil prices soared from 147 in 1972 to 826 in 1975 (price
index of oil with 1969-100). It was also a time when the Bretton Woods
system of orderly exchange rates collapsed creating chaos in currency
management.
On the domestic front, the 1971 insurgency had disrupted the supply
side of the economy, the 1972 republican constitution had re-emphasised
"economic independence" and less external dependence, 1974 was marked by
a severe drought, etc. These factors both from the external and internal
fronts posed a serious challenge to NM's strategy and the Five Year
Plan.
In this negative economic environment whether the strategy of
austerity that NM pursued went too far needs to be discussed in detail.
For instance, Ronald Herring, in an article in the Economic and
Political Weekly in 1987, identified the Sri Lankan economy at that time
as the most controlled and restricted economy outside the Soviet bloc.
Whether the policy response to the situation was the most appropriate
also needs to be examined. For instance, would a flexible exchange rate
policy instead of a fixed exchange rate with import controls have
reduced the burden on the masses in terms of shortages and high prices?
That the social consciousness movement did not make an impact was
clearly seen in the 1977 electoral verdict when the political left was
completely wiped out from parliamentary positions. Thus while the
overall objectives and goals may have been appreciated, people were not
prepared to forgo consumption for nearly 5 years for the sake of future
development.
Economic historians will judge the 1970-75 period according to their
ideological bias. Critics will dismiss the policies of this period
stating that they were too restrictive and inward looking and prevented
Sri Lanka emulating the high growth of East Asian Tigers and made it a
latecomer in global integration.
The supporters will say that some of these policies laid the
foundation for strengthening the domestic production base, and had more
time been given, Sri Lanka would have come out of austerity for a
full-scale development take-off. Whatever the judgement is, Economic
Historians can do a detailed assessment of this important period in Sri
Lanka and assess NM's contribution given much of the valuable
information given in the book.
One thing is clear from the authors narrative, i.e., NM did not fail
to temper his ideologies with pragmatism and the result was some home
grown wisdom and innovative thinking. NM was a rare kind of statesman
when compared with most of the present day politicians. He valued
scholarship, was prepared to listen and learn and change his mind when
required.
This is an altogether engaging book and a must read to all those who
are interested in the progress of the Sri Lankan economy over a period
that is now dismissed by some commentators as a 'dark era'. The book is
indeed a valuable addition to the current literature on the Sri Lankan
economy.
(This is a review of a book on Dr. N.M. Perera written by Prof. B.
Hewavitharana, Standford Lake Publication, 2006). |