Contrasting performances in India
Dayan JAYATILLEKA
"...as long as they accept, as we have
previously said, our condition of being a country that will not tolerate
shadows over its independence, and based on the principles of equality,
reciprocity, non-intervention and mutual respect."
- Raul Castro (Dec 2, 2006)
LESSON: Most Sri Lankans would be greatly relieved that war veteran,
Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa escaped the Tigers' suicide
terrorism.
The lesson is clear: unless we pre-empt them, they will come for us
and decapitate our nation. Of course preventive self defence does not
mean doing so in the ill-thought out manner of Jayasikuru/Agnikheela/Muhamalai.
Mahinda's innings
Any patriotic Sri Lankan would also be pleased with the performance
in India, of President Rajapaksa and his team, including, prominently,
Minister Douglas Devananda, who turned 50 just a few weeks before. (This
despite Mahinda's alleged marginalisation of Tamil democratic allies).
President Mahinda Rajapaksa with Congress President Sonia Gandhi.
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On Indian soil, Mahinda Rajapaksa held his ground, refusing to be
cowed or crowded, declining to retreat from his representation and
defence of the Sri Lankan position that:
(i) The LTTE has been waging a war of aggression, eschewing chances
for a negotiated peace.
(ii) The democratic Sri Lankan State has the inalienable right to
self-defence and prioritisation of national security.
(iii) The State is doing its best for Tamil civilians, and casualties
among them have been inadvertent - due to the LTTE's human shield
tactics and "the fog of war"; some episodes are under investigation
(iv) The Sri Lankan Government's position is not militarist, the door
is open for negotiations; with or without the LTTE the political reform
component is maximum devolution either within a unitary State or a State
that is neither unitary nor federal in nomenclature.
(v) Having learned from the fiasco of the domestically de-stabilising
Indo-Lanka accord, this political reform will and must issue from a
broad-based, multiethnic and multiparty consensus, which is already on
the horizon.
Meanwhile, the Leader of the Opposition and the UNP, Ranil
Wickremesinghe, also 'messaged' India. Consider for instance the
following paragraphs of his speech. First, his second paragraph:
"After the elections, the LTTE started an Intifada type uprising in
Jaffna, protesting that the Government was going back on its
undertakings. Karuna's paramilitary group re-commenced the killing of
LTTE supporters. In retaliation, the LTTE started laying claymore mines
and a number of military vehicles were blown up, resulting in a large
numbers of deaths."
Firstly and most directly, by labelling it retaliation, he covers up
the Tigers' initiation of war against the State mere weeks after the
election.
Secondly and indirectly, by defining the actions of the LTTE's
civilian front as a protest against the newly incoming Rajapaksa
administration's alleged resiling from the CFA, he confers legitimacy
upon these actions and actors, notwithstanding the facts that the
just-elected president had done nothing to signal withdrawal from the
CFA; these protests called for the removal of the High Security Zones;
and the civilian protestors were recruits to the LTTE's new militia and
had recently received military training.
In both instances, the LTTE's actions are made to look reasonable and
even justifiable. In both cases, Wickremesinghe engages in a remarkable
sleight of hand.
If in fact the LTTE's attacks were in retaliation, they should have
been against the Karuna group or their other Tamil rivals, not the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces, which, even in Wickremesinghe's re-telling were not
the perpetrators of the initial killings.
If it were a matter of understandable 'retaliation', it should have
been proportionate to the original incident, which was that of the
killing of two persons. Instead dozens of Armed Forces personnel died in
a spate of claymore attacks and ambushes.
Secondly Wickremesinghe, who painstakingly contextualises all the
deeds and depredations of the LTTE, chooses by contrast to omit the fact
that the Karuna group attempted a peaceful resolution of their
differences with Prabhakaran.
It was the latter that brushed aside offers of mediation by civic
leaders in the East and launched a military offensive on Good Friday
2004 - aided and abetted by Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga - against
Karuna. So, Prabhakaran got his 'retaliation' in first, as is his wont.
If the killings of the pro-Tiger elements in Jaffna were indeed by
Karuna's men, or any other group such as the EPDP, it was retaliation
against lethal violence launched and sustained by Prabhakaran throughout
the ceasefire period.
Contrary to Wickremesinghe's insinuation, there is no legitimate
reason for the LTTE to have targeted the Sri Lankan Armed Forces,
killing up to 90 in the first few weeks after President Rajapaksa's
election. This was before any attacks or counterattacks by the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces.
Here is another extract of Wickremesinghe's lecture:
"The Government of Sri Lanka took no action to disarm the
paramilitary, arguing that the Tamil paramilitary forces were operating
outside the areas controlled by the Army.
As a result, violence erupted again in March. It escalated after the
killing of a prominent leader of the TNA inside the high security zone
in Trincomalee.
The second round of talks, set for April 2006, was postponed. Since
then, seven months of escalating violence have brought a suicide bomb
attack on the Army Commander; the explosion of a land mine in
Kebethigollawa, resulting in the death of nearly 60 passengers
travelling in a bus; sea battles between the Navy and the Sea Tigers;
the abduction and killing of Tamil civilians in Colombo District; air
strikes within the areas controlled by the LTTE, including the
Mullaitivu hospital; artillery shelling of the Vaharai refugee camp; the
Army clearing the LTTE from parts of Trincomalee District; the killing
of another very popular TNA Member of Parliament; and the killing of
security forces personnel, LTTE members, and Karuna group members."
Looking at this paragraph I have excerpted from Wickremesinghe's
speech, one notes again the justification of LTTE aggression: "as a
result" being the crucial phrase.
What is their bloody aggression a result of? The Government's refusal
to disarm the alleged paramilitary groups as demanded by the Tigers in
Geneva. Given that these groups were picked off like stray dogs by
Prabhakaran's killers during Wickremesinghe's CFA, how did one expect
them to survive other than by active armed self-defence?
In Wickremesinghe's paragraph reproduced here, there is no mention of
the ethnicity of the victims of the Kebithigollawe massacre, namely
Sinhalese, but there is a mention of those abducted or killed in
Colombo, namely Tamil!
The bombing of the Mullaitivu hospital and the shelling by the army
of the refugee camp are not explained as accidental - or even
probably/possibly accidental -but are listed as if they were deliberate.
There is a positive description of the late Raviraj, but no mention -
let alone description - of Kethesh Loganathan, a well-known conflict
resolution intellectual written up posthumously in the New York Times,
and the Deputy Head of the Peace Secretariat, which was set up during
Wickremesinghe's CFA!
The blame for the A-9 crisis is placed squarely on the government, by
Wickremesinghe:
"The Government closed the A9 route in August 2006. Under the 2002
Ceasefire Agreement, both parties had agreed to open the A9 route to
facilitate the normal transportation of goods and persons; and provision
was made for the safety of sea transport between Trincomalee and Jaffna.
However, the LTTE has now stated that it cannot assure safe passage for
ships passing close to LTTE-controlled areas."
There is no mention of the LTTE's acts of war which preceded the
closure and the tactical considerations which necessitated it. This is
in sharp contrast to Wickremesinghe's repeated attempts to construct a
chain of causation for the LTTE's massive violence.
Military win for Tigers is OK
Finally, Prabhakaran's deadly speech of November 27. The Sri Lankan
Government and the LTTE equated as sources of war, and the Tiger
whitewashed as having changed positively over the past five years.
"Speaking at the "Heroes' Day" Commemoration on November 27, 2006,
the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, accused the Government of
making the Ceasefire Agreement defunct by following what he calls "a war
and peace approach." He stated that the LTTE has "no other option but an
independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam."
Nonetheless, he has not formerly declared a separate state. Neither
has he given notice of termination to the Norwegian Government in
accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement.
However, he has announced that the LTTE is not prepared to "walk
along the same futile path" and will re-commence "the freedom struggle."
It is clear then that the LTTE is ready to intensify the war. Its
objective is a decisive military victory that will give it a significant
advantage at the negotiating table when peace talks resume. The
Government has responded by announcing its readiness for war....
...A lot of water has flowed under the bridge in the last five years.
The LTTE itself has gained experience in negotiations and acquired
knowledge on different systems of government.
Time is of the essence, and it is important that the peace process is
finalised with the least delay. The Nepalese peace process, which
started last year, has already been concluded and the parties have
signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement."
Wickremesinghe correctly deduces that escalation signalled in
Prabhakaran's speech is for the purpose of scoring "a decisive military
victory".
But he extends that deduction to the conclusion that Prabhakaran
seeks "a decisive military victory that will give it a significant
advantage at the negotiating table when peace talks resume."
Now this is nowhere mentioned in Prabhakaran's peroration. Indeed,
having criticised Wickremesinghe's interlude as well, he says he has
dispensed with the old path of talks, and declares the intention to go
well beyond it and set up the government of an independent state of
Tamil Eelam.
"Decisive" though it may be in his understanding, Wickremesinghe is
untroubled by Prabhakaran's project of a 'military victory'. He does not
urge the India or the international community to deter the LTTE or to
support Sri Lanka in that eventuality.
A decisive military victory is by definition precisely that:
decisive. In the event that the LTTE secures 'a decisive military
victory', there is little left to talk about, except the total
evacuation in defeat and disgrace of what's left of the Sri Lankan Armed
Forces (and State) from the North and East, and as Anton Balasingham
said in the 1980s, "the issue of borders".
So Wickremesinghe's optimism concerning the prospect of meaningful
negotiations even following a "decisive military victory" for
Prabhakaran is to say the least, unfounded.
No pal of Nepal
Wickremesinghe's reference to the fruitful Nepali peace process is
wildly inapposite and deliberately misleading. Wickremesinghe is either
oblivious or chooses to obfuscate the very basic difference between the
Nepali Maoist insurgents and the LTTE, as stated by the highly literate,
educated leader of that insurgency, Comrade Prachanda, and reported some
days back in the Hindu, the very newspaper in which Wickremesinghe's
speech appears!
Prachanda disclosed that his party sent representatives to study the
situation in Sri Lanka recently, and concluded by contemptuously
characterising the LTTE as "a narrow nationalist movement... with no
political programme."
The LTTE's Great Heroes' Day usually features two speeches: one by
Prabhakaran from Kilinochchi or Mullaitivu and the other by Anton
Balasingham in London.
This year, Balasingham was seriously unwell, but two speeches there
still seem to have been! Reading Wickremesinghe's speech I was struck by
the news item of a teacher, Dharmatilleke I believe, who upon learning
that his brother, a Sri Lankan army Major, had worked for the LTTE (and
that he himself had been an inadvertent beneficiary in as much as his
treacherous brother had given him some money), hired a boat, rowed into
the middle of a lake and jumped overboard, drowning himself in shame and
atonement. It is an example to be commended.
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