Govt succeeds in facing terror threats and boosting national security

PEACE: The capability of any Government to usher in peace depends on its capability to defend national security. And it always depends on its ability to identify threats to national security and its ability to get rid of such threats.

For successive Governments, identifying such threats became a tiresome task in the face of threats posed by the Tiger outfit on the country's national security and neglecting those threats after sticking to the blind policy of bringing peace at any cost.

The LTTE for the past few decades used this tactic to boost their bargaining power at peace talks posing terror to national security and thereby hindering any genuine effort by any Government to address the grievances of the Tamil community in the North East.

Therefore, it was incumbent upon any Government to get rid of such threats on national security to direct the negotiations between the Government and the LTTE towards evolving a solution for the North East issue.

It was under these circumstances that President Mahinda Rajapaksa at a meeting he had with Donor Co-Chair representatives on August 22 stressed that his Government will seriously consider any initiative incorporating a clear commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable Cessation of Hostilities by the LTTE leader.

He further stressed that such a cessation of hostilities should include modalities to ensure that the Sampur area does not pose a military threat to the Trincomalee harbour and its environs due to the LTTE military presence in Sampur violating the CFA.

The line of thinking of President Rajapaksa was very clear as his statement indicates that he was well aware of the unpredictable nature of the Tiger terrorists' commitment to a cessation of hostilities and also LTTE's ability to make use of their presence in Sampur to pose a threat to national security.

Though elimination of threats on the Trincomalee harbour was taken as a political issue no one dared to remove those threats as they did not want to buckle the peace process in the name of national security.

It was under this backdrop and with the change of defence policies the present Government took the initiative to dispel all forms of threats to national security while effectively facing the offensive operations of the LTTE.

The Government always had the good intention of keeping the hopes for peace kicking and alive.

The decision to flush out Tiger threats from Sampur area upto Ilankanthai in the South of Trincomalee was taken following the LTTE's abortive attempt to take control of Muttur in South of Trincomalee when troops engaged in the humanitarian mission of liberating the Mavilaru anicut from the LTTE.

It was patently clear that LTTE used the Mavilaru issue as a launching pad for their military operations to gain control over the strategic Muttur town and Trincomalee harbour and their follow up bid to take control over Jaffna peninsula.

If not for the Security Forces ability to foil the LTTE's August 2 pre-dawn attack on the Kattaparichchan Army detachment the story would have been much more different today.

The LTTE would have taken more advantage in their follow up bids to take control over Jaffna as it could pose a bigger threat to the Trincomalee Naval Base, the harbour and also to Trincomalee town if they succeeded in their effort to overrun Kattaparichan Army camp.

If they could breach the defences at Kattaparichchan and take control over Muttur they could have easily sieged the Trincomalee harbour as Muttur was the only location they did not have any control earlier.

All areas surrounding the Koddyar bay, Sampur and Ilankanthai in the South of Muttur and Ralkuli, Navaladi, Gange, Upparu, Kandalakadu, Kinniya and Manirasakulam in the Western part of Muttur were under Tiger control and Muttur was the only obstacle to keeping their line of contact.

The failure of the LTTE to take control of the Kattaparichchan Army detachment manned by nearly 50 Security Forces personnel inside and outside the detachment using more than 400 LTTE cadres kept Security Forces morale high to face any LTTE threat.

If they succeeded in their bid they could have pushed the Security Forces to Habarana and totally cut off the linkage with the Jaffna peninsula by sea in the aftermath of the closure of A-9 road from Omanthai.

The subsequent attempts by the LTTE on August 12 and 16 to breach Forward Defence Lines in Muhamalai and Kilaly was a clear indication that the Muttur attack was not a diversionary one but was interconnected to their master military plan to take control of Jaffna peninsula.

The foiled attack on the Jet Liner carrying 800 unarmed soldiers and the artillery attack on Trincomalee dockyard on August 1 were also clear evidence that all those plans were interlinked.

The clashes in Muttur and the confrontations at Jaffna FDLs prompted the Government to make the Trincomalee harbour more secure as it is the life line linking the Jaffna peninsula with the South.

The Security Forces ability to gain control over Sampur and Ilankanthai areas in early September flushing out LTTE Sea Tiger squadrons and artillery and mortar threats further South of Trincomalee towards Verugal has pushed the LTTE's capabilities of posing threats to national security to the lowest level.

The deployment of troops under the 222 Brigade coming under the 22nd Division of the Army has strengthened security in 160 square kilometres in Sampur and Ilankanthai. The Security of Trincomalee harbour was further strengthened with the move by the Security Forces to take control of uncleared areas of Navaladi, Upparu, Kandalakadu, Gange, Ralkuli and Manirasakulam in a limited operation conducted in the area in the first week of October.

Now the Security Forces have recommenced dominating these areas destroying the LTTE military training bases in Kandalakadu and a number of LTTE transit camps there.

In addition to this the Security Forces' ability to push the LTTE defences in the Jaffna peninsula further South of Jaffna peninsula has also helped lessen LTTE artillery and mortar threats on Security Forces defences in the Jaffna peninsula specially to the air field in Palaly.

The Security Forces has also been able to paralyse the Sea Tiger capabilities by successfully engaging their Sea Tiger bases in Mullaitivu and in the East through air strikes. Several Naval battles has also further diminished the LTTE hopes for posing bigger threats to national security.

As repeatedly reiterated by the Government it had not moved out of the path of evolving a negotiated settlement to the North-East issue by engaging in such limited operations in its bid to strengthening the national security.

But it seems the LTTE as a terror organisation with a long history of suicide missions, despite expressing their willingness to enter peace talks have not given up their desire to pose a threat to national security.

The LTTE throughout the last few months had clearly demonstrated that they would not hesitate to use their death squads to inflict damage as they failed to effectively face with the Security Forces.

The suicide attacks on unarmed Naval troops at Digampotana, Habarana, on the Dhakshina Naval Base in Galle and the foiled suicide Sea Tiger attack in Nagarkovil in Jaffna within last week clearly indicate that it was the only option they have to resort in the event of their inability to convince their terror capabilities.

So far no legitimate Government in the world has found any mechanism to defend national security from such suicide attacks.

The LTTE delegation in Geneva for the proposed talks on October 28 and 29 will have to answer on which ground they are going to represent the Tamil community as it had held the Tamil community to ransom on gaining their terroristic goals.

Under these circumstances the responsibility lies with the international community to corner them internationally, strengthening the hands of the Government without issuing some ludicrous travel warnings to their citizens to prevent them visiting Sri Lanka in the aftermath of such suicide attacks.