Scandinavian doublespeak

Rajiva Wijesinghe

DESIRED CONCLUSION: Long ago, in my undergraduate days, we had occasionally engaged in something called textual criticism, which involved close analysis of particular texts.

In trying to understand exactly what was going on, one had to bring all sorts of evidence to bear, making comparisons and detecting internal inconsistencies, though often what was termed inspired guesswork was as fruitful in achieving results. Sometimes one had the impression that the result had been deduced first, though in such cases clearly any guesswork had to be clothed in even more convincing intellectual subtleties.

I was reminded of those long ago days when studying recent pronouncements of our Scandinavian friends, both naughty Norwegians and silly Swedes. Of course, assuming they bother to read what Sri Lankans write, they may well feel that I am engaging in similar work myself.

However, the difference of my approach will be clear, since I am dealing here with actual texts, which anyone can check on, whereas their own pronouncements deal with particular actions, and 'confidential conversations' which cannot be analysed with the same attention to the details of evidence.

I will in any case avoid guesswork, except with regard to what I assume will shortly follow, their report on the attack on the Army Commander. Following the logic they have advanced thus far with regard to the ACF aid workers, they will doubtless rule that that attack was committed by the Sri Lankan Security Forces.

On the day it took place, Army Headquarters was in fact under the control of the Security Forces, and later the SLMM claimed that they were not allowed to make thorough inquiries, so doubtless some silly Swede will conclude that 'Taking into consideration the fact that the Security Forces had been present in army headquarters at the time of the incident it appears highly unlikely to blame other groups for the attack. Provided that was the case it would be particularly illogical for the Security Forces to prevent the SLMM from entering the area and making proper inquiries in order to find the perpetrator(s).'

To return to actual textual criticism, I believe the last line quoted above from Ulf Henricsson's report on Muttur makes clear, despite the very categorical ruling he delivers against the Sri Lankan Security Forces, the tentative nature of his argument.

When he says 'Provided that was the case', does this conditionality apply to his claim that the Security Forces were present or his assertion that it appears highly unlikely to blame other groups? If the latter, begging the question of the confused syntax, is this unlikelihood based on the subjectivity of the Scandinavian approach in attributing blame?

Despite this tentative approach here, the conclusion towards the end is categorical. It should be reiterated therefore that it is based on three highly circumstantial pieces of evidence. 'Firstly' as he puts it (though without mentioning what comes second or third) is that the SLMM 'cannot find the reasons for the restrictions of movements into the said areas especially in above mentioned circumstances acceptable'.

Since earlier he gives the reasons adduced by the Security Forces for these restrictions, what he is in fact saying is that he does not believe 'the safety and security of SLMM members' acceptable reasons.

Now I realise that perhaps one should make allowances for peculiarly Scandinavian uses of English (as in the apocryphal translation from Hamlet, 'Omelet, Omelet, das is dein Papaspoek'). Incidentally, the British Council does, I believe, offer excellent courses in English, particularly in report writing, and I would recommend these to the SLMM.

They could probably get these at concessionary rates, at least for the Swedes (if they ever come back - perhaps the Brits could throw in free English lessons as an inducement.) The naughty Norwegians however may be wary of such collaboration following their fears about Mahinda's visit to Tony Blair.

If the Scandinavians were able to use straight English, what they would have written was 'The SLMM does not believe that the Security Forces were concerned about the safety and security of SLMM members when they prevented them from going to Muttur'.

Such a formulation would have made even clearer the absurdity of the participial clause, 'thereby strongly indicating the Government's eagerness to conceal the matter from the SLMM'. A participle depends on a noun, and the noun here (as less clearly in Henricsson's wording) is the SLMM. But any half-intelligent person would see that the belief of anybody cannot provide evidence for the intentions of another body.

The logic is even less acceptable when it is seen that Henricsson has doubts about the motives of the Security Forces, but goes on to cast aspersions on the Government of Sri Lanka.

What Henricsson was in fact saying was that, since he did not believe the Security Forces were concerned about SLMM safety, this is evidence that the reason the SLMM was not allowed into Muttur was that the Government wanted to conceal the deaths of the aid workers.

Henricsson's argument seems even weaker when we consider the 'above mentioned circumstances' to which he refers. He states quite categorically that the LTTE eventually withdrew 'from Muttur center during the day on August 3 bringing the Government troops back into town'.

The Sunday Leader obligingly supports this by citing Keheliya Rambukwelle's claim, headlined in the Daily News on Friday August 4, that the Government was in full control of Muttur. The Leader asserts that this claim must have been made on the 3, which makes it obvious 'that the Security Forces were in full control of Muttur on August 3.'

Sadly, because it is an entertaining paper, most people who look at evidence have now realised that the Leader is neither logical nor consistent when it comes to attacking the Government and the Security Forces.

On August 6 it had claimed on its front page that 'The LTTE pulled out its cadres from Muttur on Friday evening after three consecutive days of fighting and the Security Forces moved into the city and started clearing operations'. Inside, on p 14, it reproduced 'for the sake of clarity...coverage of the events of last week on LTTE and pro-LTTE websites.

The boxed headline there, though undated, claims that 'LTTE prevents Government recapturing Muttur harbour'. Interestingly, the tell-tale use of the word 'recapture', implying a capture that arose from unprovoked hostilities, makes clear the absurdity of the concluding paragraph of that article, that 'The Government Forces have been attacking the Muttur area regardless of the civilians in the middle.'

Still, by September 3 the Leader evidently, in line with Henricsson's allegations, had total faith in Rambukwelle. Both these adherents of terrorism totally ignored the narration of the Jaffna University Teachers for Human Rights, reproduced in fact in the Leader under its triumphant citation of Rambukwelle, that shows the LTTE pulled out of the town area on August 4.

Incidentally the UTHR narrative suggests the ACF workers were killed after 3 pm on the 4, since around that time the aid workers were twice advised, by a relative and by a 'Roman Catholic nun' to leave the area. Henricsson's report contradicts this, since it begins with the assertion that 'On the morning of August 4, 2006 seventeen local civilian aid workers belonging to a French NGO, Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger, ACF) were assassinated in Muttur town).

His categorical assertion of the time may be based on his statement that the ACF office in Trincomalee last contacted the officers at 6.10 am on August 4.

Since he notes that the Head Office made contact every half hour from August 1, and that after 6.10 the Trincomalee Office 'attempted to contact the Muttur Office through radio, mobile phone and fax, however, in vain' (another wonderfully dotty Scandinavian locution), this led by S. L. Gunasekara and Gomin Dayasiri, not perhaps very scientifically, to assume that the murders took place 'between 06.10 hrs and 06.40 hrs on the morning of Friday the August 4, 2006'.

Gunasekara and Dayasiri cite the report of the JMO that 'the probable time of death was between the night of August 3 and August 4, 2006'.

This does not make it clear whether the latter limit is the end of the night on August 4 or the whole of that day, extending to the night of August 4 and 5. This latter would square with the narration of the UTHR.

Unfortunately Henricsson, with his assertion that the LTTE withdrew from Muttur on the 3rd, has prompted a commensurate reaction from Gunasekara and Dayasiri, that the murders can be pinpointed to half an hour early on the 4th morning. This vitiates an otherwise admirable effort by them to show the flaws in Henricsson's arguments, so it would be a pity if the government relied on this effort only, as it seems to be doing in the 'Island' report of September 4 which cites their document under a headline implying that the article had been issued by the Government Peace Secretariat.

But what is clear is that Henricsson is quite wrong in his assertions as to when the Security Forces took control of Muttur, and to the weight to be attached to his interpretation of their motives in not facilitating access to the SLMM to Muttur.

Given that he claims that Government assistance to journalists showed that the 'restrictions put on the SLMM freedom of movement were grounded on other reasons', whereas such journalists were amongst those who highlighted the killing of the ACF workers, he has clearly lost all control of logic in his bitterness against the Sri Lankan Government.

Selective sources

I believe the preceding analysis makes it clear that the arguments used by Henricsson are tosh. He goes on however to cite a third reason for his categorical ruling, namely 'confidential conversations with highly reliable sources regarding the party who most likely has been responsible for the act.'

In the preamble to the report he cites 9 such sources, as well as Observations made by the Head of SLMM and the Head of SLMM Trincomalee. Three of the sources are security personnel, but they are all from the police, and based at Trincomalee.

He has not interviewed anyone in the Security Forces at Muttur, nor anyone in the army, nor is there any suggestion that he tried to do so. He also interviewed personnel of the Trincomalee hospital, though there is no reference in his report to the post mortem examination of the JMO.

In addition there are 'Interviews with the international personnel of the ACF' and 'Communication with relevant actors within the International Community'. Who are not being mentioned, which is unfortunate since one of the reasons for the ruling is that 'The views have not proved contradictory and the Security Forces are widely and consistently deemed to be responsible for the incident'.

Then there is an interview with 'family members of one of the victims', though where these persons are based is not indicated. Most tellingly there is an 'Interview with the Political Wing leader, Elilan', who obviously needs no other identification. I do not know whether it was stupidity or cunning that led Henricsson to omit that this is the Political Wing of the LTTE - certainly the fact that he is the only person mentioned by name in the report is a particularly telling faux pas.

Finally there is 'Information received from an eyewitness'. We are not told what the person was an eyewitness of. The word in this context would imply an eyewitness of the killings, but the failure of the report to assert categorically that there is direct evidence of who did the killing indicates that the eyewitness account was of something else. What this was remains shrouded in mystery.

Equally significant is the use here of the word 'information' as opposed to 'interview', indicating that this evidence was received at secondhand. Apart from the culpable failure of Henricsson and his cohorts to interview such an important witness, or to indicate why they failed to do so, the question arises as to their source for this information.

If it was one of their interviews, the suggestion, given the order in which the sources are cited, is that it was the engaging Elilan. Surely, in any inquiry into this incident, it is incumbent on any international body to find out the details of these sources, under oath, from Henricsson (unless, like Darrel Hair, he asks for a payoff in return for continuing silence. I have no doubt Elilan will be able to arrange this).

In the context of Henricsson's mysterious sources, it is worth comparing the report of the UTHR, which cites the report of the Reuters correspondent Peter Apps, who also seems to have interviewed a family member of one of the victims - "We believe it was the army," said 50-year-old Richard Arulrajah, whose 24-year-old-son was among those killed and whose body was found in the ACF compound.

Now I have no idea, given Henricsson's secretiveness about everyone except Elilan, whether this was the family he had interviewed. Given however that the UTHR report appeared in the Island on August 28th, and Henricsson's letter is dated August 29th according to the Leader, it would be irresponsible of Henricsson not to have interviewed Arulrajah before making his categorical pronouncements.

His failure to do so is the more culpable in view of what Apps goes on to quote - "On Friday he phoned and said he would be back by Saturday. After that, we heard the military personnel came and shot them." Now any serious investigator would at once have detected the discrepancy between this account and that of the 'international personnel of the ACF' cited by Henricsson, that they could not contact the Muttur Office after 6.10 am on Friday, by radio, mobile phone and fax'.

At the very least we should have been told at what time young Arulrajah called his father. Assuming that he could get through, but the ACF was not being disingenuous in claiming that they tried by every means possible but could not make contact, the question arises as to why young Arulrajah did not attempt to contact the ACF office.

I believe that, unless they do a Darrel Hair on us, it is essential therefore that any international investigation find out from the ACF officers, under oath, as to what precisely they were up to. Their action and inaction seems the more perverse, in that the UTHR report suggests that these 17 aid workers were actually sent into Muttur on August 1st.

I find this difficult to believe, so I should quote in full the relevant paragraph from the UTHR report, which is not at all sympathetic to the Sri Lankan forces - On 1st August the army had commenced a large military operation south of Muttur the previous day and the ICRC was also pulling out of the area.

Why the ACF sent a group of local workers by vehicle from Trincomalee without a French national accompanying them, suggests their ignorance of the ground situation. Why the local workers agreed to go by themselves despite advise to the contrary by the non-violent peace force cannot now be answered'.

Who this 'non-violent peace force' was is not mentioned. But certainly the 'international personnel of the ACF' cited by Henricsson should be questioned in detail. Though it is unlikely that the organization as a whole is guilty (as opposed to being culpable), it takes only one rotten egg, briefed by someone who wanted such aid workers placed in a dangerous situation, to create mayhem.

Suspicions of the bona fides of some members at least of the organisation, international or local ones, is roused by the determination of the 17 aid workers to stay on in Muttur in spite of the advice they received from so many disinterested sources.

The UTHR report begins by citing a brother of one of the 17 who called an acquaintance in Colombo on August 2, to ask for help. Since at this time clearly communication with the aid workers direct was not a problem, one would assume such concerned relations were also indicating to them that they should vacate the place.

The report goes on to mention 'a church official with the acting Divisional Secretary for Muttur' advising them to leave the office on Thursday.

The same official and the DS went again on Friday morning with the same advice. In the afternoon (when, according to Henricsson, the aid workers were already dead), a relative of 'M Narmathan, one of the ACF workers' spoke to him and advised him to leave, and later a Roman Catholic nun 'told another ACF worker Kodeeswaran very strongly that he should either go with them or stay with Father the parish priest'.

The UTHR Report notes that the aid workers rejected this advice because 'their head office had asked them to stay in the premises'. Narmathan it seems had explained that they were asked 'to remain in the office for transport that would be sent the next day'. Arulrajah obviously believed this too.

Given the situation however, which must have been reported to the 'international personnel of the ACF', that the residents strongly advised either immediate withdrawal from the city, or else refuge with a church, it is quite extraordinary that those personnel are reported, on Thursday and on Friday, as having asked the workers to stay on in the office.

Finally, it is worth noting another discrepancy between Henricsson's report and that of the UTHR. Henricsson claims that all the victims were 'lying face downwards seemingly lined up and with several bullet wounds, mainly to the head as a result of being shot dead at close range'.

The UTHR Report suggests that 15 bodies were discovered initially, and two more later. If this report is correct, it would be pertinent to find out where these two bodies were discovered, and why Henricsson got it wrong. In particular, the status of his eyewitness, and which interviews he relied on, should be investigated.

In short, it seems to me that the whole business was a set up, in which Henricsson, having been ordered by the Swedes, in support of their friends, to withdraw from the SLMM, plays a rather loathsome part.

Though I do not think it is necessary to accept the Gunasekara / Dayasiri suggestion that the LTTE killed the workers, the manner in which they and their friends have sought to exploit the occurrence, together with the culpability of ACF in sending the workers into a dangerous area, and keeping them there despite all advice to the contrary, smacks of the duplicity which they have brought to a fine art.

I believe it is essential then for the Government to insist on a full inquiry, in which they ensure that all parties concerned are questioned under oath. The fate of these poor playthings of vicious forces, local and international, should not be left in the hands of those who have so obviously vitiated their own integrity and intelligence.