Ketheshwaran and the Tamil dissidents' dilemma
A statement issued by the University Teachers for
Human Rights (Jaffna), Sri Lanka
Ketheshwaran Loganathan
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Victim: Ketheshwaran Loganathan's assassination fell on the first
anniversary of Lakshman Kadirgamar's. Neelan Thiruchelvam's seventh was
less than a fortnight earlier. Ketheshwaran follows a long list of
committed Tamils who desired that their community would enjoy peace with
dignity within a united Sri Lanka. They all knew that despite the
reasonableness of their cause this was an uphill task. Current
developments give us ample insight into why this is so and might so
remain for decades to come.
The LTTE-intelligence related web site Nitharsanam devoted seven
lines to the killing of Kethesh. It began, "Infamous traitor of the
Tamil race Ketheshwaran Loganathan was shot dead a short while ago.
Known as Tamil Betrayer Kadirgamar Junior, he was Deputy Head of the
Government Peace Secretariat..." This derisive snigger is the stamp of
the killers, their very nature and their values that are the antithesis
of decency and true heroism. The implicit boast in the killing and its
timing is that this organisation can and would pick off its unarmed
opponents at will, should they persist in giving hope to the people.
As for hope, this killing of one individual comes amidst a massive
humanitarian catastrophe in the North-East, and its significance is
prone to easy misrepresentation at popular level, which is also a
significant factor in the timing.
The humanitarian catastrophe throws into relief the institutional
incapacity of the Sinhalese dominated State to respect civilian life and
property of minorities in the North-East. Following the mainly
government shelling of Muslim-dominated Mutur town, refugee camps of the
Tamil displaced and places of refuge such as churches where civilians
gathered during confrontations, have been relentlessly bombed or
shelled. Inevitably the Muslim civilians are caught between the
duplicity of both the security forces and the LTTE.
Take the experience of the twice or thrice displaced in the last four
months from a camp of about 1,500 families south of Mutur: "When the
planes bombed I ran, barely looking behind, I saw the dead scattered
like fish on a dry tank bed." No LTTE military facility was nearby nor
could its cannon threaten Trincomalee harbour from there. There are
literally hundreds of such testimonies.
Amidst such suffering where the final civilian death tolls might rise
to several hundred, what is then the relevance of the Ketheshwaran,
Kadirgamar, Thiruchelvam and what is presented as a handful of other
dissidents? The answer is literally, everything.
There are also other testimonies coming from experiences victims and
that is why, however many of its people the LTTE kills, the dissident
phenomenon shows no signs of abating. Both in print and in interviews
with refugees, one hears a good deal of spontaneous dissidence. People
question the LTTE's right to attack the Army in a manner that places
civilians at risk, often using them effectively as shields; its
strategies that deliberately contrive civilian casualties and its by now
well known incapacity to agree to any political settlement that obliges
it to respect human rights.
In conversations among ordinary people they are well aware of the
hypocrisy. When LTTE functionary Daya Master had a heart ailment, they
appealed to Kethesh's Peace Secretariat, which arranged for urgent
medical attention.
According to well placed media reports in Colombo, children of LTTE
functionaries used their privileged contacts with the Government during
the peace process to send their children abroad for a Western education,
while the young at home were being dragged from their mothers and
seasoned as cannon fodder. Why were then Ketheshwaran and other
dissidents traitors?
The dissidents knew well that fascism, hypocrisy, criminality and
systemic reliance on assassination were natural outgrowths of the LTTE's
past choices coming from intolerance and egomania and a total rejection
of common morality.
They also knew that the Sinhalese polity was the root cause of this
phenomenon acquiring a totalitarian grip over the Tamil people.
Meanwhile Tamil dissidents with clarity of mind faced a constant
thinning down of their ranks. There was absolutely no room for them to
talk to the Tamil people, give them hope and to form mass organisations.
If they chose to remain in this country, they were condemned to lead
fairly lonely lives in Colombo with just a few friends who gave them
some space to articulate their ideas.
Lonely battles
It is the universal conviction of dissidents that only a political
settlement that offered the Tamils and Muslims peace with dignity would
undermine the LTTE's grip. The cause of the Tamil-speaking people of the
North-East was articulated more than 50 years ago by S.J.V.
Chelvanayakam of the Federal Party and more urgently after the
intolerance signalled by the Sinhala Only Act of 1956.
His demands were for an end to discrimination on the basis of
language, and a working recognition of the home of the Tamil-speaking
people - the Northern and Eastern Provinces - so that the cultural and
linguistic character of the region would be protected without prejudice
to the rights of the Sinhalese.
Such a demand would have seemed fair and necessary in most parts of
the world and, many would argue, sanctioned as a basic right in UN
covenants such as the ICCPR and ICESR to begin with.
Instead of addressing the basic issue, which became also one about
Tamil security, we have spent 50 wasted years on hair splitting
arguments about national sovereignty, homeland and differences between
federalism and separatism.
The basic issue became so confused among the Sinhalese that writers
often tended to dwell on pros and cons without reaching any finality.
Meanwhile there have been deliberate attempts backed by the State to
solve the problem by violence and attrition particularly in the East.
This lay at the root of the problems in Trincomalee this year that
precipitated the resumption of war.
The Sinhalese polity had two choices. One is to treat the Tamils as a
fifth column to be degraded and marginalised by a mixture of violence,
attrition and deceit. The second is to trust them, take the plunge into
federalism and build up a relationship of amity. Tamil dissidents have
held that the latter is the only course that could keep Sri Lanka
united.
After Chandrika Kumaratunga became President, there seemed to be an
opportunity for Tamil dissidents to contribute towards pushing the
second option. Neelan Thiruchelvam MP contributed actively towards
drawing up new constitutional settlement. A. Thangathurai MP used the
thaw to obtain resources for the badly needed rehabilitation of
displaced Tamils in Trincomalee District.
Both were killed by the LTTE. The Kumaratunga Government's initial
commitment to a political settlement also enabled some dissident Tamils
to contribute towards this objective through the state media. To the
Tigers they were simply all traitors.
What the Tamil dissidents did not have is a mass organisation, only
ideas and their commitment. Their fate thus became subject to changing
illusions and volatility, both in the Sinhalese polity and also the NGO
community in Colombo.
After President Kumaratunga's attempt to push through a new
constitution in August 2000 was undermined by the UNP at the 11th Hour
by allying with the chauvinistic opposition, Kumaratunga's People's
Alliance abandoned the urgency of a political settlement and tried to
compete for the chauvinist vote. Among the consequences were the
Bindunuwewa massacre of young Tamils at the rehabilitation centre in
October 2000 and attempts to cover it up, followed by communal violence
against Muslims in Mawanella in early 2001.
Ranil Wickremasinghe's UNP in collusion with a number of influential
NGOs by late 1999 advocated a novel notion that since the LTTE had no
interest in a political settlement, the way forward was to appease the
LTTE, keep it quiet and let the rest of the country outside the
North-East get on with economic growth and donor aid. Violation of human
rights, not a novel idea in Southern politics, was to be winked at. This
was the basis for the 2002 Norway-brokered Ceasefire Agreement, which
literally signed the death warrant of hundreds of Tamil dissidents.
The UNP's calculation was that the Sinhalese voters would be grateful
for ending open warfare. It took little account of the LTTE's past
behaviour and that its provocations and habitual preparations for war
would make the Sinhalese voter nervous.
The result was, with tactical help from the LTTE, the election of
Mahinda Rajapaksa as President in 2005, whose government was hamstrung
by its extremist allies, the JHU and JVP. On the one hand the Government
had to show a nominal interest in a political settlement of the minority
problem because of pressure from the international community and India.
On the other, the extremist JHU and JVP influence was strong in the
Defence Ministry, and the Government's human rights record particularly
in the North-East took a downward spiral.
First there was nervousness in the South about the government forces
being able to hold their own in the face of signs that the LTTE would
resume open hostilities. Then early spring of this year saw new global
strictures against the LTTE led by its banning in the EU and Canada,
owing much to active voice of Tamil dissidents and supported by the US
and India. In the same breath, the Western nations and India placed also
the Government on notice demanding that it put forward a political
settlement.
Extremist elements in the Government urged by the JHU and JVP misread
the signals and took the new spate of strictures against the LTTE as a
cue for military adventurism to fulfill their ideological dreams in the
East, ignoring the demand for a political settlement.
Warnings by the international community were met with an outburst of
xenophobia with a strong anti-Tamil tinge, placing the country once more
on the threshold of anarchy.
A disturbing development was the presence of the Patriotic National
Movement with its Secretary Wimal Weerawansa of the JVP in Jaffna on
22nd July to address the security forces.
The JVP's constant refrain in recent months has been that there is no
ethnic problem, but only a terrorist problem; and that foreign agencies,
the UN and Norway are on the side of the terrorists. The latter is an
oversimplification that fails to ask how outsiders would be struck by
the Sinhalese polity's long and dismal record?
50 years after 1956, President Rajapaksa found himself in a position
similar to that of the SLFP's founder, Prime Minister S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike, a vacillating tool of extremist elements that had helped
his rise to power. This leaves Tamil dissidents with no role except to
sit back and wait for the violence and illusions to exhaust themselves.
The lack of a clear perception of self-interest and a love of
deceptive shortcuts did not allow the Sinhalese polity to take Tamil
dissent into constructive partnership, with a clear long-term vision of
the good of all Sri Lankans.
Tamil dissidents were useful when campaigning for global strictures
on the LTTE. Tamil human rights activists were useful when violations by
the LTTE were a closely guarded secret that few dared to talk about. But
today violations by the State too are hidden under a veil of terror, so
that people are mortally afraid to come forward as witnesses. Does the
South have the same space for human rights activism that many fought
hard for during the decade prior to the 2002 CFA?
In joining the Norway-UNP bandwagon of appeasement of the LTTE,
rather than building a robust human rights infrastructure and culture
that entailed challenging the elimination of Tamil dissidents, the
progressives in the South surrendered their capacity to resist
repression.
On the political front, the JVP and other extremists, who claimed to
care about the human rights of Tamil dissidents during the years of
ceasefire and who praise the Tamil Lakshman Kadirgamar for being useful
in articulating Sri Lanka's case abroad, have conveniently forgotten
that he also constantly pleaded for a federal solution to the ethnic
problem in Sri Lanka. Tamil dissidents, who struggled for the rights and
aspirations of their community, have found few genuine friends in the
South, be it be among the "progressives" or the "chauvinists".
Ketheshwaran was consistent in his dedication to the welfare of the
Tamils in Sri Lanka. In the early 1980s which saw growing communal
violence directed at Tamils it was natural for a decent left oriented
Tamil with an intellectual bent to join the EPRLF, which he did. The
struggle he joined was destroyed by the LTTE in 1986.
After very difficult times for his people, Ketheshwaran found
openings for his interests in justice and a political settlement among
Colombo-based NGOs. He strongly objected to the degradation of human
rights in the 2002 ceasefire agreement and on occasions was almost alone
in voicing his concern over the conscription of children in the Colombo
NGO fora, which Norway, the NGOs and the Government wanted to downplay.
Erik Solheim was quick to mark him out as an adversary.
Ketheshwaran never forgot that he had been a militant. He stayed on
in the EPRLF and left it only in 1994 after differences with an
individual who too later left. His background enabled him to easily make
the transition to activism in civil society.
He was constant in his concern that other militants too should be
given the means and opportunity to come out into civil and political
life. He pushed for the Norwegian initiated peace process to address
this cause for all militants including from the LTTE. But after the
Karuna split the Norwegians pinned the label 'paramilitary' on all non-LTTE
groups and this effort came to a standstill.
Ketheshwaran wanted the Norwegian initiated process to go on, but
became very upset and utterly disillusioned when the LTTE started a
campaign of political killings, culminating in the assassination of T.
Subathiran of the EPRLF in June 2003, a man he had known as a fine and
committed human being.
Kethesh's writings and analyses became critical for dissenters who
challenged the Norwegian approach to the peace process. This approach,
while lax on human rights and democracy, looked for quick fixes as some
crude arrangement convenient to the Government and the LTTE. Kethesh was
neither a romantic nor a mere analyst.
Where possible he collaborated closely but quietly in challenging the
forces opposed to human rights and democracy, whether it be the LTTE,
the Government or the Norwegian facilitators.
Unfortunately for him and his security, he became isolated even
within the INGO and NGO community in Colombo that had been his home
turf. His insistence on ensuring human rights in the peace process and
his opposition to appeasement of the LTTE to the detriment of the
people, resulted in his being further isolated, and to his peril,
singled out and labelled a critic of the LTTE or simply 'anti-LTTE'.
Kethesh would not be silenced, he voiced his own concerns about human
rights and the primacy of a political settlement in a series of articles
under the pen name Sathya in the Daily Mirror. The earlier Peace
Secretariat Headed by Jayantha Dhanapala had kept itself above the local
political fray.
When the Rajapaksa Presidency committed itself to a political
settlement and offered Ketheshwaran the position of Deputy Head of the
New Peace Secretariat, Kethesh sought the opinion of his dissident
friends.
All were concerned for his security, but if the President was
committed to a political settlement, many felt that it would be good for
a Tamil to be in that position to push both a political settlement and
human rights concerns.
They were thinking of the Peace Secretariat as a body that could
advise the President while keeping above the political fray. After his
death and given the current reality where his fears are coming true,
some of his NGO colleagues have expressed agreement with him. Had they
done so four years ago, his cause would have developed the critical mass
that would have minimised the danger to his life.
In time both the Government's human rights record and its commitment
to a political settlement began to look dubious as the Defence Ministry
and the President's allies, the JHU and JVP, began pushing him in their
direction and he seemed to be caving in. The Peace Secretariat was being
driven into a partisan role.
Kethesh constantly on his own asked his contacts for independent
information on human rights violations and was determined to pressure
the Government from within. Kethesh knew about the plight of the 17 ACF
workers stranded in Mutur.
When the news of their killing came out on 6th August, Kethesh was
upset over his helplessness in the situation and was convinced that the
Army was responsible. Six days later he was killed. As a person playing
the role of a conscientious civilian he felt that he did not need
security and had declined offers of it. He died another Tamil dissident
caught up in fateful developments beyond his control.
When will the Sinhalese polity learn? While there is nothing
sacrosanct about a united Sri Lanka after 50 years of dreary
misgovernment in the North-East, most Tamils know that separation will
result in the diminishment of all of us.
We would go down as peoples who had so much in common, but could not
muster enough tolerance and humanity put aside fond nationalist myths
and live together. When will the Sinhalese polity learn that the
dwindling numbers of Tamil dissidents who are picked up and dropped to
suit the momentary whims of those in power are the last hope of a united
Sri Lanka? There will be no united Sri Lanka after the fantasies of the
JHU and JVP.
When will the Tamil expatriates learn to think responsibly about a
force that has five times in 20 years presided over Jaffna being overrun
or massively destroyed and civilians evicted and killed without any end
in sight? They would easily do it five times again in the next 20 years
simply for the egomania and survival of the leaders.
When will they learn about a force that has tortured and killed
thousands of dissidents and has only to show as its achievements
thousands of vanished youths and children it used as cannon fodder and
covered up its crime by flattering them with rows of martyrs' tombs? In
the context of today's humanitarian catastrophe, the hapless people
living in the LTTE controlled areas, long abused by the LTTE whom they
cursed, are being callously attacked with government missiles.
A number of children are among the injured in the Vanni receiving
very rudimentary care in Killinochchi Hospital. Whether they were
conscripts or schoolchildren, the Government dismisses them as cadres
under training. In representing their plight the LTTE today carries no
credibility internationally. This places on Tamil dissidents the
responsibility to speak on their behalf. |