The Doha round collapse: end of globalisation?
Dr. D.B.Nihalsingha
DOHA: There is much finger pointing in the wake of the collapse on
the 24th July, of the Doha round of free-trade negotiations hosted by
the World Trade Organization. The three blocks that were the primary
protagonist in the Doha drama- the United States, European Union,
Brazil-India block, went home nursing mutual accusations for failure.
Ironically, this was called the 'development round,' aimed at helping
the poorest of the poor to raise themselves out of poverty.
Inasmuch as the term development was a misnomer, (the talks were not
about development but expanding markets and reducing tariffs), the
contradictions and deception, which led to the collapse, forms an
essential backdrop to the events.
Whether in trade, war or politics, inconsistency between precept and
practice abound: the US advocates human rights, while abusing them in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanomo Bay and in secret prisons around the
world; the G8 commits itself to a "democratic, prosperous and peaceful
Africa," but the funds for such an effort are not forthcoming; the
Washington Consensus demands that developing country subsidies for the
poor be cut while some of the heaviest subsidy (for agriculture) exists
on their own door steps; a world court is rejected, while multilateral
measures are espoused for trade.
The failure of the Doha round, plodding on for the five years, was a
foregone conclusion: the Economist, (29th July, 2006) called it "the
confidence trick on which the system is founded." That newspaper called
the failure "a reckless disregard for...the smooth working of world
trade" noting that all wanted access to world markets while being
unwilling to open their own to imports. It called the drive for
concessions in tariffs for one country, which are then granted to all
and the dressing up the Doha talks as 'development' when it was not, as
a double "trick" which had "backfired."
In the past, as in the Uruguay round (which took eight years), the
developed countries, managed to get more from the developing world than
they gave. Philip Bowring (N.Y. Herald Tribune) referred to the fact
that thus far the poorest countries have been "largely excluded from the
benefits of open trade," with dismal benefits of free trade to the
developing world. The poor of the world has thus far been short-changed.
It is that realization which led to the camouflage of 'development' to
be applied to the Doha round.
Ha-Joon Chanag, of the Cambridge University Economics Faculty
Assistant Director of Development Studies holds that the world's per
capita income grew by 3.1% between 1960 and 1980 era of state control
but grew only by 1% during the free-trade period after 1980 (to 2000).
Chanag says, "Even this paltry 1% masks the reality of growth
collapse in many developing countries. Per capita income in Latin
America has virtually stood still in the 1980-2000 period, that [of]
Sub-Saharan Africa has been shrinking and those in many former Communist
economies are still half or less of what they were before the fall of
Communism."
He went on to say that this is "a truly embarrassing record for a
[free-trade] doctrine that has prided itself on hard-nosed focus on
efficiency and growth and has thus justified its policies on the ground
that greater wealth needs to be generated before it can be distributed."
WTO regards that 50 countries are in the least developed category (LDC).
With the world trade quantum at $19 trillion, the LDC share is a mere 1%
of the pie. At the same time, the ability of free-trade alias
globalization to "lift all boats" has been a misnomer. Bigger boats have
been lifted, some boats have not been lifted at all: there are some 4
billon poor, living on less than $2 a day. Despite all the hype about
prosperity, free-trade has opened a yawning and ever widening gap
between the rich and the poor, between countries and within countries.
The developed nations at Doha demanded that less developed nations
cut their tariffs before the developed nations cut theirs. This was
again a replay of the earlier attempts which short changed the
developing world. This time, however, Brazil-India led developing
countries stood firm, requiring the developed nations to cut massive
farm subsidies and conceding only limited cuts in tariffs in
agriculture. India's trade minister stated, "We can't negotiate
subsistence and livelihoods."
In this Catch 22 situation, who is mostly responsible for the Doha
debacle? For all the lecturing to the developing world about subsidies,
the developed worlds own subsidies are massive. The US subsidy is $43
billion.
Even though its tariffs on agriculture are low, it offered a 60% cut
in five years. That pales before the European Union (EU) agriculture
subsidy of $143 billion and high tariffs. EU, while offering a token 39%
cut, has sidestepped the issue altogether, arguing cutting tariffs would
not help the poor. It would not, because the highest tariffs and the
largest subsidies are not in the US but in Europe. To that extent EU has
been responsible for contributing to torpedoing the Doha round.
Adam Smith Institute's Madsen Pirie commented "The problem is that
old Europe does not want a deal...The losers are poor countries. Their
farmers cannot sell their goods in [developed world] markets and in some
cases cannot sell in any other markets thanks to EU dumping of
subsidized surpluses." The Economist summed up that "Doha's failure
makes rich-country promises to help the poor sound hollow."
The World Bank has estimated the gains of a multilateral agreement to
be $300 billion; a gain, which will lift some 'small boats'- the worlds
poor, out of poverty. Unfortunately that prospect is out of the script
for now. Talks have broken down before: the Uruguay round was scheduled
for four years and took eight. There will be a time of stock staking and
attempts will be made to bring all parties back to the table. After
licking their wounds, they most probably will be at it again.
In the meantime, the developing world would see a proliferation of
regional trade deals- short cuts to by-pass multilateral agreements.
These have been growing, with US leading the charge with some 14 deals
already done and 11 more in the making. The ASEAN have bi-lateral deals
with each other; all have deals with China. Some 70 free-trade deals are
estimated by end of 2006.
The noodle bowl of deals thus created- the sheer numbers will turn
the world in to spaghetti-bowl- some 200 regional trade deals in all the
world, will make life more complex and more complicated.
Is this the end of free-trade? Will all the kings' horses and all the
kings' men ever put humpty dumpty together again? Time alone will tell. |