Implications of nuclear missile testing
Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne
NUCLEAR MISSILE: The consequences of the nuclear missile firings of
July 5, 2006 by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) once
again brought to bear the hazards and grave dangers it pose to society.
A nuclear missile is a weapon which derives its destructive force
from nuclear reactions of either nuclear fission or the more powerful
fusion. As a result, even a nuclear weapon with a relatively small yield
is significantly more powerful than the largest conventional explosives
and a single weapon is capable of destroying an entire city.
The missile firings of DPRK prompted the unanimous adoption by the
United Nations Security Council on July 15, 2006 of a Resolution
imposing sanctions on DPRK's dangerous weapons and condemning the
missile tests.
In response to a protest and consequent request made by Japan of a
resolution to be adopted, the Security Council discussed the missile
firing for 10 days. The Resolution adopted requires all UN member States
to stop imports and exports of any material or funds relating to the
reclusive DPRK's missile programmes or weapons of mass destruction.
It also demands that DPRK suspend all activities related to its
ballistic missile programme and re-establish a moratorium on the launch
of missiles.
The issue at stake is that DPRK's missiles, which were fired over the
high seas, could have adversely affected civil aircraft plying air
routes over sovereign territories which extended to the questioned area
over the high seas in which the missiles were cruising.
In this regard, the fundamental legal postulate regarding rights over
the high seas is contained in Article 87 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which provides that the high
seas is open to all States and that freedom of the high seas comprises
inter alia freedom of over flight, which gives aircraft of States the
right to use airspace over the high seas without hindrance.
Article 88 of the Convention expressly stipulates that the high seas
shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.
Furthermore, Article 300 of UNCLOS requires State parties to fulfil
in good faith its obligations assumed under the Convention in a manner
which would not constitute an abuse of right.
From an aeronautical perspective, Annex 11 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944,
which deals with the subject of air traffic services, lays down
requirements for coordination of activities that are potentially
hazardous to civil aircraft.
Standard 2.17.1 stipulates that arrangements for activities
potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, whether over the territory of a
State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the appropriate
air traffic services authorities, such coordination to be effected early
enough to permit timely promulgation of information regarding the
activities in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15 to the Chicago
Convention, which contains Standards and Recommended Practices relating
to Aeronautical Information Services.
Standard 2.17.2 of Annex 11 explains that the objective of the
coordination referred to in the earlier provision shall be to achieve
the best arrangements that are calculated to avoid hazards to civil
aircraft and minimize interference with the normal operations of
aircraft.
At its 32nd Session in September/October 1998, the Assembly of the
International Civil Aviation Organisation adopted Resolution A 32-6
relating to safety of air navigation which addressed a similar incident
which took place on August 31, 1998 in the same vicinity in which the
DPRK missiles were fired.
The ICAO Assembly exhorted all Contracting States to strictly comply
with the provisions of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and related
procedures. The 1998 Resolution was also sparked off by a protest by
Japan of a violation of its airspace by DPRK's test of what was believed
to be a ballistic missile. DPRK's response was that the event at issue
was not a missile launch but rather the country's first launch of an
artificial Earth satellite.
Resolution A 32-6 involved an incident on August 31, 1998, where an
object propelled by rockets was launched by DPRK and a part of the
object hit the sea in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Sanriku in
north-eastern Japan. The impact area of the object was in the vicinity
of the international airway A590 which is known as composing NOPAC
Composite Route System, a trunk route connecting Asia and North America
where some 180 flights of various countries fly every day.
The ICAO Assembly did not have any difficulty in determining that the
launching of such an object vehicle was done in a way not compatible
with the fundamental principles, standards and recommended practices of
the Chicago Convention.
The Assembly therefore urged all Contracting States to reaffirm that
air traffic safety is of paramount importance for the sound development
of international civil aviation, and to strictly comply with the
provisions of the Chicago Convention its Annexes and its related
procedures, in order to prevent a recurrence of such potentially
hazardous activities.
Another contentious issue is whether nuclear testing by nations is
acceptable at law. In the opinion of the International Court of Justice
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, handed down on
July 8, 1996, Judge Weeramantry, in a brilliant and detailed expose of
the issue, delivered within what he called was his dissenting judgement
observed "My considered opinion is that the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons is illegal in any circumstances whatsoever.
It violates the fundamental principles of international law, and
represents the very negation of the humanitarian concerns which underlie
the structure of humanitarian law. It offends conventional law and, in
particular, the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and Article 23(a) of the
Hague Regulations of 1907.
It contradicts the fundamental principle of the dignity and worth of
the human person on which all law depends. It endangers the human
environment in a manner which threatens the entirety of life on the
planet".
Judge Weeramantry went on to say that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons cannot be justified, one reason being that any involvement with
nuclear weapons violate the principles of the United Nations Charter.
Judge Weeramantry observed: "There are six keynote concepts in the
opening words of the Charter which have intense relevance to the matter
before the Court.
The Charter's very first words are "We, the peoples of the United
Nations" - thereby showing that all that ensues is the will of the
peoples of the world. Their collective will and desire is the very
source of the United Nations Charter and that truth should never be
permitted to recede from view.
In the matter before the Court, the peoples of the world have a vital
interest, and global public opinion has an important influence on the
development of the principles of public international law. As will be
observed later in this Opinion, the law applicable depends heavily upon
"the principles of humanity" and "the dictates of public conscience", in
relation to the means and methods of warfare that are permissible.
The Charter's next words refer to the determination of those peoples
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The only war
they knew was war with non-nuclear weapons. That resolve would
presumably have been steeled even further had the destructiveness and
the intergenerational effects of nuclear war been known.
The Charter immediately follows those two key concepts with a third -
the dignity and worth of the human person. This is recognised as the
cardinal unit of value in the global society of the future. A means was
about to reveal itself of snuffing it out by the million with the use of
a single nuclear weapon.
The fourth observation in the Charter, succeeding hard on the heels
of the first three, is the equal rights of nations large and small. This
is an ideal which is heavily eroded by the concept of nuclear power.
The next observation refers to the maintenance of obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law (emphasis added).
The argument against the legality of nuclear weapons rests
principally not upon treaties, but upon such "other sources of
international law" (mainly humanitarian law), whose principles are
universally accepted".
The principles of international law applicable to missile testing is
well laid out in various international treaties. In 1963, the United
States, the United Kingdom and the then USSR signed in Moscow the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, commonly called the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
The Treaty, although adopted outside the formal United Nations
umbrella, is open to adoption by all States of the world. The limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Article 1 provides that each State Party to
the treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not carry out any
nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or
control, whether it be in the atmosphere, beyond its limits including
outer space or over the high seas.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, in 1994 adopted the
Convention on Nuclear Safety which places responsibility for nuclear
safety with the State having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation
and obliges States Parties to take legislative and administrative action
to implement the obligations imposed by the Convention.
It has to be conceded that any State which is not a party to the
above mentioned treaties, is not bound by any of them, in particular the
Limited Test Ban Treaty to which it is not a party to, since the treaty
does not constitute a customary rule binding all States irrespective of
the treaty.
However, DPRK, like any other State recognized by the United nations,
is subject to the general principles of public international law.
Firstly, there is treaty obligation under Annex 11 to the Chicago
Convention as discussed above. Secondly, although every State has a
right over airspace above the high seas this must not be taken to mean
that any State could use its freedom of the air over the high seas to
impede air traffic over the high seas.
In its Report to the General Assembly, the ILC in 1949 recommended a
draft provision which required that Every State has the duty to conduct
its relations with other States in accordance with international law and
with the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the
supremacy of international law.
This principle was formally adopted in 1975 by the International Law
Commission (ILC) in its Articles of State Responsibility which affirms
in Article 1 that there is a general rule of public international law,
widely supported by practice that every intentionally wrongful act of a
State entails responsibility.
Article 2 provides that an intentionally wrongful act of a State
carried out through conduct involving omission or commission is directly
attributable to the State and will be considered as constituting a
breach of an international obligation.
This principle, which forms a cornerstone of international conduct by
States, provides the basis for strengthening international comity and
regulating the conduct of States both internally - within their
territories - and externally, towards other States. States are
effectively precluded by this principle of pursuing their own interests
untrammelled and with disregard to principles established by
international law.
It must be noted that it is international law, and not municipal law
that determines as to what constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
Article 12 of the ILC's Articles of State Responsibility makes the
act of a State which does not conform to what is required of an
obligation a breach of an international obligation.
In the light of the above, the issue of DPRK's missile testing is
both grounded in the issue as to whether DPRK had a legal right to
conduct the tests and also whether DPRK's missile testing was in breach
of a requirement at law to adhere to international treaty provisions.
It must be noted that in a judgment handed down on December 20, 1974,
a view was expressed in the International Court of Justice that the
decision of a State to launch missile tests over the high seas was a
political issue which should not be adjudicated unless there was a
breach of a provision of international law.
Justice Gros was of the view that there was a certain tendency of
States to submit essentially political conflicts to adjudication in the
attempt to open a door to judicial legislation which could result in
government by judges.
Be that as it may, The above discussions clearly show that there is a
coherent system of rules at international law that identify the
responsibilities of a State in the instance of a breach of international
obligation. A fortiori, in the field of international civil aviation,
there are explicit provisions in established treaty law that would
effectively preclude a State from arbitrarily engaging in aeronautical
or non-aeronautical activities that would endanger aviation.
It is only apt to conclude this article with the statement of Judge
Weeramantry in his ICJ opinion that "massive documentation details the
sufferings caused by nuclear weapons - from the immediate charring and
mutilation for miles from the site of the explosion, to the lingering
after-effects - the cancers and the leukaemias which imperil human
health, the genetic mutations which threaten human integrity, the
environmental devastation which endangers the human habitat, the
disruption of all organization, which undermines human society". |