Tamil grievances, aspirations, demands and solutions

Dr. Mahinda de Silva

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: Though I have contributed to diverse national newspapers on diverse subjects (including coconut oil, beautiful skin, Homelands and Tiger rides), I have not introduced myself to readers, and would appreciate the opportunity to do so very briefly.

For most of my life I have been involved in the practice and teaching of Western Medicine, 20 of which have been abroad from 1968. From my school days I have had a keen interest in the history of Sri Lanka, (Ceylon History), a time when history was still taught in school.

My father was a long standing "upcountry "politician and a founder of the SLFP. I was thus very familiar with the events and personalities associated with the early days of this "Tamil problem".

Sri Lankans in general have been led to believe that the causes of the present violent conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE are due the unaddressed grievances and unfulfilled aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

Commonly called the "ethnic" conflict, this view became predominant during the presidency of Mrs. Kumaratunga. In her speech to Parliament on the "devolution package" she stated that: "the Tamil community has been discriminated for the past fifty years".

This however is a distortion of the facts. In the early 50s, growing Sinhalese nationalist sentiment stifled for centuries under colonialism, demanded redress for the harm to their language and culture.

In the period leading up to Independence and after, this sentiment clashed with the resentment the English educated Tamil leaders felt at becoming a minority among the 70 percent Sinhala majority.

They had acquired a superiority complex relative to the Sinhalese, resulting from the privileged position they held in the British Colonial Administration.

Their aversion to this impending loss of privilege was manifested in their racist and divisive rhetoric and actions, which began long before Independence.

In the 1924 Legislative Council, the Sri Lankan Tamils had a 1:2 proportion of seats relative to the Sinhalese. When under the Donoughmore reforms this was reduced to 1:5, Tamil leader Sir P. Ramanathan tried desperately in London to prevent its implementation.

In the 1940s G.G. Ponnambalam, leader of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress, demanded "50:50" ("balanced representation"), in the legislature, for the 12 percent of the population of Tamils. The British appointed Soulbury Commission rejected the proposals, describing it as an attempt "to convert a minority into a majority".

In 1949, the principal resolution establishing the ITAK (Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kachchi) party, whose leader was Mr. Chelvanayagam, stated that: "We believe that the only means of ensuring that the Tamils are guaranteed their freedom and self respect... is to permit them to have their own autonomous state guaranteeing self-government and self-determination for the Tamil nation in the country" and again, at a meeting at the Fort Young Men's Muslim Association in 1954 he stated: "It is better to have our own territory, our own culture and our own self-respect than be a minority in the island, living on the good fortune of the majority community"

The Grievances

When asked to state specifically the current grievances the Tamils have, (which other citizens of Sri Lanka do not have), they recount past events for which mea culpas, some deserved and some not, have been rendered, and redress, where ever possible, offered.

Foremost among these are the Sinhala only Act of 1956, Standardization of University entrance marks, burning of the Jaffna library, "colonization" of "Tamil areas", and anti Tamil riots.

Language Responding to the majority Sinhalese demand, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's government took steps to replace English, used by 10 percent of the people, with Sinhalese as the Government's official language.

Those of us who were in school and university in the 50s and 60s, know that the government service and the professions had proportionately many more Tamils than Sinhalese. Throughout the early 50s more than 40 percent of entrants to the clerical service were Sri Lankan Tamils.

The professions too had a similar proportion even up to the late 60s. In the context of the rising unemployment at the time, the Sinhalese feared that bilingualism would result in entrenchment of the status quo.

The Tamils of course resented the loss of their advantaged position, adding that their language and culture would suffer. They seemed to forget that these were both secure, with the many millions of their brethren across the Palk straits, a security which the Sinhalese language and culture did not have!

Christian missionaries opened many more English schools in the Tamil north relative to the population, than in the Sinhalese South.

In 1959 the Universities Commission reported that Tamil districts had science facilities for university entrance far exceeding those of other districts, and the proportion of Tamil university entrants was 10 times that of Sinhalese entrants, relative to their populations. Even in 1969 the percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils entering the Engineering courses at the University was 48 percent!

Attempts were made by both Mr. Bandaranaike and Mr. Dudley Senanayake with Mr. Chelvanayagam, the Federal Party leader, to assuage the Tamils by the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, but this was not implemented due to Sinhalese opposition and continued Federal Party agitation in the North.

However, by the new constitution of 1978, Tamil was made a National Language and given parity of status with Sinhalese in 1987.

Comparing similar situations elsewhere, one might well ask what justification is there for 12.5 of the population to demand that their language be given equal status to that of the language of 70 percent of the population.

In India, the true homeland of a 100 million Tamils, Tamil is not an official language. In the United States where there are large concentrations of "ethnics" for example the Swedish in Minnesota, the Dutch in Pennsylvania, and now the Spanish speaking people from Puerto Rico and S. America, there has never been a suggestion that their languages be made official languages.

In Los Angeles almost 50 percent of the population are Spanish speaking. Very often, the entire first generation of these immigrants never learn to speak English, but subsequent generations learn English, and join the main stream.

Standardization of University entrance

Marks as mentioned earlier the large preponderance of Tamil Media students entering the University over Sinhalese students, and the suspicion aroused by many anecdotes and rumours, of "marking up" of scripts by Tamil examiners, caused the government to take steps to correct this anomaly.

Thus, the government introduced "area-wise" standardization instead of "media-wise" standardization of marks, and district quotas for admission, due to the disparity of opportunities in different districts.

The end result was that Tamil medium students entering the local university fell, (though the number entering the Arts faculty increased). Standardization was scrapped in 1978, but this had no effect on the anti-Sinhalese propaganda by the Tamil leaders, and violence the Tamil youth in the North.

Colonization of the "Tamil Homeland"

The concept of a Tamil homeland is a myth as many have pointed out in recent national newspapers. According to the Constitution every citizen has equal rights to settle anywhere in the country, if he or she wishes. Sri Lankan Tamils have always availed themselves of this right without any restriction or prohibition.

This is evidenced by more than half the population of Sri Lankan Tamils in the island being settled outside the demanded "homeland", with their numbers increasing daily! Colonization schemes date back to the 1920s when dislocation of food supplies by World War 1, the British decided to develop agriculture in the dry zone, for example round the Minneriya Reservoir.

Also, to address the problems of landlessness among peasants, Crown land was distributed on lease, starting in the Batticaloa District and extended to Matara and Hambantota, and the Land Commission of 1927 on peasant agriculture, recommended the colonization of the dry zone.

The first Sinhalese to be settled in the North and East were in the 1950s, where under the Gal Oya scheme, Tamils were settled in the Batticaloa district, and Sinhalese in the Amparai district.

These schemes were intended to settle indigent citizens from densely populated areas to lightly populated ones. Given the relative population proportions of Sinhalese to Tamils it is rational that many more Sinhalese than Tamils should be resettled, but this did not occur. It is said that of the nearly 13,000 allotments, in "Tamil" areas, only about a 100 were to Sinhalese.

Anti Tamil Riots

Though referred to as anti-Tamil riots, these were for the most part (except for 1983) Sinhalese-Tamil riots. The 1958 riots occurred a month after the unilateral abrogation by Mr. Bandaranaike of the pact with Mr. Chelvanayagam and communal tensions were high.

The ITAK, whose main constituent was Chelvanayagam's Federal Party, proclaiming that the introduction of the "Sri" Sinhalese letter on vehicle license plates by the government, was an insult to Tamils, started a "tar brush" campaign to tar the Sinhalese letters on name boards in the North and East.

The anti-Sri "tar brush" campaign resulted in an anti-anti-Sri campaign in the South, with the Sinhalese reciprocating with tarring Tamil letters on name boards. In the violence, over a thousand died and many more were rendered homeless.

As with the '58 riots it is necessary to remember the context of the '77 mayhem. The TULF formed in 1972 with ITAK, All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the CWC (which left it shortly after), took every opportunity to increase tensions. In 1976 in the Vaddukodai Resolution they proclaimed that their "historical Tamil homeland" was being encroached upon, and espoused a separate state.

Special reference has to be made to the TULF youth gangs who at this time terrorized the North, murdering anyone associated with or sympathetic to the government, from politicians to Tamil police officers and civilians. These marauders were endearingly referred to by the elite Tamils in Colombo, quite openly, as "our boys". The LTTE was spawned from these "boys" in May 1975.

In these riots which occurred about one month after the elections, clashes which began with attacks on Colombo-Jaffna trains, resulted in thousands being made homeless, and with 98 Tamils and 30 Sinhalese, dead.

Though the TULF won in all areas they contested in the 77 elections, the Youth leaders were the dominant force, and following the '77 riots, escalated the violence, with the army and police reciprocating.

In 1981, the latter were responsible for the deplorable burning of the Jaffna library. The unleashing of communal violence in the aftermath of the elections was the occasion for J.R. Jayewardene's then famous challenge to the TULF, "If you want war, let there be war. If you want peace let there be peace. This is not what I say. The people of Sri Lanka say that."

An ambush in which 13 soldiers died, sparked the '83 (Black July) riots in which the deaths by some estimates were around 2000, most of them Tamils, with the widespread destruction of Tamil owned houses and businesses.

There is no doubt that the responsibility for the extent of this catastrophe rested squarely with President Jayewardene, some government politicians and elements in the security forces who supported and encouraged the rioters.

J. R. Jayewardene's public statement, before the '77 riots was acted out to its conclusion! The point in all this is that in all these clashes while there was deplorable violence against the Tamils, there was reciprocal violence against the Sinhalese by Tamils, instigated by the arrogant and unreasonable demands of a privileged minority of Tamil politicians, unwilling to come to terms with the fact that they were a minority.

They were oblivious to the majority Sinhalese sentiments and grievances regarding the suppression of their language, religion and culture and demands for their restitution.

It is also important in this context to point out that there was no violence against the Muslims by the Sinhalese.

Also, to put things in perspective, it must be noted that in any violent conflict the minority is liable to sustain more casualties than the majority, especially when the latter is proportionally much larger.

Tamil Aspirations

By 1987 the whole complexion of the problem had changed. The Tamil grievance such as Language, Standardization, and Colonization had ceased to exist. So "grievances" were replaced by "aspirations" which were even more amorphous in nature.

The fascist LTTE had become the dominant player in Tamil politics, assassinating other militant groups and eliminating ruthlessly any opposition.

The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 was forced on President Jayewardene by the Indians, at a time when the army was ascendant, had cleared the area North and East of Jaffna and was poised to take the Jaffna peninsula.

In the 13th Amendment to the Constitution which resulted, legal and executive powers were devolved to the Provinces. Thus the Central Government's powers were "qualified", and Sri Lanka thereafter was no longer a strictly unitary state.

Legislation passed by the Provincial Councils (PCs) needed a two third majority in parliament to be overridden, and an item on the provincial list could be overridden by a simple majority, but only after consultation with the PC.

Under the Accord, the Northern and Eastern provinces were merged for a year after which a referendum was to decide the permanency or not of the merger. Elections were held in the new North East province in 1988, which the LTTE boycotted, and in which the EPRLF gained power.

Its first Chief Minister Varatharaja Perumal, in March 1990, declared a UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) for the NE, which led to the take over of the Provincial Administration by the Central Government functioning through the Governor, thus negating the very reason for the 13th Amendment. This state of affairs has lasted since then.

After Premadasa's election, the IPKF withdrew, giving the LTTE control over the Tamils of the North East. They murdered the PLOTE and TULF leaders, and feigning talks with President Premadasa, murdered 600 Tamil and Sinhalese policemen. Attacks on Sinhalese and Muslim villages caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of displaced.

From 1994, the eleven years of Mrs. Kumaratunga's Presidency were a misfortune both for the Unitary status of Sri Lanka and for military action against the LTTE. She attempted to negotiate peace with Prabhakaran via some mostly amateur negotiators and soon enough she was waging a war which she had declared was "unwindable".

The strategic Jaffna town was taken in Operation Riviresa, but subsequent conduct of the war, which she did personally with her uncle, a general with doubtful military qualifications, officers chosen for political reasons, and a military pervaded with corruption in military procurements, was inept and indecisive.

This resulted in the most expensive and bloody war, with loss of hard won gains in the East, military debacles and devastating terrorist attacks in Colombo.

In the political sphere, her attack was on the unitary status of the country. Possessing little insight into the "ethnic" problem or a vision regarding a solution, she gathered around her so-called Colombo based "moderate" Tamil intellectuals prominent among whom was the TULF leader N. Thiruchelvam, foreign funded "peace" NGOs, and even the kin of LTTE hierarchy, as advisors.

She was unquestioningly supported by short-sighted power seeking, witless and ignorant politicians. The result was the 1995 devolution proposals and the 2000 draft proposals to parliament, in which the Unitary State was to be replaced by a "Union of Regions".

Regional councils were to have exclusive executive and legislative power in respect of a "Regional List". Not only was there no concurrent list as in the 13th Amendment (or some power-sharing arrangement with the Centre, which is present in any power-sharing agreement anywhere in the world), but the list included an independent police force and judiciary.

By a concurrent list the Central Government as well as the regional government exercise coordinate powers over subjects which impinge directly on people's lives, and which are important in a multi ethnic region such as the East.

These include social services such as relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, national housing, agriculture and agrarian services, higher education, and health. These subjects were included in the Regional list of the 2000 draft proposals.

Propitiously, the LTTE rejected it and the bill was defeated in parliament, the UNP (for its own political reasons) and the JVP voting against it. The next body blow to Unitary Sri Lanka was the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which some commentators called the greatest act of treachery since 1815.

This was signed by Messrs Ranil Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran under Norway's patronage. In a violation of its territorial integrity, "LTTE controlled areas" were demarcated in the North and East, which where outside the jurisdiction of the Government (GOSL).

The UNF government's subsequent role in decimation of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP), demoralization of the military, and its part in strengthening the LTTE politically, militarily and internationally, is well known.

National Security

In September 2004, Mrs. Kumaratunga proclaiming that the UNF government was jeopardizing National Security took over three ministries, and dissolved Parliament a few months later.

However, in power with a PA government, she continued the same obsequious policy of appeasement of the UNF. Cheered on by the latter, she even considered beginning discussions on the basis of the ISGA proposals of the LTTE.

The following news clip from the Island of July 30, 2004 by Brian Tissera summarizes the politics of the situation: "UNP offers support to President but no carte blanche. Urges her to ignore JVP threats and proceed with the ISGA".

Her next assault on the sovereignty of the country involved accepting LTTE as the "sole representative" of the Tamils, and the abandonment of the Government's duty to manage its funds by a financial arrangement written into the P-TOMS agreement.

This violated the legal framework on public finance a basic prerogative of a democratic government. It appeared that the objective of the "Joint Mechanism" was to legitimatize further the claims of the LTTE to the North and East.

The President and her supporters claimed that no foreign aid would come in for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Tamil Tsunami victims without it. This proved to be false, as the US Ambassador himself reconfirmed aid flow without P-TOMS, and stated that no US funds would be credited to the P-TOMS account.

The election of President Rajapaksa who stood for a "Unitary state with devolution" resulted in the simultaneous, near political oblivion of Mr. Wickremesinghe and Mrs. Kumaratunga, two formidable opponents of the Unitary status of the country.

Federalism however is still quite prominently advocated by the thoughtless and naive, though the accent is now on an "Indian model" or even a home made Sri Lankan one.

First, it must be clear to even the simple minded, from the LTTE's words and deeds, that they cannot and will not accept a federal arrangement. It cannot, because the constituents of a federal state must of necessity be democratic, respecting human rights and democratic institutions and permitting free elections.

Other Tamil parties contesting elections would automatically negate the LTTE's claim to "sole representative" status.

Under the current circumstances it is not rational to believe that the LTTE will agree to the GOSL's exclusive control over the Armed Forces and Police, a Supreme Court that can override those of the subunits, and exclusive Central Government control over external affairs (i.e. power to enter into international agreements, to regulate foreign commerce, coin money) which are the essential features of a federal system.

Indian Model

A lot has been said, by many with little information, about the "Indian Model". In this model the powers of the central government over the State legislatures are so pronounced that it has more unitary characters than federal ones.

The Indian constitution provides that in respect of the State list and Concurrent list. the executive power of the state is subject to the Constitution and laws made by the Central Government (Article 62), and the enforcement of any state law is subject to Central government control (Article 73).

Following the 13th amendment, these powers are present in a much more diluted form in our Constitution (Article 154 and sub articles). As someone said, there is not a chance of a snowball in hell that the LTTE will countenance such a constitution.

Dangers of Devolution

The danger to the Sri Lankan state of a federal arrangement is considerable. History tells us that devolution of power on ethnic or religious basis will inevitably result in fragmentation of the state.

A recent and vivid example is the fate of Yugoslavia, which disintegrated into 15 states in 15 years! Thus unrestricted devolution of power on an ethnic basis, to conflict-ridden multi-ethnic states like the North East, would very likely cause the conflict and division to continue.

Another danger is, that if a territorial unit of a federation formed from a unitary state were to undergo dissolution and the unit unilaterally declare independence, according to international convention, the region becomes an independent state, with its boundaries that of the former federal unit.

Constitutional expert, Professor G.H. Pieris, points out that in the experiences of federations, the determinant of their durability has been the existence of a strong central government, with the capacity to overcome, by force of arms any challenges to its authority. Can any Sri Lankan government be characterized as such?

To believe that the LTTE will agree to negotiate on any terms except ones similar to the ISGA proposals, is stuff that dreams are made of. The solution to the problem has to involve the Sri Lankan Tamil majority living outside the North East, and perhaps those living abroad.

At this point, with all communities weary of conflict, disagreements and fears regarding language, education and employment could be more easily negotiated and resolved.

It is unlikely that the current Tamil leaders will exhibit the arrogance and intransigence of their predecessors.

Since these discussions will not be possible until they can be protected from the long terrorist arm of the LTTE, full security should be extended to them, defraying the cost by reducing security to the myriads of politicians, most of whom it makes no sense for the LTTE to harm!

There is no need or sense in jettisoning the Unitary State. In our small island, a rational devolution of power relevant to the needs of citizens, with effective control by the centre is necessary.

The LTTE has to be marginalized by external pressure and strictures, their terrorist activities contained by the security forces and hopefully, internal dissensions will complete its marginalization.

Important also is a stable and growing economy, as conflict is unlikely when people's material needs are satisfied.