Introduction: Panic Nation
Mick Hume
EPIDEMIC: Since the panic about a SARS epidemic gripped the world in
2003, the New Labour government's policy towards issues such as
bioterrorism and SARS in the Uk has been based on the principle of 'organised
paranoia'. This memorable but little-known phrase was coined by Geoff
Mulgan, former head of the powerful Downing Street Performance and
Innovation Unit.
Mulgan was speaking at a conference entitled 'Panic Attack:
Interrogating our Obsession with Risk,' organised by spiked - the online
publication of which I am editor - at the Royal Institution in May 2003.
He had a wry little smile on his face when he used those words, but he
definitely was not joking.
Mulgan suggested that organised paranoia would help the government
become better at spotting new risks such as SARS, BSE or bioterrorism
'before they become evident'. But how exactly do the seers and oracles
of Whitehall hope to identify a potential risk before it has even become
visible? By gazing into a crystal ball, perhaps?
Almost, it seems. The modern political equivalent of the crystal ball
is the 'what if?' scenario, and this is increasingly becoming the stuff
of policy-planning discussions on both sides of the Atlantic, especially
post-9/11.
It means that policy-makers dream up fantasy disasters (what if a
terrorist infected with SARS crashed a petrol tanker into a nuclear
power station?), and then try to plan how to deal with these
hypothetical crises. Under the policy of organised paranoia, government
and society are continually being re-educated to expect a worst-case
scenario. This trend has the potential to become a real disaster for us
all.
The advance of organised paranoia was what prompted spiked to
organise the Panic Attack conference in the first place. It proved a
timely event, taking place in the middle of the global SARS panic. The
reaction to SARS became a powerful symbol of what is wrong. Here was a
new but relatively minor epidemic that, in a sane society, would demand
a serious response from the medical and epidemiological authorities.
In our apparently less-than-sane society, however, officials from the
World Health Organisation (WHO) downwards treated SARS as a cross
between the black death and a bioterror attack, quarantining entire
cities and damaging whole economies.
Meanwhile, people across the world could be seen walking around
wearing useless paper masks, a sort of modern equivalent of the medieval
amulets used to ward off evil. The SARS panic turned into an outstanding
example of the cure being worse than the disease, causing more damage in
the real world than any fantastic 'what if?' scenario is likely to.
It is common to blame such outbreaks of irrationality on the supposed
ignorance of 'ordinary people'. But Mulgan's remarks should serve to
remind us that the suffocating, safety-first spirit of the age comes
from the top down that the precautionary principle has become a guiding
light in public life. Major political, academic and scientific
institutions now appear to be obsessed with risk and infected by the
outlook of organised paranoia, with damaging consequences.
For instance, scary speculation about us all being doomed is
traditionally associated with the crank forecasts of astrology. Yet it
now seems to have crept into the science of astronomy, too. Martin Rees,
the UK's astronomer royal and a leading scientific figure, has published
a major book entitled Our Final Century: Will the Human Race Survive the
Twenty-first Century?
In it, Rees argues that human civilisation has no more than a 50-50
chance of surviving the twenty-first century, because of the alleged
'dark side' of scientific and technological advance, and because our
'interconnected' world makes us more vulnerable to new risks.
He advocates investment in space travel, not because we might want to
push back the boundaries of exploration, but because we will need
somewhere else to run to pretty soon, when we have destroyed the Earth.
Not very long ago this would have been rightly considered the stuff of
science-fiction fantasies. Now it is put forward by a leading
scientists, and taken seriously by many of his peers.
Not very long ago the notion that the end of the world is nigh would
have been the preserve of a few religious nutters marching up and down
wearing sandwich boards. Now the astronomer royal offers it up for
serious consideration. If this kind of stuff is allowed to go
unchallenged, however, the end of the rational world may well be nigh.
The BBC, one of our leading national institutions, has become a
particular champion of organised paranoia and the scaremongering 'what
if?' scenario. Around the time of our Panic Attack conference, the BBC
broadcast a TV docudrama entitled The Day Britain Stopped, about how a
series of events supposedly brings the entire transport system crashing
to a halt at the end of 2003, with disastrous consequences.
It was a striking example of a dramatised 'what if?' scenario, but
the fictional programme immediately became the subject of a serious
Newsnight discussion, where experts pontificated on whether its
fantastic scenario was 'plausible' or not.
Since then, the BBC has launched an entire genre of Apocalypselight
entertainment shows, screening docudramas about a smallpox epidemic in
Britain and a dirty-bomb attack on London, along with a series about
similarly speculative risks entitled If... These programmes projected
some of society's current fears into the near future, and asked what
would happen if the worst possibility became reality.
So we were treated to dramatised considerations of what would happen
if the lights went out, if we don't stop eating and so on. These were
presented not as horror-film-style fantasies, but as real risks - an
impression reinforced by the involvement of genuine experts in the
shows.
The professor of food policy who says of obesity, 'This slaughter
cannot go on!' If... We Don't Stop Eating' is the same man who in real
life dreamed up the far fetched proposal for a fatty-food tax that was
almost taken up by the government. The series editor on If... insisted
that the film-makers were no more guilty of scaremongering than
government emergency planners, British Telecom or the CIA when they
create speculative 'what if?' scenarios. He was right about that, at
least.
Almost every day, it seems, we are confronted with fresh evidence of
how far the obsession with risk and risk-aversion has gone. It all goes
to reinforce my view that this has now become the major barrier to
social, scientific and technological advance.
It is humanity's most powerful self-imposed constraint on its own
potential liberation. A century or more ago, an atheistic humanist such
as myself might have said that organised religion played that role. Half
a century or more ago, it might have been right-wing nationalism or
Stalinism, depending on the circumstances. Now I see it as risk
aversion, the culture of fear and the politics of organised paranoia.
As the old political and religious systems have lost their purchase
on society in recent times, risk and precaution have emerged as the
focus for an attempt to create a new kind of morality to guide human
behaviour. Safety-first has become a virtue for its own sake, to be
repeated like a religious mantra, regardless of the practical
consequences.
And, especially since 9/11 brought these underlying trends to the
surface of society, organised paranoia has now become a policy principle
guiding government planning and discussion.
In the run-up to the 2003 Panic Attack conference, spiked asked
leading scientists to name any historic advances that they thought could
not have been made if the 'precautionary principle' which constrains
science and technology today had been in place in the past. They came up
with a scary list, starting with A for aspirin and going through to X
for X-rays.
Yet the better-safe-than-sorry spirit of the precautionary principle
is not confined to the scientific sphere. It has escaped from the
laboratory to infect public discussion about everything from how we
should raise our children to how armies ought to fight wars.
When the quasi-religious belief in safety-first touches so many
disparate issues, from mobile-phone masts to GM foods, it is clear that
the problem must be bigger than the science of the specific disputes. It
is feeding off far wider cultural assumptions about human vulnerability,
and our supposed incapacity to cope with risk and uncertainty. This is
what is really new.
Humanity has always faced risks, and there has always been a debate
about how to manage them. Today, however, unlike in the past, risk is
seen not as something we can handle or perhaps even turn into
opportunity, but as something that we suffer from and must be guarded
against.
The war on terror has become the latest focus for much of this stuff.
Take the memorable statement made by one British security official,
after the alleged discovery of the chemical agent ricin in a London
flat, that 'There is a very serious threat out there still that
chemicals that have not yet been found may be used by people who have
not yet been identified' (Financial Times, 8 January 2003). As terrorism
expert Bill Durodie commented, this is now 'the logic of our times:
never mind the evidence, just focus on the possibility.'
George W Bush and Tony Blair have been accused of exploiting the
politics of fear around the war on terror. Yet many critics of the US
and UK governments seem perfectly willing to deploy the politics of fear
in their own arguments. Thus, David Corn, editor of The Nation,
America's leading left-leaning journal, argues that 'technologies long
challenged by environmental advocates are potential sources of immense
danger in an era of terrorism'.
Americans for Fuel-Efficient Cars also link their campaign against
sports utility vehicles (SUVs) to people's fear of terrorism, arguing
that Americans should 'free ourselves from the nations and terrorists
holding us hostage through out addiction to oil.'
Who really benefits from this increasingly pervasive culture of fear,
the belief in human vulnerability and the politics of organised
paranoia? Apart perhaps from some compensation lawyers or paper-mask
manufacturers, nobody does really. The elevation of safety-first into an
absolute virtue disorientates society to the point where a one-off
accident can close down an entire railway system, or where senior judges
can refuse to consider parole for a man who shot a burglar on the
grounds that he may pose a risk to others who try to burgle his home.
Even the New Labour government can discover that the precautionary
principle comes back to bite it from behind. When the global SARS panic
broke, the British authorities tried to reassure the public that there
was no real risk in this country. But, having already put Britain on a
permanent state of alert about the alleged threat of bio-terrorism, they
could not get away with such a sensibly low-key response.
Immediately, the government found itself accused of complacency and
of putting the public at risk by not doing enough in the way of airport
checks and quarantine. On this, as on many other risk-related issues,
the Tory opposition proved that there are now no depths to which it will
not sink in search of a populist cause.
Organised paranoia has caused New Labour even more trouble with
regard to the MMR triple vaccination, as the government's promotion of
innumerable other health panics over everything from passive smoking to
fast food made many people less willing to accept official assurances
that MMR is safe.
The fact that people in our society now live longer, healthier lives
and enjoy a better diet than even before would surely be seen as a cause
for celebration in a more level-headed present. Instead, we seem
obsessed with worrying about these things, through panics about the
supposed demographic time bomb' or 'obesity time bomb'. According to the
doctrine of organised paranoia, everything now has to be for the worst,
in the worst of all possible worlds.
Writing about the panic over AIDS in the late 1980s, the recently
deceased American critic Susan Sontag noted how a widespread 'sense of
cultural distress or failure' was encouraging continual 'fantasies of
doom'.
In this peculiarly modern mood of social pessimism, the end is
believed to be nigh but never comes. It is a case, as she put it, not so
much of Apocalypse Now', but of 'Apocalypse From Now On'. Sontag saw the
consequence of living in this perpetual state of fear as 'an
unparalleled violence that is being done to our sense of reality, our
humanity.'
Challenging organised paranoia and all the rest of this risk-averse
irrationalism should be a priority for anybody concerned about social
and scientific advance.
To do nothing in the face of this danger would be to risk squandering
the great potential for society to change and move forward, and that is
one risk that it is really not worth running. The cultural mood that
Sontag described so well poses a more pressing threat to civilised life
as we know it than could any speculative 'what if?' scenario.
The writer is editor of the online magazine Spiked (www.spikedonline.com)
and a columnist for The Times
Panic nation is published by John Blake Publishing, London.
|