Will Geneva usher in peace for Sri Lanka?

by M. R. Narayan Swamy

Norway will soon name a new special envoy for Sri Lanka ahead of peace talks scheduled in Geneva, most likely on Feb 21-22, between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But Norwegian minister Erik Solheim, who won a few pats after making the two sides to agree to meet in Switzerland, will remain in overall charge of the faltering peace process he has helped to resurrect.

A combination of quiet but intense backroom dialogue and carrot-and-stick diplomacy involving a variety of actors including the US helped to break the impasse over the venue of the talks. Although the selection of Geneva can be called a breakthrough, it is just another halt in what threatens to be a long and tortuous journey to - if all goes well - eventual peace.

Using Solheim as the emissary, LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran has promised Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse that he will scale down attacks on the military but demanded that Colombo should rein in "paramilitary forces" - a Tiger euphemism for Karuna, the former Prabhakaran loyalist who broke away in March 2004 creating an unprecedented schism in an otherwise well-knit group.

Clearly, then, this issue is likely to dominate at Geneva, and it will have to be seen how Colombo responds since the military intelligence is highly unlikely to deliver Karuna to Prabhakaran lock, stock and barrel.

Another subject the LTTE is bound to raise is the "high security zones", primarily in Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka's north.

The LTTE wants the military to pack up and leave from civilian areas in Jaffna, a demand Colombo is unlikely to concede or do so only symbolically.

The Sri Lankan military assessment is the LTTE wants to take by stealth what it has not taken in battle.

The Geneva meet will, however, be more of an exploratory nature, in the hope that it leads to more such high level dialogues while maintaining peace in Sri Lanka's north and east. This is a tall order.

No one is calling Geneva the seventh round of talks.

The first six rounds, which began after the LTTE and Colombo signed the Norway-brokered ceasefire agreement in February 2002, have seemingly gone down the drain.

This includes the December 2002 Oslo meet where the LTTE pledged in writing to explore an eventual federal solution to the ethnic conflict while retaining its right to self-determination.

Even before he flew to Sri Lanka, Solheim was in touch with Anton Balasingham, the London-based LTTE ideologue and Prabhakaran's chum for over a quarter century. Solheim has always enjoyed a better chemistry with Balasingham compared to S.P. Thamilchelvan, the LTTE political chief.

Switzerland (which is not a member of the European Union, which has refused to welcome LTTE teams) had quietly agreed to host an LTTE-Colombo summit. So it was no surprise that when Solheim met Prabhakaran on Jan 25, the LTTE chief was more than ready to meet in Geneva.

Although Prabhakaran - reading out from a notebook - had a litany of complaints against Colombo, by all accounts it was one of the most cordial meetings the Norwegians had with him. The discussions, including over lunch, lasted well over two hours.

There is no doubt among Asian and Western diplomats that the US decision to talk tough with the LTTE ahead of the meeting made things easier for Solheim. In three statements within a fortnight, Washington made it abundantly clear to the LTTE that the cost of launching a new war would be very high for the insurgent group. It also virtually threw out LTTE complaints and lent its full weight to Colombo. The US hit at Prabhakaran where it hurts him most: it called him a terrorist. This is a label the LTTE hates. The Tiger argument has been: "Call us killers if you like, but not terrorists. We fight for a cause."

The killings and counter-killings are only one worry for Norway. After four long years, Norway is no more overconfident. It now firmly believes that there ought to be a consensus among Sri Lanka's Sinhalese polity before anything tangible can be achieved. Without this, no dialogue can help. It is also ready to do business with President Mahinda Rajapakse, recognizing that he is a man of the Sinhalese masses.

Although Norway may so desire, India is reluctant to get into the quagmire of Sri Lanka's "southern politics".

The late Lakshman Kadirgamar, assassinated by the LTTE in August, had more than once urged Indian communists to "inject some good sense" to the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which mixes Left ideology with Sinhala nationalism. Norway knows that the JVP's backing is a must for the success of any long-term solution in Sri Lanka.

And Norway is trying to act on complaints that it is pro-LTTE.

The LTTE has of course not changed its stripes or given up murder as a political tool to achieve an independent Tamil Eelam. Western diplomats not used to LTTE tactics, who went gaga in 2002, now admit it is going to be a long haul.

Colombo and the LTTE do not trust each other. In such circumstances, the international community's support to Colombo is not enough.

Sri Lankan society should be ready for a sweeping power sharing with Tamils. The LTTE will also have to prove its sincerity vis-a-vis peace.

Despite several imponderables, Geneva provides a good opportunity to both sides to begin afresh.

(The writer is a Sri Lanka watcher and the author of a biography of Velupillai Prabhakaran. He can be reached at [email protected]).

- Indo-Asian News Service