Janavegaya, International Alert and the coup in Sierra Leone - Part II

BY SUSANTHA Goonatilake

Continued from January 27

IA's role was one of advocacy on behalf of the RUF and not that of a facilitator as it often claimed... In the period since the signing of the Abidjan Accord, IA through its representatives, Kumar Rupasinghe and Addal Sebo, embarked upon sabotaging all efforts at implementing the peace agreement in good faith. [Later,] Rupasinghe and Sebo left no stone unturned to derail or delay the implementation process."

President Kabbah had now lost patience with "all these machinations of International Alert and its representatives". He further charged the IA for allegedly "engaging in activities that are not only intolerable but down right criminal".

Kabbah's letter makes a further strong allegation that his elected Government was "in possession of concrete evidence that IA have been engaged in these malicious practices in order to prolong the conflict in my country which they use for soliciting funds from donor agencies and governments while benefiting personally from the illicit mining and sale of precious minerals and the purchase of weapons by the [rebel group] RUF."

His government had "Consequently now decided to severe all relations with International Alert" and was urging "all governments and International organizations to refrain from interacting with IA".

Later President Kabbah addressed the Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Summit in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1997 and summarized IA interference succinctly (Kabbah 1997 reported in http://www.sierra-leone.org/kabbah082797.html).

He identified that at "the centre of all this is the diamond and gold business which was the prime reason for the involvement of third parties, especially International Alert with the RUF".

He noted that the "duplicity and greed displayed by the RUF and International Alert" nearly wrecked the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement.

He also observed that there was a "lack of faith in this agreement by the RUF inspired by International Alert" which was leading to difficulties in implementing the agreement.

He then thanked the assembled Heads of State for the principled stand they had taken in the Sierra Leone crisis precipitated by the bloody Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The connections with illicit diamonds are confirmed from an independent source.

In a story on how diamonds fuelled the Sierra Leone conflict the London based Africa Confidential mentions how International Alert had "positioned itself as a mediator for the RUF, handing out copies of [RUF leader] Sankoh's ideological pamphlets to puzzled journalists" (Africa Confidential Special Report, How diamonds fuelled the conflict April 1998 London http://www.africa-confidential.com/).

These activities of IA also reached the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Its key members had been briefed in a special closed session on IA's activities at a meeting of heads of state in Harare and were told not to have anything to do with.

In December 1997 Liberia had rebuffed the offer of any cooperation with IA after three consultants were to go there.

Abdul Mohammed, President of the Inter Africa Group, which liaises very closely with the OAU, in a letter dated July 14, 1997 addressed to IA puts these matters in a very strong: anti-imperialist manner (I was shown a copy of the letter). It bluntly tells Rupasinghe's IA:

"Let us remind you ... there is nothing that you can do for Africa from Europe that we cannot do. So, as you contemplate your presence in Africa, you should be aware that we lack neither the intellectual nor the practical capacity to respond meaningfully to the challenges of early warning and peace building in Africa".

He adds, warning of these imperialist designs "Please do not make the mistake - made by many NGOs in the West - of thinking that Africans are still incapable of addressing the challenges they face in all areas, without the direct management of their affairs by institutions in the North...

We have recently come to realize to our dismay and disappointment that you continue to portray us to the donors as lacking in maturity and capacity as a result of which you are indispensable to us. ... We resent that. This is why we say that there is nothing that you can do that we cannot do."

Abdul Mohammed then adds that "the time is overdue" for [Rupasinghe's] IA to stop acting "as a manager of African affairs from London".

As a result of these turn of events, IA's reputation and standing suffered greatly in Africa. One consequence was that IA was not being invited to major conferences where it should have been.

And Rupesinghe as Secretary-General of International Alert had to term the Sierra Leone government's decision to eventually cut relations with IA "extremely unfortunate" (http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0497.html).

Collapse of IA's image

With this collapse of IA's image, the Christian Michelsen Institute of Norway was called in to carry out an evaluation in October 1997 at the request of the donors of IA, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

This Christian Michelsen report itself has to be seen not as a neutral effort, but about how "good" the interventions on internal affairs of sovereign nations were.

The Christian Michelsen report admits that "IA has been subject to serious allegations ... in Sierra Leone, which the organization itself has celebrated as its main achievement (Serbe, Macrae and Wohlgemuth 1997 p1.).

IA's neutrality and transparency was... widely questioned by the Freetown [Sierra Leone] authorities, international organizations and other governments" (ibid p.58.)... Many in the international community [believed] that IA was working as an adviser [to the rebels], not a neutral facilitator, in the peace process (ibid p. 60)....

IA's interventions, in particular it's continued lobbying of senior politicians and international civil servants, despite the Trustees' [of IA] decision to become "non-operational", served to create confusion (and thus suspicion) regarding IA's intentions". (ibid p 61).

After the coup, which overthrew the elected government, IA was seen, the report goes on -"as an advocate of [the rebel movement] RUF's interests rather than a neutral party advocating the achievement of a just and peaceful settlement" (ibid p 61).

The report criticizes the IA for "lack of clarity and transparency" (ibid p x.).... Problems of credibility and transparency - contradictions between IA's stated position and its actual interventions. - continued to affect IA.... and led to mistrust and suspicion that the organization was not neutral nor transparent in its dealing with international organizations" (ibid p 62).

All these actions were now "seriously affecting the organization's reputation, credibility and effectiveness and, therefore, also [the IA] staff morale" (ibid p 62).

These events also resulted in problems within IA staff. One of the allegations made by some IA staff was that IA was following a (white) racist policy, implying that African employees were being paid less than whites for doing the same type of work.

Eventually the British Industrial Tribunal found IA guilty of discrimination and awarded an aggrieved African employee 250,000 pounds, a large sum of money.

So IA's credibility, transparency, reputation and effectiveness were all in strong doubt as documented by their donors' own consultants at the end of 1997. But IA had their warning already in 1996 in a British Parliament report.

International Alert was, in a sense, the odd man out, being the only NGO amongst governmental regional organizations. Their presence at the talks was controversial for many reasons.

International Alert had made the first contact with the [rebel group] RUF and had been successful in persuading Foday Sankoh to release foreign hostages, which raised suspicion that they were not entirely neutral.

This concern was fueled by the fact that International Alert is not seen to be entirely transparent in its actions.

This sentiment was expressed.... by members of the government delegation, the press, many NGOs and the public" (The Conflict in Sierra Leone September 1996, Parliamentary Human Rights Group, p 30).

Later, in late 2001 after Rupasinghe left IA, Dr. Nana Busai an envoy from IA London came on bended knee to Sierra Leone. During a press conference in Sierra Leone he apologised and asked for forgiveness from Sierra Leone for IA machinations.

He said he wanted to "set the record straight with regard to the controversial involvement of IA in the Sierra Leonean conflict". He mentioned that his organization had come under international condemnation, and that the "condemnation and allegation made IA [under]staffed as many workers left the organizations."

He now begged for forgiveness from Sierra Leone saying, "though I was not an employee of [Rupesinghe's] IA then, I on behalf of the organization am asking for forgiveness. We want to win the trust and confidence of Sierra Leoneans." (Salone Times 22 October 2001 www.cmetfreetown.org).

The leaders of IA ally RUF were eventually arraigned in the UN "Special Court for Sierra Leone" for crimes against humanity and war crimes (New York Times 03-11-2003).

The Norwegian report on Rupesinghe's has an annexure by Mark Duffield. It notes that in recent years "conflict resolution has been privatized" [with NGOs being the private sector].

Consequently, this "Western intervention ... has created a major expansion opportunity for both international and local NGOs" (Duffield 1997 p.84).

Duffield further notes in the report that the growth of these conflict resolution NGOs has been accompanied by "the prior demise of alternative political projects within the regions ... which, in different ways, attempted to maintain national independence and autonomy" (ibid p. 82).

Translated, what this meant was that these NGOs actively helped erode national independence and sovereignty.

It observes that through these mechanisms "the ability of the West to directly modify internal political processes .......... is greater today than at any time since the colonial period" (ibid p 98).

It also notes that "there are a growing number of critics [in the west] of conflict resolution .. which interpret increased Western involvement in the crisis regions as a new form of imperialism" (ibid p 98). Translated: recolonisation.

The donors' report finally warned International Alert that it needs to develop "a management style characterized by openness and a willingness to be actively self-critical if it is to defend its interests.

An ability to see oneself as others see us is an elusive, but necessary, skill to develop. Denial of others' perceptions risks reinforcing the impression of organizational insensitivity and lack of analytical capacity" (ibid p 224).

And on IA's role in Sri Lanka the report was specific. It questioned "the wisdom of the high profile held by IA in Sri Lanka ..... The Sri Lankan attitude to NGOs as well as international agencies remains largely ambivalent, particularly when it comes to what is regarded as interference and meddling in internal conflict" (ibid p ix).

The report noted correctly that in Sri Lanka "particularly following the largely negative press coverage of IA's activities, there are worries that a close association with IA may be considered a possible liability" (ibid p. 70). With huge monies at hand to in effect have journalists and others in their pay the liability was not very heavy.

The IA was formed in the 1980s specifically targeted on Sri Lanka. Its beginnings were also actually "in the conflict within Sri Lanka between Sinhalese and Tamils". But this beginning was very much partial to the separatist cause.

Thus, IA's charter was to make "widely known", "the present condition of the Tamil people and their genuine demands" as IA stated then. In keeping with these partisan aims, IA also published an alleged map on the ethnic issue which showed over half of Sri Lanka as Tamil.

These alleged Tamil areas included the central highlands as well as substantial sections of the South, including Hambantota, much bigger than the LTTE fictitious maps.

IA also said that it was making a "major effort" internationally on several fronts on Sri Lanka, including "UN interventions". IA's publications also give as one of its objectives alerting the world on "mass killings and genocide" allegedly of Sri Lankan Tamils.

So there was no doubt of IA's agenda from its very beginnings, its acceptance of a skewed version of Sri Lankan events, a fictitious Sri Lankan history and its advocacy of intervention in the country's internal affairs and involved in an alleged "genocide" of Tamils.

But the question remains how IA appointed Kumar Rupasinghe in the first place who in Sri Lanka had taken positions diametrically opposite to what IA stood for.

This debate is closed - Editor

Involvements in anti Sierra Leone activities

ALHAJ DR. AHMAD Tejan Kabbah President of the Republic of Sierra Leone in a letter to Secretary General United Nations Kofi Annan in April 3, 1997 says.

I know that you have been closely following the latest developments in Sierra Leone particularly the events of March 29, 1997 when the Kallahun faction of the RUF abducted a number of prominent RUF officials as well as the Ambassador of Sierra Leone to Guinea.

My Government together with the leaders of the sisterly States in the subregion are doing everything possible to overcome the crisis created by the treacherous act of recalcitrant elements within the RUF and put the peace process back on track. I have no doubt that all men and women of goodwill fully support our initiatives in this regard.

I am gravely concerned, however, by the continuing anti Sierra Leone activities of a London-based NGO, International Alert (IA), in general, and two of its officials Kumar Rupesinghe and Addal Sebo in particular.

They started interfering in our internal affairs in, violation of the principles guiding the conduct of NGOs when Mr. Sebo surreptitiously entered our territory on more than one occasion and stayed with Corporal Sankoh for weeks at a time in 1995.

During these illegal visits, IA did everything to gain propaganda advantage for the RUF and to raise money for its war efforts in several capitals around the world.

Joining forces with the erstwhile military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and the RUF, IA fought tooth-and-nail against the process of democratization, especially the presidential and parliamentary elections in February/March last year.

Likewise, during the extended period of peace negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, IA's role was one of advocacy on behalf of the RUF and not that of a facilitator as it often claimed.

There is no doubt that the slow pace of the negotiations is the first instant and the subsequent unnecessary delays in signing the agreement were all due in large measures to the pernicious advice which IA provided to the RUF.

In the period since the signing of the Abidjan Accord, IA through its representatives, Kumar Rupesinghe and Addal Sebo, embarked upon sabotaging all efforts at implementing the peace agreement in good faith.

Violating the decision of their own Board of Trustees not to be involved in the affairs of Sierra Leone any longer once the peace agreement had been signed.

Rupesinghe and Sebo left no stone unturned to derail or delay the implementation process. In this connection, I attach copy of a letter which Addal Sebo addressed to my Special Advisor even before the ink was dry on the Abidjan Peace Accord introducing extraneous factors which clearly are intended to wreck the implementation process.

My Government has tolerated all these machinations of International Alert and its representatives, limiting itself only to taking the necessary precautions in order to minimise the damages there from.

However, I have now decided to bring the matter to your attention and through you to the international community because the lives of innocent persons are directly being jeopardized by IA.

I have received reliable reports to the effect that IA through its above mentioned representatives have now embarked upon yet another exercise to confuse the international community about its role while engaging in activities that are not only intolerable but down right criminal.

They have been facilitating contacts between Corporal Foday Sankoh and the Kallahun faction of the RUF which had carried out on March 29, 1997 the kidnapping of persons engaged in a peace mission in Nongowa, Guinea.

They have been transmitting orders from Sankoh to the faction in Kallahun to execute innocent people while at the same time telephoning the families of the intended victims with a view to intimidating and silencing them.

They have also been conducting intense psychological warfare against known opponents of Corporal Sankoh with the aim of coercing them to change their position.

My Governments is in possession of concrete evidence that IA has been engaged in these malicious practices in order to prolong the conflict in my country which they use for soliciting funds from donor agencies and governments while benefiting personally from the illicit mining and sale of precious minerals and the purchase of weapons by the RUF.

Consequently, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that my Government has now decided to severe all relations with International Alert and to urge all Governments and international organizations to refrain from interacting with IA on all matters affecting Sierra Leone, and particularly the peace process.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest consideration.