The price of conflict - containment

by Lynn Ockersz

While the cataclysmic blood-letting in Bali, Indonesia, is right now proving the top story, perhaps even eclipsing for a moment the tortuous agony which is Iraq, it is the polls success of the PLO's Fatah faction in the Middle Eastern theatre which helps put these seemingly disjointed bloody happenings into an analysable coherent whole.

Reports from the West Bank indicated that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah group had won nearly half the 104 West Bank and Gaza Municipal Councils in a third round of balloting which pitted it against the far more radical and militant Hamas group which won 13 Municipalities, while the rest of the local government bodies were won by other groups.

The polls results are seen as a pointer to the eventual outcome of the Palestinian parliamentary elections which are due in January next year.

Coming almost close on the heels of the Israeli pull-out from the Gaza in mid-September, Fatah's encouraging electoral fortunes could be seen as an initial popular endorsement of President Abbas' handling of questions flowing from the Middle Eastern imbroglio.

In other words, political moderation and not extremism is winning popular acceptance, for, a spirit of compromise and a preference for a negotiated settlement of the Middle East question are some of the more positive features of the Abbas administration.

Rather than continue on a confrontational path with Israel, Abbas has opted for a "land for peace" approach to resolving the Middle East question and this, rather than mindless confrontation and antagonism between the parties to the conflict, seems to be the average Palestinian's preferred policy.

The municipal polls results make it quite clear that the policy of totally annihilating Israel, which is preferred by groups such as Hamas, is failing to make an impression on the average, Palestinian voter.

Political moderation, then, is forging ahead and as long as Israel is willing to surrender once-seized Palestinian lands into the hands of the Palestinians, some forward movement may be witnessed in the Middle East peace process.

The key to these relative successes in peace-making is the widely held popular conviction that tangible gains are being made in the effort to bring peace; in this instance, the handing back to the Palestinians of land once controlled by the Israelis. In other words, peace in exchange for land.

It needs to be remembered here that land does not only bring the bread of a people; it helps in establishing and defining that people's identity. This accounts for the continuous description of Lanka's North-East, for instance, as the "Tamil homeland", by Tamil militant opinion.

These issues are of profound relevance to several of Asia's long-running, bloody conflicts. There are lessons here for most antagonists in the Iraqi and Afghan theatres, for instance, besides Jammu and Kashmir and Sri Lanka.

The bombers in Bali, Baghdad, Kabul and earlier, Cairo and London, may be driven to desperation but they are unlikely to make much of an impression on their antagonists, inasmuch as the stubborn refusal by the latter to negotiate in a spirit of compromise, is likely to pave the way for a settlement of the respective conflicts.

Territorial concessions and a willingness to respect the right to self-determination - even within limits - of the disaffected, rebellious groups, is likely to offer the prospect of these conflicts being contained. This, of course, demands a spirit of compromise on the part of the rebels too. There needs to be a willingness on the part of both groups, to meet each others essential aspirations.

Whether it be the Middle East, Iraq or Kashmir, one of the most significant factors to be contended with is the respective groups' sense of selfhood. This is the basis of identity-based conflicts, which are a defining feature of today's political turbulence.

In Iraq, for instance, it would be important to ensure that the country's cultural groups enjoy a degree of self-determination within a geographically whole state. Inasmuch as the Shias and Kurds should wield a substantial degree of political power, so must the Sunnis. A refusal to see this need would keep Iraq on the boil.