Lessons from Northern Ireland

A declaration by the IRA that its armed campaign against the British State in Northern Ireland has come to an end, has, quite naturally, attracted worldwide interest and prompted the Lankan Government too into welcoming it. If the IRA is in earnest and if there is, indeed, a cessation of armed hostilities by it in the British-ruled region, the declaration could be viewed as a major turning point in the peace process in Northern Ireland.

For quite some time now, the peace process based on Northern Ireland's 1998 Good Friday Agreement has remained stalemated on account of, mainly, the IRA's armed campaign which was not seen as having slowed down despite the implementation of some vital provisions in the accord. The IRA was also not seen as cooperating fully with the arms decommissioning process which is vital for the establishment of normalcy in the rebellious province.

Accordingly, the decision by the IRA to lay down arms has the potential of defusing tensions among the main parties to the Northern Ireland conflict and of returning the province to a degree of normalcy after well over 30 years.

However, it is important to remember that a power-sharing institution is already in place in Northern Ireland, in terms of the Good Friday agreement.

It is a legislative body in which the Catholics and the Protestants would be sharing power equitably through their representatives.

It is also a process in which no single party would be exercising a dominating influence, to the detriment of the other. One of the major obstacles to the full implementation of this power-sharing deal was the armed campaign by the IRA and the non-foolproof decommissioning of arms.

If the IRA really downs arms and cooperates fully in the decommissioning of arms, Northern Ireland's peace prospects could be considered as having brightened.

The Sri Lankan Government-rightly-sees this development as constituting an example to other armed groups around the world including those in Sri Lanka, for the lessons it could offer in hastening an end to armed rebellions.

Obviously, the Lankan Government has the LTTE in mind and we do hope that the Tigers would gain some inspiration from the IRA decision to lay down arms and thereby hasten our journey towards peace too.

However, as mentioned earlier, it is vital to remember that a power-sharing agreement is already in place in Northern Ireland. There is no doubt that this accord, has provided an appropriate backdrop for the decision by the IRA to lay down arms.

Inasmuch as the IRA decision to lay down arms has a message for the LTTE, the Good Friday Agreement per se has an equally vital message for the rest of the Lankan polity: that is, there is no way out of our quagmire without the installation of a power-sharing agreement between the centre and our regions.

Unless and until a power-sharing deal is in sight, we could be accused of being overly optimistic over the IRA decision having a positive impact in Sri Lanka.

The lessons from Northern Ireland are particularly for those in Sri Lanka who are even crying "foul" over the P-TOMS agreement.

They need to realise that unless the Government talks to and works with the parties seen as enemies, peace wouldn't come to Sri Lanka.