The Courage for Peace
by Lakshman Kadirgamar, PC.
In a conflict situation, courage is usually associated with war not
the pursuit of peace. A soldier could be called upon at any moment on
the battlefield to react to a situation in which he may perform an act
of courage or an act of cowardice. I once asked the former US Secretary
of State Colin Powell who had been under fire as a young officer in
Vietnam in 1963 whether any soldier, or his superiors, could predict
with certainty how he would react when the defining moment of his life
confronted him. His answer was: "You can never tell. Bravery often comes
from unexpected quarters". A typical citation in any award to a soldier
for valour in battle refers to heroic conduct unmindful of his own life.
To a soldier, courage is a frozen moment in time. In the life of a
political leader, courage is revealed not in a single act but in a
course of conduct over a long period. The leader has a vision, an
over-arching goal, to which he or she is committed with sincere
conviction. The goal has to be defended against various assaults.
Temptations in the form of tactical compromises in pursuit of the goal
are always present. But the fatal compromise would be a decision, by a
process of rationalisation, to abandon the goal in the name of prudence.
In the eighties Vijaya and Chandrika Kumaratunga spent time in India
discussing the Sri Lankan conflict with Indian leaders and Tamil exiles.
They came to the conclusion that the conflict could only be resolved by
negotiation, not by war.
By the time of the general election of 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga's
view on bringing the armed conflict to an end was ready to be put to the
test of acceptance by the people. There were two approaches to that
election: one, urged upon her by party seniors, to campaign against the
incumbent government on its seventeen year record of mismanagement and
corruption; the other, for which there were fewer proponents, to put to
the people directly, in addition to the record of the Government, the
question whether they wanted the war to continue with all the terrible
consequences that war had already brought to the south or to have a
peaceful settlement of the conflict negotiated with justice for all. Her
own clear preference was for using the impending electoral victory to
secure a mandate for negotiating peace. There was never any question of
her contemplating a division of the country as a means of bringing
peace. In the early days of the campaign, the question was put to small
pocket meetings, in the heartland of the South. She has said that she
was pleasantly surprised at the vocal support of the people for the
pursuit of peace rather than the pursuit of war. The rest is history.
She was elected to the Presidency following the general election with
a record majority. The party leaders who were apprehensive that such a
divisive question might even affect the party's chances of victory on
other safer issues had to confess that the sheer boldness of her
approach coupled with an accurate reading of the mood of the people had
carried the day. One senior said: "She has given the party created by
her parents a new direction, away from their policies. Who are we to say
she is wrong"?
Soon after her election, she matched promises with deeds. Four rounds
of talks were held with the LTTE. A large number of letters passed
between her and the LTTE leader. On our part there was perhaps a degree
of naivety about the format of the talks inspired by optimism and
goodwill rather than a rigorous assessment of the LTTE's readiness to
engage in talks seriously, leading paradoxically to LTTE allegations
against her of duplicity when the talks broke down, whereas that label
fitted exactly the conduct of the LTTE in breaking off the talks in
April, 1995 and going back to war.
Suddenly, the unwelcome role of supervising the prosecution of the
war was thrust upon President Kumaratunga, the dream of dealing
rationally and fairly with the LTTE shattered again. It took courage to
fight a war she did not want and had done noting to provoke. The war had
its successes and reverses. Jaffna was regained, other important bases
were lost. But the over-arching goal of pursuing peace remained
constant. The Sudu Nelum Movement was launched to sensitise the people
to the advantages of peace over war. Elaborate discussions were
conducted both in Parliament and outside on drafting a comprehensive
constitution which would contain federal features.
At the 50th anniversary celebrations of Sri Lanka's independence, she
made a memorable speech widely acclaimed then but, alas, now not widely
recalled tracing the history of errors made by the southern polity in
managing the ethnic question over the years. This magnanimous admission
by the Head of State on such an important occasion was an act of courage
of rare quality. After the near fatal assassination attempt on her on
the eve of her second Presidential election, she made another memorable
speech extending the hand of friendship to the LTTE which only a few
days earlier had sought to kill her.
A few days after her re-election as President, she made the momentous
declaration from her hospital bed in London, where she was recovering
from the grievous injury inflicted upon her by the LTTE, that the
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE had agreed to engage the services
of the Government of Norway as a facilitator. This was the first time in
the tortuous history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, and also the
first time in the politics of South Asia, that an outside Government had
been engaged for this kind of work. This courageous decision will for a
long time remain controversial. In defence of it I would say that the
stage had been reached in our faltering negotiations with the LTTE when
the assistance of an outside party could be helpful. Initially, indeed,
the assistance of Norway seemed helpful but with the passage of time it
has become apparent that the degree of impartiality required of an
acceptable facilitator has not always been evident in the role of
Norway, leading to considerable suspicion in the South that the cause of
Sri Lanka in the resolution of the conflict is not being well served.
President Kumratunga's goal of peace remained intact although the war
continued with renewed ferocity on the part of the LTTE into the middle
of 2000.
The loss of Jaffna was averted. The efforts at constitution making
proceeded, and had gone very far until that fateful day in October 2000
when she personally presented the draft constitution to Parliament. That
was the most infamous day in the history of our legislature. It was a
day I will never forget for many reasons.
She need not have undertaken the burden and the risks of presenting
the bill personally. As she rose to speak, she was met by the most
disgraceful scene of hooliganism that our Parliament has ever witnessed
on any occasion, let alone on one of such historical significance. The
hooting, jeering, thumping of tables and burning of the draft
constitution by the opposition went on without pause for over an hour
while she gamely continued with her speech. As an act of sheer
political, indeed almost physical, courage her performance that day is
unlikely ever to be surpassed in Parliament.
After the second Parliamentary election of her term, attempts to
resume discussions with the LTTE were made leading to cautious efforts
to conclude an agreement for the provision of humanitarian relief to the
LTTE dominated areas. But by July 2001 with the LTTE's attack on the
international airport, peace making efforts ground to a halt, also
because the Government had lost its majority and another Parliamentary
election was scheduled for the end of the year.
With the loss of the general election of December 2001 and the
installation of the then opposition as the new government, the role of
the Executive President under the present constitution was subjected to
severe strain.
Co-habitation, which the constitution theoretically provides for, had
come about, decreed by the people. The way the President handled the
savage attacks continuously launched against her by the Government of
the day, especially in the Cabinet of which the President is the
constitutionally designated head, is another chapter in the saga of
courage that President Kumaratunga has displayed over the entirety of
her Presidential tenure.
The signing of the ceasefire agreement between the Prime Minister of
the day and the leader of the LTTE without even cursory consultation
with the President prior to signature was a dramatic illustration of the
impossible situation that could arise in the circumstances of
co-habitation. But, again, the President's focus on the pursuit of a
peaceful resolution of the conflict remained unaffected.
With the restoration of her own party to office after the general
election in April, 2004, a renewed attempt was made to reopen the peace
talks that had been stalled a year earlier.
The same commitment to the relentless pursuit of a peaceful
resolution of the conflict was in evidence once more. Although the
efforts to have the talks renewed were unsuccessful due largely to the
intransigence of the LTTE, who insisted that the agenda should be
limited solely to a discussion of their proposal for an interim
self-governing authority, efforts continued until the tsunami struck in
December 2004.
The conclusion of an agreement with the LTTE for the conduct of
tsunami relief operations in a limited administrative context is the
hard fought culmination of her efforts to engage the LTTE in the process
of working together with the government at least on a limited venture.
The conclusion of the agreement has proved to be highly
controversial, but as an act of commitment to the over-arching goal the
President set herself many years ago, of bringing the conflict to an end
consensually, notwithstanding even the break up of her own government,
it must stand as a unique example of political courage in pursuit of a
strongly held belief.
The conclusion of the agreement may be the end of one chapter, but it
is the beginning of another in which the President still has a vital
role to play. That chapter involves addressing as vigorously as she has
addressed the cause of promoting engagement with the LTTE, the task of
making it clear to the LTTE, and to the Government of Norway, that the
restoration of democracy, including the creation of space for dissent
and the promotion of human rights in areas presently controlled by the
LTTE, is a priority of the highest order.
The more than 50 signatories to the Tokyo Declaration should not be
allowed any longer to mollycoddle the LTTE which was required, inter
alia, by paragraph 18 of the Declaration to comply with benchmarks
relating to adequate Muslim representation, respect for human rights and
phased disarmament.
It is axiomatic that the conflict in Sri Lanka cannot finally be
resolved until the LTTE becomes a fully civilian organisation with no
army, navy and air capability. These issues could provide an opportunity
for building a new platform on which even those parties which have
rejected a tsunami mechanism could stand. Internationally, it could not
possibly be argued that the promotion of democracy in the affected areas
of the North and East of Sri Lanka does not deserve the fullest support
of all countries who practise democratic governance.
The movement for democracy in certain districts of the North and East
must begin to roll. If the Government of Norway is unable to plead this
cause with the conviction and determination that it deserves it should
stand aside and yield to other parties who could carry the flag of
democracy into areas where darkness presently prevails. |