Religion and politics in Central Asia

M. K. Bhadrakumar

ANY replication of the Taliban phenomenon in Central Asia could have far-reaching implications for the geopolitics of the region.

Three successive waves of political Islam have swept across Central Asia during the 15-year period since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. They appear dissimilar.

But they have common elements - the most important being that they all had extra-regional affiliations even as they sought to secure a habitation and name amidst the uncertainties endemic to the region's transition.

The first wave of political Islam appeared in Tajikistan in 1992 seeking to make the country an Islamic state. The Islamic rebels were initially concentrated in the southern provinces of Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube and were an indigenous force.

But, incrementally, they linked up with elements in neighbouring Afghanistan. By 1996 they were operating from within Afghanistan. Some leaders were moving about in Pakistani cities.

True, the Tajik civil war involved factions, but there were ideological overlaps of secular democracy, nationalist reformism, and political Islam.

A listing out of the parties involved in the protracted Tajik peace process under UN auspices (1994-96) is revealing - Russia, United States, Iran, Pakistan, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

The American perceptions of the Tajik civil war (1992-96) were consistent: that it was a power struggle involving clans or regional cliques; that it was engineered by Russia with a view to justifying its military presence in Central Asia.

The line of argument was that there were no Islamist elements in Afghanistan who were interested in a spillover into Central Asia; that the Taliban was an indigenous Afghan phenomenon that did not have any regional agenda; that the Afghan fratricidal strife was purely about capturing power in Kabul; and that the Taliban was in the long run a factor of regional stability.

With the dramatic ascendancy of the Taliban (leading to the capture of Kabul in 1996), however, Russia and Iran swiftly closed ranks and worked in concert to bring about a Tajik settlement, giving the United Tajik Opposition a role in the Government in Dushanbe.

Much of this was possible through the astute diplomacy between Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov and his veteran Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Velayati.

This led to a broad Russian-Iranian understanding over Central Asian security, which holds good even today. The Chinese-Russian "Shanghai initiative" coincided with this process. (The tangible signs of a link-up between Uighur militants and the Taliban began appearing by 1996).

The U.S. debunked the Tajik settlement as a patchwork but in the event the power-sharing formula worked to stabilise the Tajik situation.

American diplomacy continued to move on the same track, actively encouraging Central Asian states to forge cooperative links with the Taliban Government in Kabul - that is, until the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.

No sooner than the Tajik settlement came about, the Uzbek militants who fought alongside the Tajik Islamists broke away and openly linked up with the Taliban.

The period 1996-2001 saw the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (as it came to be called) operating from Taliban-ruled areas within Afghanistan and stepping up its activities inside Central Asia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in particular. IMU was the second wave of political Islam to appear in Central Asia.

Russia once again took the leadership to counter the militant threat. (The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was still in the making.) On the other hand, the U.S. approach was once again argumentative - that Russia was "exploiting" a non-existent threat of militant Islam.

However, the American stance took a U-turn with the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. secured military bases in Central Asia on the new imperative to forge a common front against "Islamic terror."

The collaboration with Al-Qaeda was certainly the IMU's (and the Taliban's) fatal mistake. In the American military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, IMU cadres were decimated. The rump elements retreated to Pakistan's tribal agencies. Some reports mention that they are presently in American custody.

Rise of the Hizb-ut Tahrir

At any rate, in the void left by the IMU, a third wave of political Islam has appeared in Central Asia - the Hizb-ut Tahrir (Party of Islamic Liberation).

Unlike the earlier manifestations of political Islam, HT claims to be a pan-Islamic movement. It subscribes to the goal of establishing a Shariah-based "Caliphate" in Central Asia, but targets Kyrgyzstan as the soft underbelly of the region.

The majority of HT members are ethnic Uzbeks living in and around the Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan), a bastion of Wahhabi faith throughout the last century.

HT remains in many ways an enigma wrapped in mystery - much like the Taliban was. American media organs periodically interview HT spokesmen, but no one knows where its leadership is based. HT is believed to be getting its financing from "Arab charities" and its branches in "some Western countries." The structure of HT resembles a secret hierarchical pyramid consisting of five-member cells, each with a leader.

No two cells interact directly. Leaders of every four cells are grouped as a local body under a `Naquib' who, in turn, belongs to a regional council headed by a `Muta'amad' (head of a region). The Muta'amads work independently under the Amir's (Supreme Leader) supervision. The entire arrangement is on a "need-to-know" basis.

The great social and economic upheavals in the Central Asian region provided a fertile ground to HT. It recruited its cadres primarily from the deprived sections of society - especially unemployed youth. (The average monthly income for a Kyrgyz works out to three dollars).

HT is most popular in the rural communities. Members are not required to have any detailed knowledge of Islamic principles but must subscribe to the Shariah-based goals of the party. Recruits vigorously undergo study classes stretched over several months on topics ranging from religion to world politics.

It is believed that HT has a parallel military structure. According to Western think tanks, HT's hard core would be in the region of 20,000 cadres. Central Asian security agencies put the figure as 60,000.

By either reckoning, HT is indisputably the single biggest cadre-based political movement today in the region. American specialists on Central Asia have begun describing HT as the region's "most popular radical Islamic group."

The Central Asian countries and Russia proscribed the HT as a terrorist organisation. Uzbekistan blamed HT for several incidents of violence. The U.S. nonetheless refuses (unlike Germany) to list HT formally as a militant organisation, given HT's self-projection as a force of enlightened moderation.

The regime change in Kyrgyzstan has focused attention on HT. Kyrgyzstan with its relatively free political climate is a stronghold of HT. With Kyrgyzstan's slide toward instability (amidst clan struggle, regional imbalances, extreme poverty, nationality questions and a fragmented polity), HT happens to be the net beneficiary of the "velvet revolution."

To quote the well-known scholar on Islamic militancy, Anatol Lieven, "In depressing circumstances, adherence to a radical Islamic network provides a sense of cultural security, a new community and some degree of social support - modest, but still better than anything the state can provide."

There is a contrary view of HT amongst Islamic circles in Central Asia. The leader of the Islamist movement in Tajikistan (where after all political Islam first surfaced in the post-Soviet space), Deputy Prime Minister Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, warns of a nefarious plot to "remake Central Asia."

He says: "A more detailed analysis of HT's programmatic and ideological views and concrete examples of its activities suggests that it was created by anti-Islamic forces. One proof of this is the comfortable existence that HT enjoys in a number of Western countries where it has large centres and offices that develop its concept of an "Islamic Caliphate."

Could the Taliban phenomenon be replicating as a seamless phenomenon? In the competitive geopolitics of Central Asia, bordering Russia and China's Xinjiang, the implications could be far-reaching.

(The writer is a former Indian Foreign Service Officer with wide experience in Central Asia)

Courtesy: The Hindu