The need for a joint mechanism
 

Political Perspectives by Mark Anthony

A joint mechanism for tsunami relief has been the topical subject in political circles for weeks. It was also a topic at several May Day rally speeches. Leaving aside the rhetoric the issues at hand deserve a serious political debate or discussion. Since the facts or details of the joint mechanism itself is not known, the current debate would have to be on the principles and basic ideas, ideals or policy that it entails, which of course are the fundamentals of the issues.

The background to the joint mechanism is that within fifty six hours of the tsunami striking Sri Lanka, or by the afternoon of Tuesday 28th December 2004, the Secretary to the President as directed by President Kumaratunga had written to Mr. Thamil Selvam, political wing leader of the LTTE inviting the LTTE's participation in the post tsunami relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The LTTE by Thursday 30th December 2004 had responded positively to the President's invitation and thereafter early in the current year, the Government's Peace Secretariat and the LTTE Peace Secretariat commenced a process of seeking ways and means by which the same could be accomplished.

That brings us to the current situation where four months of the year are gone and now the grapevine, political circles and the diplomatic community are all expecting a finality or closure to a process that began in the immediate aftermath of a national calamity and then took several months of discussions to bring to a logical decision point. President Kumaratunga has commenced an intense round of consultations with political parties, religious leaders and other stakeholders on the issues of the joint mechanism.

The basic thesis for a joint mechanism is fairly simple. The tsunami was a tragedy and a humanitarian disaster that calls for a concerted and united response. The victims of the tsunami were from all communities in Sri Lanka and in all parts of the country namely the North, South, East and West. The uncleared areas of the North including Mullativu were affected and require relief and rehabilitation. That process requires the cooperation and concurrence of the LTTE, a basic ground reality.

The uncleared tsunami affected areas cannot also be ignored by the Government of Sri Lanka for that creates the anomaly where the Tamil people are called upon to be a part of a united Sri Lanka but are not treated as Sri Lankans or enjoying the benefits of relief and rehabilitation from a disaster. There is also a humanitarian imperative.

Further the tsunami joint mechanism of an inclusive process with the LTTE is strictly in keeping with the policies that President Kumaratunga has always and consistently articulated. The President has promoted a positive non conflict engagement with the LTTE through an inclusive process. The mechanism seeks to do so. If leaked media reports are a basis to go by, the mechanism includes representation for the Muslims as well as civil society including NGOs who have been active in relief efforts.

The Muslim role or position in the joint mechanism becomes a crucial factor given that the Eastern Province was the worst affected and the largest number of victims was from that community.

However the mechanism creates a very interesting opportunity for the Muslims. For the past fifteen years since the first peace overtures were made in the two decades long conflict, the Muslims have demanded an independent or third party role in any process regarding the North and East.

The LTTE have previously resisted this move, but the current mechanism in granting an explicit role to Muslim political leadership actually creates an inclusive process that is perhaps the most strategically and practically greatest accommodation of Muslim interests.

Then there is the JVP factor and their fairly strident opposition to the mechanism. Their propaganda secretary calls it a stepping stone to the ISGA and hence they oppose it. Firstly a few facts should be considered in respect of this thesis.

The LTTE's conflict with the Sri Lankan State for a separate state was then moved to a proposed discussion on an ISGA, which was widely opposed and now the discussion is on tsunami relief, an even less and limited scope exercise. A failure on the part of the Sri Lankan State to reach an accommodation with the LTTE on tsunami relief would cast serious doubts amongst all stakeholders of the Sri Lankan Government's ability to agree with the LTTE on anything.

Then there is the seeming moral argument made as to why killers or terrorists, namely the LTTE need to be included at all. Firstly because they are a ground reality and have to be dealt with, they can't be wished away.

Secondly it is now three years since the ceasefire and the LTTE after three years of not fighting are pressing their claim to a political role. How long after the JVP stopped fighting the Sri Lankan State did they engage in political activities, basically also in about three years time after nineteen ninety or by nineteen ninety three for they contested the nineteen ninety four general elections, though under a different banner.

One can argue that a political role comes after disarmament and the counter to that would be that disarmament comes after a political solution, which requires political talks or negotiations. Working jointly together on a humanitarian endeavor of mutual interest and benefit to the communities is likely to build trust and increase rather than decrease the likelihood of success in subsequent political talks that would lead eventually to peace with democracy.

(The Political Perspectives column was born of the need for an analytical political commentary that moves beyond conventional wisdom. ([email protected])