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Need for an alternative Interim Arrangement

by Prof. Gamini Keerewella

(Continued from July 31)

In the course of conflict transformation an Interim Arrangement could be a useful strategic move if it is properly established in a correct context. Firstly, it is considered an appropriate arrangement to address issues in a transitional phase.

The transition from conflict environment to a post-conflict settlement is a complex process and it creates serious security concerns and vulnerabilities for both sides.

An Interim Arrangement will offer some space for the both parties to adjust to the new situation. Secondly, it will offer an opportunity to the both parties to test the Bona fides of each other.

In the conflict, normally each believes the other party is the cause of the conflict. It is not possible to dispel mutual suspicion overnight. The fear that the other will utilize the settlement to gain a monopoly of power prevents both from reaching a settlement. Thirdly, an Interim Arrangement can be used as a training ground for civil administration and democracy to militants.

On the battlefront the logic of war determines behaviour. Skills and training required for a proper civil administration in a democratic environment differ from what was useful in war.

Good soldier

A good soldier does not necessarily make a good administrator. While there is a division of labour in this regard on the part of the State, there is no such division in the LTTE, Fourthly, if carefully executed Interim Arrangement can be used to alleviate fears of the general public in the conflict-ridden areas and outside. Building of trust and confidence is necessary for the implementation of the post-conflict settlement.

The interim phase can be utilized to build mutual trust and confidence. Further more, Interim Arrangement can be utilized to dispel fears of the imagined consequences of a settlement before implementing the negotiated settlement in toto.

However, to reach above benefits of an Interim Arrangement in the peace-building process, it must fulfil six conditions. Firstly, it should be established as a part of an agreed political settlement for a specific period till the arrangements are made to implement fully the agreed political settlement.

Secondly, the composition of the Interim Council should be such that it must include all the stakeholders, political and ethnic, to enable it to have democratic content and practice.

Interim Administration

As has been mentioned earlier, even it is composed to reflect the multi-ethnic and multi-party complexion of the region, as long as one group is a armed, Interim Administration will not be democratic.

Thirdly, it follows that the establishment of Interim Council must be linked with decommissioning of arms.

Fourthly, powers and functions of the Interim Council must be clearly delineated and provisions made for the government at the center to execute its legitimate functions and responsibilities are to be in place. fifthly, it should contain in-build system of checks and balances incorporated within the constitutional framework.

Finally, any administrative arrangement should take care of the protection of human rights of the people in the region.

Challenge of resuscitating

Finally, it comes to the issue of resumption of negotiations with the LTTE, Consequent to the past strategic errors and blunders of the UNF government in handling the peace process the earlier confidence and the support base in the South as well as in the North and East for a negotiated settlement has now been eroded considerably.

Those who oppose the resuming of negotiations with the LTTE at this juncture argue that the LTTE has not changed its political objectives even after six rounds of talks.

What the LTTE had really done in attending the peace talks was to take the UNF government for a ride to get closer to Eelam. Further, they point out that it is not possible to talk with the LTTE on the basis of ISGA as it not acceptable.

In this context, some fundamentals relating to negotiations need to be highlighted. First, it is not unusual for parties in the conflict to come to negotiations without changing its hard-held positions.

They view negotiations as another means of achieving the same goal. In the process of negotiations, however, these positions change depending on the correct strategy adopted. Second, if there is no difference it is not necessary to negotiate and bargain over it.

Common ground

Negotiation is necessary in situations only where parties do not agree. Why the Sri Lankan Government needs to negotiate with the LTTE is not to accept what the LTTE has proposed but to find a mutually acceptable common ground by changing LTTE positions through bargaining.

In internal ethno-nationalist conflicts, no lasting peace can be achieved on the basis of a complete victory or defeat of one party. A negotiated settlement invariably implies to talk and bargain.

With the unilateral withdrawal of the LTTE from the negotiating table in April 2003, one phase of negotiations with the LTTE has come to an end. A new and structurally different phase in the negotiation process is to evolve with presentation of LTTE proposals for an ISGA.

A new government led by the Freedom Alliance replaced the UNF government after the general elections in April 2004. The GOSL cannot afford to make any more blunders in the next phase of negotiations which will be marked by a long and laborious process of hard bargaining.

A careful analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the peace process under the UNF government is very essential.

The weak bargaining strength vis-a-vis the LTTE is one of the problems that the GOSL may confront in this phase because Sri Lanka has already forfeited its many bargaining tools as a result of the appeasement strategy of the UNF government even before the hard bargaining commenced.

Political construct

The negotiations must be prepared to endure a rough and stormy ambience with the commencement of bargaining over substantive issues relating to a post-conflict political construct. It is essential for the Sri Lankan Government in this phase to view negotiations as an integral part of a broader strategy with clear targets, proper tactics, identified mile-posts, and, more importantly, strong fall back positions.

The sharp political brinkmanship that the LTTE had excelled in lately has been illustrated once again by the way in which the LTTE presented its proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority.

In the context of the present impasse in the negotiations, the challenges before the new Freedom Alliance government in Colombo in guiding the peace process in a proper direction so as to a reach a mutually acceptable solution to the ethnic conflict are enormous.

To achieve this tall goal a sophisticated approach with a clear political vision is necessary. To develop a proper strategy, not only to deal with the LTTE effectively but also in relation to the negotiated political settlement, a broader Southern political consensus, reinforced by an bi-partisan approach, is an essential requirement.

(Concluded)

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