Archives

 fast forward

by S. D. Muni, Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. ([email protected])

S.W.R.D. Bandara          ShriJawaharlal Nehru        naike

Excerpts from a Paper presented at the First Sri Lanka-India Strategic Dialogue jointly organised by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), New Delhi and Colombo, Dec. 4-5, 2003.

There were areas of sharp strategic divergence between Sri Lanka and India during the early decades of their independence. This divergence was evident both on global as well as regional issues. On the cold war and bipolarity issues, Sri Lanka displayed a greater inclination towards the Western powers as compared to India.

The Sri Lankan Prime Ministers and the United National Party (UNP) leaders like D. S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala vehemently disagreed with Nehru on his sympathetic understanding of socialism as an ideology and the Soviet Union as a rival super power to the United States. Sri Lanka had, at one time even seriously considered the possibility of joining the US led military alliances like the SEATO.

It was only after the emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and its charismatic leader S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike that some balance was introduced in Sri Lanka's strategic position. Bandaranaike also had an excellent personal and political rapport with India's Nehru as the two worked together on issues of Asian resurgence.

India-Sri Lanka relations have moved on a fast track for the past nearly one decade. In the process, considerable gains have been made in building economic cooperation and forging closer political and strategic understanding between the two countries.

The changed global, regional and bilateral context of this relationship has been carefully nursed for constructive engagement by the leadership on both the sides.

Sri Lanka is experiencing an uneasy cohabitation between President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, not envisaged by the founders of the 1978 Constitution (of Executive presidential system). But notwithstanding this uneasy domestic political relationship, both the President and the Prime Minister agree on building a robust economic and political cooperation with India.

The Indian leadership on its part also, without showing preferences in the Sri Lankan domestic political divide, has nurtured a mutually advantageous relationship with both the sides. It is possible to project India-Sri Lanka relationship as a model of productive engagement based on mutual respect, mutual advantages and mutual understanding between two countries of unequal economic, demographic and military capabilities in South Asia.

It may not be unrealistic to hope that while India will be willing to pursue a similar approach in dealing with its other neighbours, the latter will also derive positive lessons from Sri Lanka's experience in shaping their relations with India.

The most powerful and positive aspect of India-Sri Lanka relationship in the past decade has been their economic cooperation.

The coming decade is expected to see the deepening and expanding of this cooperation as the finer details of the proposed CEPA are worked out, agreed and implemented, as discussed in the previous sessions. There surely would arise difficulties on various dimensions of this Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Like in trade matters, Sri Lanka is already feeling the pressure of negative trade balance.

There are also differences of details on the proposals of strengthening connectivity, such as through land bridge, between the two countries. Both the countries will have to continue to display bold leadership, imaginative approach and constructive resilience to deal with resulting pressures and difficulties.

We discussed earlier the India-Sri Lanka efforts in sorting out the baggage of colonial rule. The issue of the persons of Indian origin in Sri Lanka has been finally resolved. There are however surprising claims from some of the LTTE leaders that nearly 46% of their recruits are from the Tamil estate workers.

Both India and Sri Lanka may have to closely monitor the political affiliations of the estate workers granted Sri Lankan citizenship under the recent legislative provision by Sri Lanka. The other issue of colonial baggage has continued to cause tensions, namely the fishing activities of the Indian fishermen in the Kachcativu region and their arrests by the Sri Lanka navy.

This issue has both legal (under the Agreements of 1974 and 1976 on Kachchativu) as well as security aspects (with the LTTE using the cover of Indian fishermen for ferrying arms and other contraband).

This question needs a humanitarian approach. India has been proposing to introduce identity cards for the genuine Indian fishermen which the Sri Lankan side finds difficult to accept and implement. Some Indian analysts have proposed that Sri Lanka, while retaining sovereignty over the Kachchativu island may give it to India on perpetual lease to help poor Tamil Nadu fishermen (V. Suryanarayan, The Hindu, March 10, 2003). Whether such proposals are accepted or not, the issue will have to be dealt with on a lasting basis.

Leaving it smoldering may not be in the best interest of bilateral relationship as vested interests in Tamil Nadu's can exploit political emotions stirred by plight of the fishermen and generate avoidable pressures on Indo-Sri Lanka relationship.

The biggest challenge to India-Sri Lanka relationship in the coming decade may arise from the unresolved ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. So far India has managed to keep a balanced posture on this complex issue. It has monitored the peace process closely and influenced it constructively without getting involved in it.

This has been done within the stated parameters of India's position that underline, Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity, a negotiated peaceful settlement without any active mediation or third party role (not to be confused with facilitation which is acceptable to India), a settlement accepted to all sections of Sri Lankan people (including various shades of Tamil and Sinhala opinions), and an interim arrangement which is linked to the final settlement. The possibility of the peace process getting out of these parameters is real.

It is difficult to predict Indian response in that situation, though there is no possibility of India playing the role of a spoiler if a sincere and lasting settlement seems in the offing. In that situation, the diplomatic ingenuity of India and Sri Lanka may also find a way out of the question of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran's extradition on account of his involvement in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination.

The sharpening of the domestic political divide in Sri Lanka following President Kumaratunga's takeover of defence and security portfolios under her constitutional rights has raised serious questions on the cohabitation and the peace process. India's response has so far been balanced quiet to this new complication, by emphasizing the need of broader political consensus.

But what happens in the more likely situation of such consensus is not worked out across the prevailing political divide? There is obviously not much that India would be able to do in that situation except to prepare for its fall out; wait for elections. The irony of the ethnic conflict and the peace process has been that the UNP which witnessed worst of the ethnic flare ups under its regimes may want to go alone in leading the peace process.

And in doing so, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's motto seems to be peace at any cost. How far can India's clearly defined parameters adjust with this, remains to be seen.

The irony of the present political confusion in Sri Lanka is also that absolute provisions of presidential powers and restraints on parliamentary processes were enacted under the UNP regime, the brunt of which is now being borne by the party. India will therefore have to trade very cautiously through these politically sensitive areas and maintain a judicious balance between contending political expectations in Colombo if it has to remain effective and relevant to Sri Lanka's peace process.

There is yet another complicating aspect of the peace process in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka in fact has been witnessing only peace without any meaningful peace process. This situation has helped the LTTE to make significant political as well as military-tactical gains.

With the flare up in the political divide in Colombo's power structure, the LTTE is in an ideal situation gleefully watching its Sinhala adversaries locked in mutual rivalry and confusion.

Expectations are that the LTTE will continue to desist from breaking peace so long as it can gain political mileage out of the rivalry between the President and the Prime Minister. But the possibility of the LTTE changing this course in the event of either the formation of a truly national government or further sharpening of political knives in Colombo exist.

The uncertain peace prevailing at present can be vitiated either by the LTTE deciding to exploit political confusion or any of the Sri Lankan adversaries provoking conflict to serve its narrow political interests. India's interests and Indo-Sri Lanka relations may be seriously affected by next Eelam war in Sri Lanka. It is not certain as to how would India respond to such a situation that may open the prospects of LTTE recapturing Jaffna and Trincomalee, even without declaring an establishment of Eelam.

India's attempt has been to deter the outbreak of armed conflict in Sri Lanka. With this objective in mind, India seems to have given a tacit approval to Sri Lanka's attempts to build "an international safety net". India's positive response to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe's proposal for a defence cooperation agreement is a firm indication in this respect. India has already been training Sri Lankan security forces and sharing naval and satellite intelligence for a long time.

Recently there have been reports of India's willingness to supply arms to Sri Lanka and help it upgrade its military facilities like the sensitive air base in Pallai.

The LTTE has taken exception to such reports and also to the proposal for a new defence cooperation agreement. One hopes that these are strong Indian signals to caution the LTTE against any adventurous move. But if the LTTE still decides to take a war initiative, it is not certain as to what would be India's logical response. Only time will tell if the IPKF experience will continue to haunt Indian policy-makers or a decisive move will be made by India to tell LTTE that no cost is too heavy to be paid for the preservation of Sri Lanka's territorial integrity.

Another aspect of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's "international safety net" is the role of international community in it.

This role certainly has a strong economic dimension in the form of an impressive package of aid and assistance for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development in the conflict affected northeast region of Sri Lanka. New Delhi has been uneasy with the expanding role of international community in the Sri Lankan peace process. This unease will certainly grow if the international community also tends to assume a military-security role in Sri Lanka to deter the outbreak of conflict.

India certainly would not be comfortable with an extra-regional military presence (beyond training facilities) in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's encouragement to such a presence may even have the potential of disturbing strategic harmony achieved between India and Sri Lanka after the end of the coldwar, except in the unlikely possibility of India reconciling with the erosion of its strategic space in the immediate neighbourhood by the international community for regional or global strategic considerations.

Thus we see that there are many slippery zones in Sri Lanka's peace process due to political uncertainties within Sri Lanka. Indo-Sri Lanka relations will have to be managed carefully in these zones as they have the possibility of eroding the gains made in bilateral cooperation so far.

In consolidating and reinforcing these gains, in addition to economic cooperation, cultural cooperation between the two countries may have to be strengthened during the coming decade. The prospects of increased connectivity and the dynamic role being played by the Sri Lanka-India Foundation in promoting people to people interaction and cultural cooperation will have to be strengthened.

More and more Indians and Sri Lankans need to be encouraged to study and understand each others cultural traits, political and social institutions and economic capabilities and aspiration. They have to be sensitized to each others historical bonds, emerging challenges and visions of future. A decade is a very small period to put this multidimensional agenda on a firm footing.

STONE 'N' STRING

www.ppilk.com

www.crescat.com

News | Business | Features | Editorial | Security
Politics | World | Letters | Sports | Obituaries

Produced by Lake House
Copyright © 2003 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
Comments and suggestions to :Web Manager