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Need for an all stakeholder peace process

by Rashomi Silva

Prof. Jayadeva Uyangoda, peace activist and head of the Political Science department of the Colombo University speaking to the Daily News said that the Government, the LTTE and Norway should broaden the peace process to allow all the stakeholders to play a role within it. In future the peace process should take form of a multi-layered and multi-structured process as was practised in similar conflict situations.

While negotiations between the Government and the LTTE should go ahead, at different levels agreements and discussions between the other stakeholders should progress.

Criticising the unevenness of the distribution of peace dividends he said most of the development plans were formed in Colombo without adequate consultation with the LTTE, a situation detested by the Tamil community. Those who are in the corridors of power should be more sensitive to the concerns of the LTTE and of the Tamil community.

He urged the Government to start a political dialogue with the President and the opposition political parties as the lack of political consensus in the South hampered the peace process.

He commended the current peace process as the most transparent process held so far. During the next round of talks which will be led by a militarily hardened LTTE leadership, the Government will have to face tough and hard bargaining. And the future round of talks will prove to be an acid test for both the Government and the LTTE.

The interview:

Q: What are the achievements of the on-going peace process?

A: The current peace process began in November 2000. After a series of military victories against the Government, the LTTE proposed internationally mediated unconditional peace talks. As a gesture of good will they declared a unilateral ceasefire for a period of one month and later extended it for a another month, but the then government failed to react to it meaningfully.

When there was a partial regime change in 2001 the conditions were conducive for the resumption of talks, the parties declared unilateral ceasefires and the MoU signed in February 2002 formalised and made bi-lateral the informal and unilateral ceasefires maintained by the Government and LTTE since December 2001, the absence of war created an atmosphere of negative peace. In the beginning the process was based on strategic military balance between the parties.

One of the key implications of phase I talks was that the parties had developed a somewhat shared conception of 'peace', that is both pragmatic and limited. It entailed to achieve what is possible, leaving aside contentious and intractable issues as constitutional reforms or modes of power sharing. The main access roads which were de-mined were opened up by the LTTE indicating, the Government-LTTE joint programmes for rehabilitation, re-settlement, re-construction and development are feasible in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

The biggest achievement during phase I is LTTE agreeing to seek a political solution to the ethnic conflict within the framework of regional autonomy. In the press conference that followed, the LTTE for the first time, publicly stated its willingness to settle for a non-secessionist goal.

The phase also indicated some crucial political transformations in the ruling Sinhala elite society. They came to accept the inevitability of a political settlement to the ethnic conflict and the validity of a power sharing arrangement in a settlement framework.

At a later stage in the process however, with the help of the United States and Japan, the Sri Lankan Government established a security net disrupting the strategic balance, on which the negotiations were initially vested. This was seen by the LTTE as a one-sided development. Due to the slowness of the implementation of the development activities in N-E, and the recent disputes in the military strategic balance, the LTTE temporarily withdrew from the talks.

Although there are no direct talks between the two sides now the peace process has not suffered a major setback instead there is a possibility of a qualitatively new phase.

Q: There are criticisms that the peace talks are confined to the Government and the LTTE and the other parties are left out of the process. How do you view that?

A: One might not be able to invite all the parties to the negotiating table at this juncture, but instead what the Government should do is widen the peace process.

There should be multi-level and multi-structured negotiations between different stakeholders. Norway brokered negotiations between the LTTE and the Government is only one negotiation level. Negotiations and peace agreements with the other stakeholders outside the table is what is not happening today. There should be an understanding between the PA, which is waiting to form the next government, and the LTTE. There can be engagement between Muslim parties and the LTTE. I think during Phase II, the Government should give serious consideration to the widening of the peace process.

Q: Recent media reports accuse the LTTE of carrying out a string of killings and human rights violations in the East. How do you view that and how can we prevent such incidents in the future?

A: The killings are a disputed thing and you never know for sure who is killing whom in the dearth of hard evidence.

One of the biggest shortcomings in the process is that we do not have a credible mechanism for verification, and it is harming the progress of the process. At least at this juncture, the Government, the LTTE and the international community should consider seriously about setting up a credible mechanism for verification, in the absence of such mechanism interested parties provide distorted information for political gains.

Q: How do you fit the Muslim factor into this equation?

A: In Muslim politics there is an interesting dimension. The LTTE has apparently made a strategic decision to negotiate the problems of the Tamil speaking people including the Muslims and as a probable secondary step they will discuss with the regional Tamil political entity and the Muslim leadership to grant the rights of the Muslims outside the negotiating table.

Q: But will that be acceptable to the Muslims, don't they want to retain their own identity?

A: Yes, the Muslim leadership say so. But I think the situation is that there is no political consensus in Muslim politics and on the strategy of obtaining their rights. Different perspectives in Muslim politics have not helped the Muslim community to get their rights even at the negotiating table.

Q: What are the weaknesses you see in this process?

A: One of the reasons why the LTTE pulled out from the talks was the slowness of the implementation of the development initiatives. In 1995 too one of the main reasons for the breakdown of the talks was the slow nature of the development in North and East.

Q: But was it not the LTTE which stood in the way of most development initiatives? For example, they did not allow the Government to open the Jaffna library.

A: The LTTE too is trying to gain control of everything in North and East, that is correct. But in the Jaffna library incident the Government has not yet apologised for the burning down of the library. I do not say what the LTTE did was correct, but one can understand their point. Some of the Government politicians were trying to make political capital out of that, and the LTTE prevented it. I think the Government politicians should stop making political gain out of the tragedy that broke out of the ethnic violence.

And even most of the development initiatives were planned in Colombo without adequate consultation with the LTTE. It is like extending the unitary state concept even after 20-years of war. What the Government ministers and the bureaucrats should realise is that there has been a war for 20-years precisely because there has been centralisation of decision-making.

Q: Do you think the Government should consult other Tamil and Muslim political parties in developing N-E development strategies?

A: The Government should consult all stakeholders. Nevertheless, the Government can't take advise from the other political parties at the expense of the LTTE. The LTTE is the main actor. Any government will have to come to an understanding with the LTTE in developing the North and East. And that is why the LTTE is demanding equal partnership.

Q: How do you view Norway's role as a facilitator?

A: Norway has so far been playing a fairly constructive role. They came here as a facilitator and a communicator between the two sides. They helped the two sides to come to this understanding. Norway has also been helping the two sides to overcome many difficulties, however I feel that the mandate of Norway is rather narrow and their role should widen. But it appears that Norway does not want its role to widen as they do not want their role to be over politicised.

Q: Can you comment on the role of the other members of the international community?

A: U.S. and Japan so far have played a negative role. They dramatically entered the process without understanding the complexities of the Sri Lankan political problems. The impression they have given is that 'check book diplomacy' would bring peace to this country, which is not going to happen. At the Tokyo donor meeting they decided the agenda, the dates unilaterally and invited LTTE to participate. The LTTE as a nationalist entity would not want international powers to dictate terms to them. The LTTE interpreted this as a hijacking of the peace process and imposition of international agendas on it.

Q: Do you mean that U.S. and Japan had better keep off the process?

A: No. They should adopt a different strategy. That is, to persuade the Government and the LTTE to accept international support for 'post conflict reconstruction', on the assumption that rapid economic development in N-E would make the conflict irrelavent.

The LTTE with its non-participation in the talks made the international community redefine their role. One possibility that emerges is that the LTTE in future may want the European Union to pay a greater role.

Q: How do you see the sidelining of Anton Balasingham and the replacement of Thamilselvam as the head of the LTTE negotiating team?

A: Signals are that the second round of the talks is going to be hard and tough. The process was led by a person who lived outside Sri Lanka and he was more subject to international pressure. Now they have a Wanni based leadership which has a military background. The negotiating process in the second phase would be directly under LTTE leader Prabhakaran. Therefore the flexibility they saw in the earlier phase will not be there.

Q: The analysts fear that the LTTE would bargain for a confederal state as against the 'Oslo declaration', if so how should the Government respond to it?

A: The Government will have to be very innovative and creative. In theoretical terms the LTTE would argue that they want a credible mechanism as an alternative to the separate state which they have been fighting for. They would want a maximum self role to be played by the Tamils and therefore it would be an advanced form of federalism, where the LTTE can tell the Tamil community that their rights as a nation can be secure in the new frame. As they consider their military capability as the biggest bargaining strategy it is likely that they may not want to decommission their weapons and demobilise their armies until a final solution is arrived at. And the Government will have to be flexible and innovative to accept that.

When it comes to a final solution I do not think that the LTTE has any illusions. It is very realistic to talk about an interim administration as there is no political consensus between the major political parties in the South. There is no way to constitutionalise any agreement without opposition support whoever is in power. Therefore the LTTE is likely to go for an interim administration based on 'Thimpu Principles,' which includes the guarantee of Tamil national right of self-determination in places of historical habitation of the Tamils and asymmetrical power sharing, (more powers should be given to the Northern and Eastern units.)

The Government would have to be more flexible and creative to accommodate a separatist political entity and this crucial round of talks will largely determine the shape of future Sri Lanka.

Q: Are you happy with the transparency of the process?

A: To me this is the most transparent peace process held so far. Previous negotiation processes held in 90s and 80s were not transparent. But in this negotiating process everything that is taking place is in the newspapers.

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The thin line dividing terrorism from respectability

By Prof.S.Ratnajeevan H.Hoole

Last week this column highlighted how high officials have played dirty games with marks at interviews. We usually pay these officials obeisance. This week saw student violence at SJP University. Being respectable folk, we shake our heads in disbelief . We dismiss the students as animals bent on wanton destruction. We cannot understand them.

What does a student who knows that these upper class games go on, do? Play these games hoping to be inducted into the system? Or blow it apart?

To examine this dynamics of power, let me take you back 33 years to personal experiences and draw from the life of Charles Ratnamuktan Alban Hoole, or Muktan, who passed away last Sunday.

Standardisation had just begun. Mahnavar Peravai, the first violently bent Tamil mass movement was gathering momentum. The leaders were graduates Ariam Thomas and Sathiaseelan who came regularly to the universities to deliver radical lectures, and Sivakumaran. Psychopathic policemen were in Jaffna on punishment transfer as if with the order If you need to beat up people, go do it in Jaffna.

Muktan, 2 others and I were waylaid in Nallur for no reason and mauled by some policemen led by an SI. Kicks below the belt left me badly hurt. We were asked to assault each other and were further assaulted for refusing. At my turn, I was reluctant but Muktan signalled that I punch him and I did so on his shoulder to avoid damage.

My father, a priest, lived by the law. We went to the Tamil SP who told us to take it to the OIC because "I would have to take action!" The Federal Party moved in and their lawyers initiated a private plaint for assault. At 18, my knees shook as the SI glowered at me in court. The case went well until the 1971 insurrection intervened and on each court date the lawyer came with the SPs certificate that he was on emergency duty. Our case flopped when we settled for an apology which my father felt we should not reject.

The law had failed us. I decided we had no hope in this country and must leave. But Muktan, being a cricketer and athlete, took an active direction. When a policeman who assaulted us came to Moratuwa on some investigation, he had him assaulted and bucketed. He joined the Peravai and used to go at dusk to Subramaniam Park for training (which at that time was mainly karate). Their idealism was fired by Israeli embassy literature on how a great nation can be built with little water. I was troubled but failed to betray him to my parents.

When N.M. Perera came to open the Insurance Corporation office across Christ Church Jaffna where my father was incumbent, police were sent ahead to secure the place by assaulting a few people and clearing the street.

Muktans operation was, armed with a sackful of stones from the side of the roof away from the street, to pelt the policemen. Not knowing from where the stones came, they became even more violent. The event was a disaster with only stooges present. Fortunately, my father saw Muktan and ordered him down. He was sent off to England with the help of our eldest brother, then working abroad.

In England, he had a religious experience that turned him around completely. He changed track to Theology, did a BA from Hull and an MA and Ph.D from MacMaster. With his marriage to Jacque, the daughter of Kenneth Guiver, OBE for leading The River Authority as it Chief Scientific Officer, his transformation from the Peravai to respectability was complete.

With his vision for transforming hearts and training minds for service, Muktan returned home. Almost single-handedly he established Baldaeus Theological College in Trincomalee (named after Phillipus Baldaeus, the first Protestant Missionary to Jaffna) and churned out responsible nation-building pastors. Baldaeus offers bilingual courses, has a not insignificant Sinhalese student section and is a role model for national universities for what good can be done with a few responsible teachers. Muktan and Baldaeus were a beacon to the nation.

In this light, what is the difference between Muktan and his many Tamil friends who took a different route? Between him and the students at SJP? It is a thin line. The difference I think, is the spiritual dimension. Unfortunately our youth are exposed to a warped spirituality that, instead of driving us towards inward reflection and service, is used to assert sectarian power.

If we can understand that, our attitude to terrorism and violence would be very different. Certainly we must never drive our youth without a sound value base to the point where they think that they cannot right the wrongs around us. For once they feel helpless, irrationality follows.

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History and story - telling

We must thank Mr. C. Rudra (Daily News, Sept. 6, 2003) for proving Prof. S. R. H. Hoole's point - that history is so badly taught, that it is mere story telling.

Mr. C. W. Thamotherampillai, my ancestor CWT, was born a Christian and baptised as C. W. Kingsbury. This is borne out by Manonmany Chanmugathas of Jaffna University in her thesis.

That CWT followed in the footsteps of Arumuga Navalar is a recent claim from 1967. Navalar is also claimed to have begun Tamil prose writing.

For Portuguese and Dutch missionaries had already translated many parts of the Bible in prose. CWT merely followed their tradition and had already published Athiyahamak Keerthanai (in verse) and Neethi Neri Vilakkam (in prose under his original Christian name of C. W. Kingsbury) by 1849, well before Navalar had begun his prose writing.

A. Tharmaratnam

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Two-part study session on conflict

The Christian Alliance for Social Action (CASA) has organised a two-part study session under the theme "From the past to the future-negotiating a political solution to the ethnic conflict".

These sessions will be a re-visiting of the landmark developments in the peace process in the past four or five decades. Accordingly, the first 2-hour session will be a close study of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, the Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact and the Thimpu talks. It will be held on Oct. 10 from 3.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. at SEDEC seminar hall, 133, Kynsey Road, Colombo 8.

The discussion leader will be Ketheesh Loganathan, Director-Peace and Conflict Analysis Programme of the Centre for Policy Alternatives and Dr. Jehan Perera, Media Director of the National Peace Council will act as a special facilitator. The second session in this series will focus on the six rounds of talks held between the Govt. and the LTTE since Dec. 2001 and the subject of federalism which emerged thereon.

It will be held on Oct. 31 at the same time and venue and the discussion leader will be Rohan Edirisinha, Director-General of the Centre for Policy Alternatives.

Participants may register by e-mail at [email protected] marked "Attn: Aimslie Joseph" by Oct. 7th. Study notes will be provided. Limited seats available.

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