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by Jehan Perera

Norway's special envoy to Sri Lanka Jon Westborg's recent visit to the Wanni to meet with LTTE leaders follows several other forays into the Wanni by representatives of the international community. On the positive side in the past few days the conciliatory gestures made by the LTTE in meeting with members of the international community, and reiterating their commitment to a negotiated settlement, have diminished the apprehensions of a breakdown of the peace process.

Jaffna civilians - uncertain future

It is noteworthy that within a fortnight of the Tokyo donor conference the LTTE resumed their dialogue with the Norwegian facilitators, and also with diplomats belonging to other countries. By doing so, they have minimised the possible negative fallout of their boycott of the Tokyo donor conference. The international community has also been gracious in its response. For instance, instead of acting petulantly for being snubbed by the LTTE, the Japanese government has agreed to build a modern hospital in Kilinochchi which is the LTTE's political capital.

Due to the international community's faith in the Sri Lankan people's determination to put the ethnic conflict behind them and, possibly, geo-political imperatives, the country received as much aid at the Tokyo donor conference as could possibly have been imagined. The LTTE's boycott did not deter the international community from pledging USD 4.5 billion worth of assistance. The most substantial condition placed on the disbursement of their funds by the international community was that the Government and LTTE should cooperate with one another in the peace process.

The LTTE's cooperative attitude after the Tokyo donor conference offers hope that the money pledged at that conference will begin to flow into the devastated areas of the North-East and have their multiplier effects elsewhere on the national economy. There are two likely reasons for the LTTE to change its mind on re-engaging with the Government in the peace process. The first is that the LTTE has begun to feel the pressure of remaining outside of the peace process. The LTTE cannot take the risk of losing ground with the people who want the benefits of peace and not be starved of them by a prolonged deadlock in the peace process.

Second, the LTTE have had their own internal differences about the best course of action. The common perception of the LTTE is that it is highly monolithic, with a military style decision making imposed from the top by its supreme leader Velupillai Pirapaharan. But in fact, like any large organisation, which the LTTE is, there are differences of opinion within it. A recent interview to the Tamil press given by the LTTE's chief negotiator Dr Anton Balasingham contained a veiled reference on his part to opt out of the LTTE's negotiating team if a continued hard line on resuming peace talks continued.

It now appears that the LTTE chief negotiator Dr Balasingham's more accommodative views on taking the peace process forward have prevailed. It must be remembered that it was Dr Balasingham's pronouncements at early rounds of peace talks that the LTTE was not seeking a separate state and was willing to settle for a federal solution that brought brightness to the entire peace process. The reports that he might be replaced as the LTTE's chief negotiator with a more hard line LTTE representative have been quashed by no less than the person rumoured to replace him, namely the LTTE's Wanni-based political wing leader S P Tamilchelvan.

As the LTTE's chief political negotiator it is apparently the case that Dr Balasingham has a sphere of relative autonomy to help or hinder the peace process. On this occasion, as on several others, he has chosen to help. However, accompanying this softening of the LTTE's stance, Dr Balasingham has also called for a redefinition of the agenda for peace talks. He has proposed addressing crucial issues relating to the harsh existential realities of the ground situation instead of pursuing guidelines, milestones and roadmaps for what he described as an imaginary solution.

Common thread

The public statements issued by Dr Balasingham on behalf of the LTTE after their suspension of peace talks have a common thread running through them. This is the call for a radically new and innovative approach to the peace process. His initial usage of this phrase was with regard to the LTTE's demand for an Interim Administration in the North-East. His most recent usage of the term has been with reference to the ground situation in that part of the country.

Dr. Balasingham's demand for a radically new and innovative approach indicates uneasiness within the ranks of the LTTE regarding the manner in which the peace process has progressed upto now. What seems to be most frustrating to LTTE cadre on the ground is their inability to run life in the North-East in a positive manner as promised by the federal system to which they publicly committed themselves at the peace talks in Oslo last year. And even after a year and a half of ceasefire, the LTTE's ability to deliver material benefits to the people of the North-East remains negligible.

The LTTE's inability to engage in effective development work at the ground level is due to a combination of factors. Perhaps most frustrating to the LTTE is its inability to govern the population in a manner that is considered legitimate by the people of the North-East themselves and by the outside world. Most of the North-East continues to languish in a state of destruction and underdevelopment, and yet the legal powers of governance remain vested in the Government in Colombo making federal-based power sharing seem a distant dream.

The LTTE's demand for a radically new and innovative structure for the North-East together with its demand for a focus on the ground situation stems from the concern that it is not gaining powers of governance throughout the North-East. When it signed the ceasefire agreement with the Government in February 2002, the LTTE may have anticipated a rapid progress to a situation where it dominated life in the North-East, either by means of an Interim Administration or through the joint committees that were established at the peace talks. But this has not happened, with the central government continuing to be the mainstay of legal governance in that region.

There is no question that the ground situation in the North-East and improving the life of the people should take priority as the LTTE insists. But the ground situation that it is concerned about comprises both issues of normalcy in the economic life of the people as well as their security of life and other human rights. In this context the spate of assassinations that are taking place in the North-East, and also other parts of the country, represent an abnormal situation and are a harsh reminder of the brutality of the yet unresolved conflict.

Issue at stake

The issue at stake for the past two months has been that of establishing an appropriate Interim Administration for the North-East, which the LTTE has demanded as a pre-condition for restarting the peace process. It might seem unfair that the Government should be called upon to deliver an Interim Administration to the LTTE, the contents of which have not been specified by the LTTE. So far the Government has made three attempts, only to the badly rebuffed by the LTTE on all three occasions. This is, however, more the Government's failing than that of the LTTE.

When the UNP in its election manifesto promised to set up an Interim Administration for the North-East, no one and least of all the UNP drafters of that manifesto, would have been thinking of setting up a joint committee to be an Interim Administration. But this is precisely what the Government did on all three occasions. It tried to offer a superior version of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) which is generally accepted to be an institution which did not properly make the grade ever since it was established. An unconstructive drama developed in which the Government kept on offering more of one thing, while the LTTE kept on asking for something else.

As the more responsible and powerful party, both in terms of creating the ethnic conflict and in terms of local and international legitimacy, it is incumbent on the Government to make the greater effort to resolve the ethnic conflict. What the LTTE has specifically asked for in terms of an Interim Administration is a politico-administrative structure. By bringing in the word "politico" to illustrate the type of administration it wants, the LTTE sent a clear signal that it cannot be a committee that makes decisions that others are meant to implement. Political power in the Sri Lankan context means hands-on power to decide as well as to implement. It is on these lines that the Government should be fashioning its interim solution.

Perhaps the Government also missed a lead as to what the LTTE was looking for in terms of an Interim Administration.

Even before the Tokyo donor conference, in a statement issued by him Dr Balasingham mentioned the Interim Administration that had been proposed in 1987 in the aftermath of the Indo-Lanka Accord. That particular body was never set up, but it did provide for an LTTE majority, and envisaged the running of the North East Provincial Council.

Dr Balasingham's reference to the abortive interim council of 1987 might have been to point to the Government the possibility of setting up an Interim Administrative structure for the North-East without having to change the constitution. This is another instance of a helpful lead given by Dr Balasingham to resolve the deadlocks in the peace process. It is a lead worth following on. But for this to happen in an appropriate manner there are two major concerns for the Government to deal with.

Governmental concerns

The first concern would be the Government's doubts regarding the LTTE's ulitmate intentions. There is a considerable body of influential opinion both within the country and abroad, particularly in neighbouring India, that holds that the LTTE is merely playing for time. The LTTE's unpreparedness to stop its practices of political assassinations of its opponents in the North East, and governmental intelligence operatives even in Colombo, lends credence to these doubts.

The second concern of the Government is the willingness of the Sinhalese people to accept an Interim Administration dominated by the LTTE at a time when the opposition is conducting a major political campaign critical of it. With an opposition alliance in the offing, and an anticipation of a Presidential dissolution of Parliament at any moment thereafter, the Government may feel it impolitic to offer too much to the LTTE at this time.

In order for the Government to feel itself empowered to tackle the issue of an Interim Administration for the North-East, it is necessary for it to either come to a bipartisan agreement with the moderate opposition or persuade the LTTE to moderate its actions and demands. So far the Government's approach has been to try and satisfy the LTTE while bypassing the President and opposition. The better course of action would be to include them in the search for a viable Interim Administration. The South African model in which all parties were brought into the negotiating process is an ideal towards which Sri Lanka should strive.

For its part, as an organisation that seeks to be legally recognised as the dominant politico-administrative power in the North-East, the LTTE needs to demonstrate it can be entrusted with the powers of governance.

This will be seen in the manner that it respects human rights and basic democratic freedoms, such as the rights to life and respect to ethnic and political pluralism. These are the guidelines, milestones and rules that not only the international community, but also the people of Sri Lanka would seek of their leaders of government.

Taking the peace process forward is not simply a matter of peace talks between the Government and LTTE aimed at sharing powers of governance. It is not only a matter of ensuring that the armed forces of the Government and LTTE do not resort to war again.

It is also about a new discourse in which the use of coercion and violence at various levels of society is abandoned and outlawed.

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