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by Arjuna Ranawana

The 24th of December, Christmas Eve 2002 marks a year of truce, the longest conflict free period this country has known in 19 years, and is seen by most as a healthy precursor to what could be a permanent peace for Sri Lanka.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam declared a unilateral ceasefire on the 24th, which was immediately reciprocated by the new government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. The truce was formalised by the Memorandum of Understanding signed on February 23.

In the conflict just 20 lives have been lost in the past year in contrast to around 2,000 in the corresponding period last year.

That in itself has to be a cause for celebration.

That the peace process itself has reached a crucial period is now a clich,. There will be many more points on the journey that will be crucial, but at present there is a ceasefire that is holding reasonably well and the outer limits of a political settlement, a federal solution has been agreed upon by the two belligerents.

The Government itself, through Chief Negotiator Minister Professor G.L. Peiris has expressed confidence that many conditions that need to be filled in reaching a final end to the conflict have been met.

Primarily, Prof. Peiris says, the two parties to the conflict appear to be convinced that there is no military solution to the problem.

To examine this situation it is necessary to delve into the recent military history of the conflict. The LTTE in the main operated at two levels. In the areas of the North and East it considers the Tamil Homeland, the LTTE operated more or less as a conventional army.

It held bases, ran logistical lines and operated a fortified frontline that divided the Sri Lanka Government forces controlled areas and the LTTE controlled or "uncleared" areas.

In regions it did not have control, mostly the South the LTTE operated as a guerrilla force carrying out assassinations and attacks on economic targets.

The overall strategy of the People's Alliance administration was drawn up through deliberations held with the military as well as Tamil advisers supporting the party.

Succinctly the strategy was to offer significant devolution to the Tamil-speaking areas in a constitutional reform package that proposed to turn Sri Lanka from its current form to a "union of regions." It was federalism with another name, based on the underlying principle that the country cannot be divided into two states.

At the time it was believed that most moderate Tamils would accept this offer thereby politically isolating the LTTE. It was believed that the LTTE could not accept anything less than a separate state of Tamil Eelam as it had motivated its cadres to fight for that dream.

Isolated politically, the strategists thought, the LTTE would be weakened to the point it will be able to defeat them or have their strength reduced through military action.

When the negotiations between the LTTE and the Government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga collapsed the LTTE broke a three-month truce by attacking naval vessels deployed off the Northern coast.

According to the correspondence between the LTTE and the President, the final disagreement was over the withdrawal of the Pooneryn Army camp, which is strategically placed, as it is one of the gateways to Jaffna. This is based on the letters released by Tiger theoretician Anton Balasingham in a recent book. These letters have not been either confirmed or denied by President Kumaratunga.

The then Government took the military option.

Operation Riviresa, the Sri Lanka Army's biggest ever military operation was launched in 1996, in the Jaffna peninsula which the LTTE had held for nearly six years. It was a success, and despite early claims that they "would never abandon" Jaffna, the LTTE chose to withdraw in the face of Riviresa's rolling thunder.

Taking almost all of the people of Jaffna with them up to the Kilali lagoon as a shield, the LTTE managed to remove most of its war machinery as well as its cadres into the Vanni by boat. They also managed to take with them into the Vanni a significant portion of the population particularly their hard-core supporters, the so-called "Tiger families" while the rest returned to Jaffna city to live under the control of the Sri Lanka Government forces.

The Government calculated correctly that it needed to hold the urban areas in the North as well as the East to counter the LTTE. This largely reduced the catchment for recruits for the LTTE and also cut down drastically its logistical base.

In the East, the Government abandoned the dirt-poor interior regions to the Tigers and held only the towns.

The Government forces then reached into the Vanni in an effort to open the A-9 highway and link Jaffna with the rest of the country.

This the LTTE fought ferociously, and the overstretched Government forces were rolled back southward up to Kanagarayankulam and northwards up to Elephant Pass.

Then came the three operations called "Unceasing Waves" conducted by the LTTE to take Jaffna. Elephant Pass fell, then Chavakachcheri.

The LTTE did knock on the door of Jaffna, going up to the Navatkuli Bridge at one stage and moving its heavy mortars into a position where it was bombarding Palali, the Government's only air link and supply line to the South.

Many analysts felt that the Army would be trapped and defeated on the peninsula.

That did not take place. The better human rights record of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in recent times and its beneficial economic effect in Jaffna meant that the general population remained neutral. The Army also fought back to roll an overstretched LTTE back from Chavakachcheri up to Pallai.

The brief, but disastrous operation conducted by the Sri Lankan forces on the eve of last year's general elections to push forward from the frontline at Muhamalai confirmed to both sides that here was a military stalemate.

The only gain made by the Army at that point was the success of the deep penetration group which had a psychological, if not military effect on the LTTE leadership by carrying out pinpoint assassinations inside LTTE controlled areas. This also proved to the LTTE that for the first time in the conflict the Sri Lankan Forces had developed a covert ability that they had not had to deal with before.

Velupillai Prabhakaran had seen the stalemate before the Government or its generals and offered several ceasefires before the abortive attempt to go forward from Pallai in December.

By then the mood of the people had turned against the war.

The people of the North and East have suffered most. Their infrastructure has been destroyed and their cultural heartland ravaged. The best and the brightest fled the country, and a generation is growing up overseas which is not likely to want to return.

In comparison to the people of the South, the Northern Tamils who have lived there right through the conflict have been reduced economically and socially. The contrast between Jaffna and Colombo is stark, the Northern peninsula looks as if it is a century behind.

These are factors that have built pressure from the Tamil civilians on the leadership to seek peace. In the South too the people are weary of war and want a better economic future for themselves and their children. The new government was voted in on a promise of peace.

The strategy of the Wickremesinghe Government has been very different to that of governments in the past. The Prime Minister took the high road, removing economic embargoes, quickly moving to economically reintegrate the country and opening up broad-based negotiations with the LTTE.

Up to now the negotiations have progressed well, reaching a notable point in the agreement on the federal solution in Oslo earlier in the month.

The international community has also backed the Government's far-sighted and bold strategy, responding with both aid and investment, even though a final settlement has not been reached.

But underlying the negotiations is the military balance. The Government has acted prudently, not withdrawing the forces from any vital area, while at the same time not insisting on disarming the LTTE. The Tigers too have confined their "Armed Formations" to barracks and have presented a "political" face.

It is this balance of forces that has helped keep the peace. In the past year we have heard the voice of the majority in this country, of all ethnic groups asking for peace.

Let us hope it stays that way.

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Copyright 2001 The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd.
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