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by Jehan Perera

One of the most positive pictures to appear on the Sri Lankan peace process was the photograph of LTTE chief negotiator Dr Anton Balasingham, Government chief negotiator Minister G.L. Peiris and Norwegian chief facilitator, Deputy Minister Vidar Helgessen. They were photographed together planting a tree in a suburb of Bangkok to commemorate the Thailand peace talks. The goodwill between the three was palpable. Each person in that photograph had brought unique gifts to the negotiating table.

The transformation of mortal foes into partners is a remarkable feat in any society at any time. The Government’s willingness to make the LTTE a partner in the affairs of the North and East and endow it with command over economic resources is understandable

Despite enduring some 20 years of brutal guerrilla war in the bush, Dr Balasingham has shown himself to be in touch with global developments in good governance, democracy and human rights. He has been the mainstay of the LTTE's negotiating effort, steering the organisation through a perilous ocean in which it has little experience. Prof. Peiris is a person of remarkable intellectual gifts who, through a process of trial and error, has been able to fine tune his thinking to understand and accommodate the needs of the LTTE and the Tamil people. Mr Helgessen has the qualities of a facilitator, refined, quietly humorous and with a subtle intelligence.

They appear to have been able to forge a partnership that was unimaginable even a year ago.

The terminology that the LTTE would be the partner of the government emerged for the first time at the first round of peace talks in Thailand in September. Those talks saw a major breakthrough in the virtual renouncing of an independent Tamil state by the LTTE. On that occasion, it seemed fitting that the government should consider the LTTE to be its partner and on the same side in the raising of international funds for the North and East.

The Government's reference to the LTTE as a partner marks a paradigm shift in the Government's approach to the LTTE. It is a shift that would be welcomed by those who have sought an end to the civil war that caused so much of destruction to the country and its people.

From the inception of the militant struggle to obtain Tamil rights and independence, the Government and LTTE have seen each other as mortal foes. Even during previous periods of ceasefire and peace talks, the competition between them did not cease, especially the efforts of the Government to edge out and marginalise the LTTE away from the sentiments of the Tamil people. The transformation of mortal foes into partners is a remarkable feat in any society at any time.

The Government's willingness to make the LTTE a partner in the affairs of the North and East and endow it with command over economic resources is understandable. From the Government's point of view, this would be the best way to ensure that its relationship with the LTTE remains within the ambit of the peace process and does not relapse into the past state of warfare. However, from an overall democratic point of view the question arises whether it is appropriate to make the LTTE the only partner in the task of rehabilitating and reconstructing the North and East.

At the last general elections held in December 2001 the vast majority of Tamil voters in the North and East cast their votes in favour of political parties that supported the notion that the LTTE was the sole representative of the Tamil people. This unusual democratic mandate clearly gives the LTTE a very special status in the North and East. On the other hand, it is also true that the vast majority of the Muslim and Sinhalese voters in those areas had no similar sentiments towards the LTTE, but voted instead for other political parties. It is in this context that the sole partnership between the Government and LTTE becomes problemmatic.

Ceasefire model

In fashioning the conceptual underpinnings of the three committees for economic development, security and political issues at the second meeting in Thailand, the Government and LTTE appear to be using the two-party model of the ceasefire agreement that they signed in February of this year. However, they need to draw a fundamental distinction between the two situations. The ceasefire agreement was drawn up to bring the war fought by the Government and LTTE to a halt. For practical purposes there were only two parties fighting out the war and that was the Government and LTTE. Therefore, the signing of the ceasefire agreement by only these two parties was fitting and appropriate.

However, the situation with regard to sustaining the ceasefire and ensuring that the living standards of the people of the North and East improve cannot be confined to only the Government and LTTE. The three joint committees will have enormous responsibilities that impact upon the lives of all the people living in the North and East, and this includes the Muslims and Sinhalese of those areas. While there were only two parties waging the war, there are a multiplicity of parties involved in the democratic life of the people in a post-war situation, such as exists today.

The recent incidents of mob violence in the east is a warning of the possibility of social unrest in the North and East in the future. When the power of guns was present it was possible to impose a certain acquiescence upon the population. But when the people feel that the guns are muzzled it is difficult to stop them from asserting themselves.

This has been marked in the case of the Muslim population of the east who are resentful about the land that has been expropriated from them by the LTTE and the taxes they have been compelled to pay to them.

Tamil civilians have recently stoned heavily armed camps of the security forces who had been oppressing them. More recently there have been reports of Tamil people who are defying unreasonable actions of local level LTTE cadre in taxing them and in forcibly recruiting their children.

Other concerns

A second area of concern is the growing feeling of being left out that is being experienced by the vast majority of people. For them the peace process is one in which they have become bystanders of a series of events in which they have no part to play, not even that of fully understanding what is going on. While this vast majority is satisfied with the ceasefire and would not wish to see its end, they are also waiting for the economic benefits of peace to come their way. But instead of the anticipated peace dividend, what they are experiencing is a constant rise in the cost of living.

It is natural that people struggling to eke out a meagre existence should begin to wonder what is happening to all the military expenditure that is being saved, and why it is not being used to alleviate their economic hardships. In the absence of information about the real flows of Governmental and foreign developmental assistance to various parts of the country, it is also natural that they would believe that all those resources are being diverted to the North and East.

There is a danger that parties opposed to the peace process will exploit the perception of the people outside the North and East and seek to make them disgruntled that they are being excluded from the peace dividend that is accruing entirely to the North and East. The Government and international donors need to keep this problem in mind and fashion some answers to it. The third area of concern is the hostility that sections of the opposition are showing towards the peace process.

While the Government is quite rightly focusing on rebuilding its relationship with the LTTE, opposition spokespersons are still referring to the LTTE as terrorists and in the old language of the war days. They have expressed their satisfaction over the Colombo High Court's decision to imprison the LTTE leader for 200 years for his role in the Central Bank bombing of 1996. The LTTE representatives in Thailand expressed their disappointment and anger at this decision, and some even said that there should be an amnesty for war crimes because they took place under conditions of war.

Instead of focusing only on war crimes of the LTTE, opposition politicians should turn the searchlight inwards as well. Successive Governments have violated the human rights of the people in their efforts to both stay in power and defend the unity of the country.

There is no question that those who have committed war crimes, whether from the LTTE or Government, should face up to what they did.

They should acknowledge what they did and pledge to change their behaviour in the future.

There should not be a sweeping or blanket amnesty for war crimes, simply on the grounds that they were committed during a time of war. If there is to be an amnesty, it needs to be a well thought out one that is linked to the reform of those institutions that engaged in such war crimes.Research from other countries that have granted amnesties after periods of social strife and civil war shows the danger of blanket amnesties which provide impunity from prosecution and accountability. They tend to lead the culture of violence within institutions, such as the military or the guerrilla army, untouched and unquestioned.

They can violate the right of victims to seek redress for the wrongs done to them, subvert the rule of law and promote public cynicism. These are issues that Sri Lankan society, in particular the opposition and civil society, needs to grapple with even as the Government tries to consolidate the peace process with the LTTE.

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