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by Jayadeva Uyangoda

There seems to be some considerable concern among observers of Sri Lanka's peace process that the cease-fire arrangements have primarily helped the LTTE. In their view, the rebels have regained access to and control of areas in the North and East that had earlier been under military control. Some critics argue that the government has not so far made any substantial gains from the MoU with the LTTE while the LTTE has cleverly utilized the no-war condition for its advantage.

Whereas the SLFP-JVP-MEP opposition alliance most vehemently articulates this point of view, many media commentators too share deep scepticism about the MoU and its consequences. In the meantime, in the NGO sector that basically defends the peace process, there is a growing unease about a range of issues including human rights, democracy, pluralism, the LTTE's expanding hegemony and the nature of politics in the North and East under a proposed interim administration. Curiously, the NGO activists have been less than enthusiastic about the prospects for peace this time around.

Even the guarded optimism which they have expressed during the initial stages of the peace process is slowly giving way to doubt, uncertainty and despondency.

This change of mood and of course the alteration of ground realities during the past few weeks is hardly surprising given the enormity of the task that is peace making in a protracted armed conflict. To maintain hope for peace, one needs to be a little realistic about what a peace process with as limited potential as the one we have in Sri Lanka at present can or cannot achieve. Indeed, when new complexities emerge in preparation to formal negotiations, hitherto unseen shortcomings and vulnerabilities of the process also become apparent. In such a context, we need to take steps to prevent cynicism from entering into our consciousness. A commitment to understand the political dynamics of peace, backed by a serious analysis of the events, trajectories and processes, can certainly help.

A colleague who has just returned from Batticaloa district told me the other day that some Tamil people were bitterly complaining about the way in which the LTTE has been spreading its control over the populace there.

According to her sources in the Eastern province, the so-called political work of the LTTE cadres, which the MoU allows them to carry out, is basically spreading militaristic propaganda, even in schools and kovils.

In one instance, while the kovil ceremonies were going on, the LTTE cadres are said to have shown, in the temple premises, videos of the LTTE's past military operations. The LTTE's Eastern command has also extended its network of taxation and extortion to areas to which they had earlier no access. Some Tamil citizens in Batticaloa are said to have expressed the fear that the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration, in exchange for some peace with the LTTE, was ready to abdicate its responsibilities towards the citizens in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Obviously, 'peace' has generated some sense of fear and it is a paradox that needs to be addressed.

What does one make out from all these negative reports of the peace process? Is there a way of interpreting them so that a better understanding of the unfolding processes could be gained? I suppose we can discern many things from them and construct a very complex picture of Sri Lanka's North and East under post-MoU conditions. Firstly, people, particularly the Tamil people, are beginning to be both critical of the LTTE and trying to be politically assertive. Of course, only a small minority would dare to be like that at the moment. Even they fear reprisals. Nevertheless, the point is that only under conditions of no-war can we expect the Tamil society and its citizens to take those very risky steps towards political autonomy and self-assertion.

The conditions of war, which influential sections of Sinhalese society appear to prefer, can hardly open up that space in the Tamil society. The war does not enable the Tamil society to re-discover its democratic politics or re-build its political community. Only conditions of peace, however imperfect they may actually be, could provide space as well as impetus for disenchantment, dissent and critique that constitute the first stage of resistance to authoritarian politics. We need to be patient about the dynamics of democratic emancipatory politics against a backdrop of militarized authoritarianism.

This point the peace-oriented civil society groups should begin to acknowledge sooner than later. In the rather inadequately framed conversation that has been going on among peace constituencies in Colombo, there seems to be some reluctance to appreciate what an imperfect peace could entail in terms of democratic transition in Sri Lanka in general and the North-and-East in particular.

By linking the future of the post-MoU North-East politics exclusively to the LTTE, they also fail to perceive how some new dynamics could emerge that might render irrelevant the LTTE's present authoritarian, militaristic politics to Sri Lanka's Tamil society. I personally don't think that the LTTE leadership, at least some sections of the leadership, is unaware of this possibility. Some might try to block it while some others might come to terms with it and live with it. A democratic transition within the LTTE, if that is possible at all, might even be a bloody affair.

Meanwhile, it is not very correct to hold on to the belief that political movements that have become exceptionally militaristic under conditions of protracted war are destined to remain static under protracted no-war conditions as well. Although many Sinhalese and Tamil critics of the LTTE argue that its militaristic authoritarianism is exclusively a creation of Mr. Prabhakaran as the so-called 'fascist LTTE' thesis suggests an alternative interpretation would be that the communalized Sri Lankan state and the protracted war have been largely responsible for the creation and evolution of Mr. Prabhakaran and the LTTE. If the Sinhalese society wants to see that Mr. Prabhakaran and the LTTE become de-militarized and de-authoritarianized or even politically irrelevant if they refuse to reform themselves, the Sinhalese society's accredited political leaders will have no option but to take a series of bold steps to politically engage with the LTTE. Only a cease-fire, however imperfect it may actually be, can provide the opportunity and space for Sinhalese political leaders to take that constructive and politically necessary risk.

Peace making is an exercise in immense risk taking, as much as the war has always been. The risk is multi-dimensional. A dreadful risk that is inherent in Sri Lanka's present peace process is the possibility of both sides the government and the LTTE returning to war in case the negotiation process breaks down. This risk and possibility is there, not because the government and the LTTE are inherently evil, but because it is the

structural logic of an imperfect peace process. The present cease-fire in Sri Lanka does not offer a basis for stable and permanent peace. It is merely a condition of no war. But this condition might fast approach what the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life) has called a 'zone of indistinction' a condition of neither peace nor war. It is a zone of uncertainty where both war and peace might co-exist in dangerous liaison where events cannot be predicted or controlled. This I hold represents the greatest risk in Sri Lanka's present imperfect peace process.

What can we do in this emerging conjuncture of uncertainty in Sri Lanka's peace process? The democratic civil society and the peace constituencies need to address this question with utmost seriousness. It indeed necessitates a qualitatively new political conversation among the peace and democratic constituencies. One proposal they might want to consider in their conversation is to persuade both the government and the LTTE to initiate a fresh political dialogue parallel to the proposed Bangkok talks that seem to suffer perpetual postponement.

In the worst- case scenario, the Bangkok talks might not take place for months to come. But, the government and the LTTE should not go back to war, even for tactical purposes. They should not give up the process of dialogue. Now the time has come for them to explore the possibilities for a mechanism of dialogue

alternative to formal, mediated talks. Inadequacy of dialogue is one defining feature of the present imperfect peace process that is slowly entering into a zone of indistinction between war and peace.

Propelling Sri Lanka's imperfect peace process forward amidst its continuing vulnerability requires re-examination of the MoU in relation to ground realities developed during the past three to six months. Given the fact that both the government and the LTTE have their own experiences of dissatisfaction with some key provisions of the MoU as well as their interpretation and implementation, the most constructive option for both sides would be to re-negotiate the MoU.

There is absolutely nothing wrong in reviewing and reworking an agreement that had been conceived, drafted and signed upon in some hurry. Such agreements usually have a life of their own. The post-agreement events, or the consequences of the agreement, have the tendency to render ineffective and irrelevant some provisions of the agreement itself. On this point, the editorial comments of the Sunday Leader last week were both perceptive and penetrating.

Against this backdrop, a position which the civil society groups should begin to articulate without delay is for the LTTE and the UNF government to initiate a joint mechanism to review the MoU while it runs its own course. This review process could function in conjunction with the preparations for formal talks.

The results of such a joint process can then productively be incorporated into the substance of the forthcoming Bangkok talks, perhaps resulting in a fresh MoU that can reflect and account for new ground realities in the North and East.

Meanwhile, opening up and strengthening of a multiplicity of mechanisms for continuing dialogue between the government and the LTTE has become absolutely crucial under the present conditions of an imperfect MoU and an imperfect peace.

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