Addressing concerns about treatment of surrendees
Prof Rajiva WIJESNHA MP
What is termed the White Flag case has caused much controversy over
the last two years. A number of different versions have been advanced as
to what has happened, and debate over this will not die down. Sarath
Fonseka, both when he was serving as Chief of the General Staff, and
when he was a Presidential candidate, is alleged to have made statements
about the matter, and government has also kept the matter in the public
eye through a case that has been brought against Fonseka. It is clearly
not a matter that can be ignored.
What seems uncontested is that several LTTE operatives, including the
head of its political wing, the former Sri Lankan policeman Nadesan, and
the head of the LTTE Peace Secretariat, Pulidevan, were killed in the
last days of the war. As Pulidevan's counterpart in Colombo, I feel a
particular interest in his fate, though he never spoke to me in spite of
several efforts to get in touch.
Intransigence
As for Nadesan, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which tried to help
me make contact, thought he was more inclined to talk than his
predecessor, and actually called me from Kilinochchi to say contact
might be possible. But that too came to nothing, and I feel that any
positive feelings he might have had fell prey to his leader's
intransigence.
To get back to his fate, it is also not contested that our Foreign
Secretary, Palitha Kohona, now Ambassador to the UN, was in contact with
those who were trying to arrange a surrender, and made suggestions as to
how this should be accomplished. What is in doubt is whether Palitha
conveyed this to the Sri Lankan government and obtained assurances of
safety.
Harsh allegations
On the basis of this uncertainty, harsh allegations have been made
against Dr Kohona, including a charge of war crimes. I suspect this was
done when it was rumoured that he might be appointed as our High
Commissioner to London, and the matter may now be forgotten. But one
reason I believe an inquiry is necessary is that his name should be
cleared of what seems to me unfair denigration. The impression sought to
be created is that he got involved, not because he was trying to help,
but because he intended to betray those who might act as he recommended.
I believe that to be a ridiculous charge, not only because it is not at
all in character, but also because the policy of the Sri Lankan
government throughout, as exemplified by its current relations with
former LTTE leaders who came into its custody, is to work with them if
possible in the primary goal of eliminating terrorism and terrorist
inclinations. Mr Nadesan would, if the SLMM were right, have been a
positive element in this regard, and Mr Pulidevan, who had also been
sidelined at the end by the LTTE leadership, would have followed suit.
Pulidevan and Nadesan
The allegations against Dr Kohona, and by extension the Sri Lankan
government, are not only absurd, the stories that have emerged suggest
clearly that they are false. Conversely, while it is possible that
Pulidevan and Nadesan and others with them did not carry white flags
with them when they emerged into areas under full government control in
the midst of heavy fighting, that possibility too seems unlikely, given
the communications that had taken place, and the different approach they
seem to have taken from the rest of the LTTE leadership.
At the same time it cannot be discounted that the communications were
part of a strategy to facilitate the escape of others whilst they were
distracting the forces. That is a possibility that, even if they had
known of the discussions that had taken place, which is not established,
the Sri Lankan forces on the ground would have had to keep in mind.
In the heat of battle
Assuming that this group of potential surrendees was genuine and
indeed carried white flags, it is possible that the forces they came
across did not see the flags in the heat of battle. It is possible that
they saw them but, fearful of ploys used by suicide cadres pretending to
surrender, they felt they could not take the risk of being killed
themselves. And it is also possible that, seeing a large group of
individuals who were obviously cadres, they eliminated them as the
Americans did Osama bin Laden, even when he was not a threat to them, in
the belief that he would otherwise continue an insidious danger.
To be continued |
