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by Harim Peiris

The political debate in recent weeks has been regarding the categorical charge levelled by the government and the minor opposition parties against the main Opposition UNP that it is in league with the LTTE, while the UNP has made an equally comprehensive denial of the same. The issue of a major national political party making common cause with the LTTE who is hellbent on continuing a devastating war for a separate State has major national security implications for the Sri Lankan State.

Some may be inclined to dismiss the links with the Tigers as an election ploy or cheap propaganda, but given the seriousness of the issue and the wide spread nature of its belief, the factors which underline the concerns are worth considering. Especially within the context that a Tamil Alliance is contesting the elections under the sole issue of being the voice of the Tigers in Parliament and that these same groups acted in concert with the main opposition party in forcing a dissolution of Parliament only an year after the last general election.

Initially the link between the main opposition party and the Tigers became clear at the last Presidential election when the Tiger controlled areas of the East voted en-bloc for the opposition candidate. This was in stark contrast to the cleared areas of the North, which was largely supportive of the winning candidature of the President. That lopsided voting pattern, i.e. Northern Tamil people supporting the PA and the Eastern LTTE controlled people voting for the opposition may in no small part be, according to intelligence sources, due to LTTE cadres on bicycles and megaphones urging a vote for the opposition together with their coercive power over people in uncleared areas.

The other factor that causes concern about possible links between the Tigers and the main political opposition is the strangely embryonic relationship that the two groups share with each other. If it hadn't been for July'83 holocaust orchestrated by the present opposition which was then in power, the Tigers would have remained a small group of perhaps fifty fighters carrying out isolated attacks on the State. It was July '83 that made Prabahkaran a general with an army. It also created the Tamil Diaspora, which is the funding and feeding ground for the battles, fought on Sri Lankan soil.

Subsequently after failing to crush the LTTE militarily, the then UNP government invited the Indians. When the presence of foreign troops on Sri Lankan soil was becoming a political liability, the UNP government armed and equipped the LTTE to fight the Indians, knowing full well that without the framework or even a discussion on a durable peace, that no sooner the Indians left the erstwhile allies, namely the UNP and the Tigers would turn on each other in bitter armed conflict, which is exactly what happened.

However what that experience demonstrated is the cynical willingness of the then government, presently in opposition to make common cause with the Tigers due to political expediency with absolutely no concern for the longer term consequences of their actions.

The consequences of their actions were that the LTTE now equipped by the Sri Lankan State to fight a proxy war against the Indians, invited in by the government itself, was much better equipped and able to fight the Sri Lankan security forces than before. In the present context the government thesis is that President Chandrika and the People's Alliance are an obstacle to power for both the LTTE and the UNP. The LTTE find the PA considerable obstacles to the perpetuation of their power.

The government has genuine credibility as a peace catalyst with the international community. Even the Northern Tamil person believes that the President sincerely desires to end the conflict and establish a durable peace. It has been the success of the PA's foreign policy establishment, now much more professional than in the pre 1994 era, that has really crimped the Tiger's overseas operational liberty, with key proscriptions and banning.

But if the LTTE was so endeared towards an opposition electoral win would not that be the harbinger of peace, one is tempted to wonder and then quickly realises that the requirement is for the genuine parameters of a framework for a durable peace, perhaps interim arrangements upon ceasing hostilities and thereafter a democratic process for change. A cynical creation of a common cause against a common political enemy based on the age old wisdom of real politick, that your enemy's enemy is your friend is no basis for a permanent peace.

The last time the UNP got together with the LTTE to drive out the Indians, the country only plunged into a further mire of misery and should they succeed this time, as alleged in ganging up together to drive the President and the PA out, the calamity for the country and the people would be much worse than on the previous occasion the UNP and the LTTE had common cause.

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